Thursday, December 23, 2010

Obtaining Leave of Court to Submit Evidence in Reply Papers for ‘Good Cause Shown’

In litigation, parties may bring motions for dismissal of the action or affirmative defenses, or move for ‘summary judgment’ (that there are no genuine issues of fact and the judge can decide the case on the law alone). Generally, the moving party puts forward all of its proof in support of its motion, including any affidavits, documents or photographs. The opposing party then puts forward all of its proof. At that point, it is inappropriate for either party to provide additional facts in reply papers, as courts want to give each party an opportunity to properly respond to the facts alleged in the original papers. It would otherwise be unfair.

Sometimes, however, additional facts or proof become necessary for various reasons. In that situation, the party seeking to provide additional proof must show “good cause” for having to do it.

Pursuant to binding Appellate Division, First and Second Department precedents, supplemental affirmations and/or sur-reply’s are permissible upon leave of the court with good cause shown, particularly where (1) the movant submits evidence for the first time in its reply papers or (2) “where the offering party's adversaries responded to the newly presented claim or evidence [citations omitted].” Kennelly v. Mobius Realty Holdings LLC, 33 A.D.3d 380, 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (1st Dep’t 2006); see Gastaldi v. Chen, 56 A.D.3d 420, 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (2d Dep’t 2008) (“The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in considering the surreply of the plaintiffs, which was in response to the gap-in-treatment argument raised in the defendants' reply papers for the first time (see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raguzin, 12 A.D.3d 468, 469, 784 N.Y.S.2d 644).”); Hoffman v. Kessler, 28 A.D.3d 718, 719, 816 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (2d Dep’t 2006) (“Further, the court properly considered the affidavit of a medical expert submitted by the plaintiffs in reply papers because the defendants had an opportunity to respond and submit papers in sur-reply (see Guarneri v. St. John, 18 A.D.3d 813, 813-814, 795 N.Y.S.2d 462; Matter of Hayden v. County of Nassau, 16 A.D.3d 415, 416, 790 N.Y.S.2d 404; Basile v. Grand Union Co., 196 A.D.2d 836, 837, 602 N.Y.S.2d 30; Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 164 A.D.2d 737, 739, 565 N.Y.S.2d 799, affd. 78 N.Y.2d 572, 578 N.Y.S.2d 115, 585 N.E.2d 364, cert. denied 506 U.S. 823, 113 S.Ct. 75, 121 L.Ed.2d 40).”); Anderson v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 31 A.D.3d 284, 288, 819 N.Y.S.2d 241, 244 (1st Dep’t 2006); Traders Co. v. AST Sportswear, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 276, 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-241 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“Defendants also belatedly submitted papers containing a security deposit argument without demonstrating good cause (CPLR 2214[c] ), which was improperly relied upon by the IAS Court (see Pinkow v. Herfield, 264 A.D.2d 356, 358, 695 N.Y.S.2d 20 [1999]).”).

Further binding Appellate Division, Second Department precedents hold that “[c]ontrary to the [movant’s] contention, the court did not err by considering the evidence in the [cross-movant’s] reply papers because it was submitted in direct response to allegations raised in their opposition papers [citations omitted].” Conte v. Frelen Associates, LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (2d Dep’t 2008); see Jones v. Geoghan, 61 A.D.3d 638, 639, 876 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (2d Dep’t 2009) (“Although the appellants expressly raised a defense based on the emergency doctrine for the first time in their reply papers, we may consider it on appeal. In the first instance, the defense was raised in direct response to the allegation made in the plaintiff's opposition papers that the decedent was struck by a van in motion, rather than thrown into the path of a stopped van (see Conte v. Frelen Assoc., LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258; Ryan Mgt. Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671; see also Kelsol Diamond Co. v. Stuart Lerner, 286 A.D.2d 586, 587, 730 N.Y.S.2d 218).”); Ryan Management Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (2d Dep’t 1999) (“The defendant characterized the evidence in the reply papers as new evidence not properly before the court. Accordingly, the defendant argued, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. ...Because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in its reply papers was in direct response to allegations raised by the defendant in his opposition papers, it was properly considered by the court.”).

In a recent action litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, the defendant submitted photographs of a sign with defendant’s reply affirmation, after plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion had been submitted, as evidence that the entrance near a certain street, within 50-60 feet of which plaintiff had repeatedly testified his accident occurred, was located at another street, thousands of feet away. In his reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not in a sur-reply, plaintiff requested leave of this Honorable Court to submit (a) further photographs clearly depicting the entrance gate at the particular street indicated, with an identical sign about which he had been testifying, adjacent to which plaintiff testified his accident occurred in his EBT, as well as (b) a supplemental affidavit from plaintiff, authenticating these photographs as fair and accurate representations of the entrance about which he had testified. Accordingly, as the evidence (a) was submitted with a reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not a sur-reply, (b) plaintiff properly asked leave of the court to submit additional evidence in his reply on his cross-motion, in order to respond to the photograph submitted in defendant’s reply on the underlying motion, and (c) defendant has availed itself of the opportunity to respond thereto, this evidence is properly before this Honorable Court. See Gastaldi, 56 A.D.3d at 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 751; Conte, 51 A.D.3d at 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 260; Kennelly, 33 A.D.3d at 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 266; Traders Co., 31 A.D.3d at 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 240-241.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, December 17, 2010

Striking the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action

When a former client sues his attorney for legal malpractice, the defendant-attorney/law firm will almost invariably put forward, as part of its defense of the law suit, the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations. In New York State, the period in which an attorney may be sued (whether for a tort [civil wrong] or breach of contract) is generally three (3) years from the date of malpractice. If the client does not sue the attorney/law firm within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, then the case is “time barred” and may be dismissed as having been filed too late.


When the defendant attorney alleges in his Answer to the law suit that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, it is essential to deal with the issue as soon as practicably possible. One effective way is to make a motion to the trial judge to “strike” (or dismiss) the Affirmative Defense from the Answer. Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3211(b) provides that a party may move to strike an affirmative defense.

Affirmative Defense – Statute of Limitations:

In a recent case, the defendant law firm asserted the Affirmative Defense that the legal malpractice action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss the Affirmative Defense. The motion requested that this affirmative defense be stricken, since it was alleged that the plaintiff-injured person brought the action within the applicable three-year statute of limitations period, as specified in CPLR 214(6).

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In the recent case, the allegation of legal malpractice against the defendant law firm was that there was a ‘blown’ statute of limitations because the law firm did not timely sue the potentially liable party. In that situation, the New York State Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 79 NY2d 777 [1991], the Court of Appeals held:
A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law §1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.
In the case, the plaintiff’s incident was alleged to have occurred on June 4, 2003. According to Public Authorities Law §1276, an action would have to have been brought against the LIRR within one year and thirty days after the incident. The defendant law firm was alleged to have failed to timely do so and the time in which to do so passed on their ‘watch.’

The Continuous Representation Toll:

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is ‘tolled’ during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

In the case, the defendant law firm was alleged to have continuously represented the injured plaintiff up until August 2007, as represented by the proceedings brought on his behalf and the correspondence between the parties. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations in which to sue the defendant law firm for legal malpractice for having missed the opportunity to have sued the proper party for the incident that resulted in the client’s injury started ticking when the law firm no longer represented him.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, December 10, 2010

Asking the Court to Grant Partition and Sale of Jointly-Owned Property

In a recent case, in which Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, represented one of three owners of real property asked the trial judge to grant ‘summary judgment’ against the other owners, granting his motion to partition and sell the real property at auction. In support of the motion, it was requested that the court grant partition and sale, in accordance with Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law [RPAPL] Article 9.

It was also requested that the court order the distribution of the net proceeds  from the auction sale of the real property to the parties in one-third interests, along with crediting the plaintiff for the moneys paid at closing when the property was first purchased.

RPAPL Section 901 provides that one who holds an interest in real property as a tenant in common may bring an action against the other tenants-in-common for the partition or sale of the property. The action was brought by Plaintiff as a tenant-in-common against the other two owners. The Plaintiff had to prove the following:

A: Plaintiff is ‘seised’ with an interest in the Property:

In the action, there was no issue of fact that Plaintiff had a right to possession of the property as a co-tenant, which is all that is needed to maintain an action for partition and sale. See, Dalmacy v. Joseph, 297 AD2d 329 (2d Dept. 2002). He was one of the three owners of the property, as indicated on the face of the Deed.

Pursuant to RPAPL 915, it was requested that the court issue an Order determining the parties’ rights, shares, and interest in and to the property.

B: Physical partition would be prejudicial:

Then, the plaintiff had to show that the property could not be physically partitioned in order to sell the entire property as one. In that case, a physical partition of the house would not have been practical and without prejudice to the owners, given that it was a three story brownstone. See, e.g. Cheslow v. Huttner, 13 Misc.3d 1224(A) (Sup. Ct., NY Co. 2006) (physical partition of a townhouse would be greatly prejudicial to the owners); Donlon v. Diamico, 33 AD3d 841 (2d Dept. 2006) (plaintiff established her entitlement to summary judgment directing the sale of the property because partition alone could not be made without great prejudice to the owners).

Based upon RPAPL 915, where it would be prejudicial to the owners to physically partition the property, the court should direct the property to be sold.

C: Plaintiff should be credited for the down payment:

Since partition, although statutory, is equitable in its nature, the court may compel the parties to do equity between themselves when adjusting the proceeds of the sale. Oliva v. Oliva, 136 AD2d 611. It has been held that a court may consider, among its factors of considering the equities of the partition and sale action, the down payment made by a co-tenant. Perrin v. Harrington, 146 AD 292.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, December 3, 2010

Plaintiffs Should Be Permitted to Amend the Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3025

Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3025 authorizes the amendment of a pleading in an action, including the Complaint of the plaintiff. According to subsection (b) of CPLR 3025, leave of court is needed to amend a pleading once issue has joined; however, it should be freely given to a party.


New York courts have held that, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the amendment of a pleading should be freely granted by a court. See, Kushner v. Queens Transit, 97 AD2d 432 (2d Dept. 1983); Sotomayor v. Princeton Ski Outlet Corp., 199 AD2d 197 (1st Dept. 1993). It is also well established law that a motion to amend a pleading should be freely given absent a showing by an opposing party of surprise or prejudice. Zacher v. Oakdale Islandia Ltd. Partnership, 211 AD2d 712 (2d Dept. 1995); Santori v. Met Life, 11 AD3d 597 (2d Dept. 2004).


In a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, it was urged that, since the action had not been pending for a significant period of time, and was not on the eve of trial, no prejudice could be shown by defendants to the amendment of the Complaint. See, e.g., Kopel v. Chiulli, 175 AD2d 102 (2d Dept. 1991). Case law has held that delay in seeking to amend the Complaint does not bar such relief. Haven Associates v. Douro Realty Corp., 96 AD2d 526 (2d Dept. 1983).


Finally, Plaintiff provided the trial court with a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to be served upon the defendants. See, Anderson Properties Inc. v. Sawhill Tubular Division Cyclops Corp., 149 AD2d 949 (4th Dept. 1989).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, November 16, 2010

Knocking Out Defenses Means They Don’t Get Up!

The Executor of the estate of a man who owned a mixed-use building in Brooklyn sold it to someone for $700,000. As part of the sale, the Executor agreed to take back two mortgages on the property from the buyer in favor of the decedent’s wife, the beneficiary of the estate.

The buyer (and now building’s owner) defaulted on the mortgages by failing to make payments on them to the beneficiary/lender. At that point, the mortgagee turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to commence foreclosure proceedings on the two mortgages against the buyer.

Once the foreclosure proceeding was brought, the buyer served its “Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.” In general terms, an “affirmative defense” is the legal term for when the defendant in a lawsuit puts forth the reason he is not liable to the plaintiff.

The First Affirmative Defense was that the Summons and Complaint were not properly served upon the defendant according to law, so the court lacked jurisdiction over the person. The Second Affirmative Defense and the Counterclaim alleged that the buyer was coerced into buying the property, having known the decedent and his family for 15 years. The defendant claimed that the conditions of the premises were concealed from it by the plaintiff and it did not have an opportunity to inspect the premises prior to the sale. As a result, the defendant claimed that there exists a defective foundation and water seepage into the basement.

Strike First!

Both federal and state court procedural rules allow for parties to a lawsuit to make requests of the judge to deal swiftly with certain claims or defenses of a litigant. These requests are called “Pre-Answer Motions to Dismiss.” In essence, the party is claiming that the claim or defense has no legal merit whatsoever for a number of reasons and, therefore, that matter should not even proceed forward in the case.

Upon receipt of the Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Your Court Street Lawyer brought a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss the defenses of the defendant (buyer of the building). This Motion challenged the legitimacy of these defenses.

Good service of process:

Attached to the motion papers was a copy of the Affidavit of Service of the Summons and Complaint upon the defendant from a licensed process server. New York law has traditionally held that a process server’s affidavit ordinarily constitutes “prima facie” [at first sight] evidence of proper service. National Heritage Life Insurance Company v. T.J. Properties Co., 286 AD2d 715 [2 Dept. 2001]. A defendant can rebut the process server’s affidavit with a ‘detailed and specific contradiction of the allegations in the process server’s affidavit’ sufficient to create a question of fact warranting a traverse hearing (citing to Bankers Trust Co. of California v. Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343 [2 Dept. 2003]). However, in this case, the defendant did not deny the process server’s allegations in an affidavit, but only in the attorney’s affirmation (which has no evidentiary value). Also, the defendant failed to timely move to dismiss the case within the 60-day period in which a defendant must move to dismiss on this ground (see, Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 3211(e).

No concealment charges against the Mortgagee:

The mortgagee asked the Judge to dismiss the Second Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim that the buyer was not given the opportunity to inspect the premises before purchase, and thus, should not have to pay the mortgages. The building was sold by the executor of the estate of the deceased person but the mortgages delivered at the closing were in favor of another family member, the beneficiary of the property under the Last Will and Testament.

Using the pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss, the mortgagee pointed out to the judge that the defenses were not permitted because they were directed against the estate, as opposed to the beneficiary of the property. Thus, under Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 3211(a)(6), the claim could not be maintained even though in the form of a counterclaim because it could not properly be asserted against the beneficiary. The Judge noted that the buyer did not join the seller of the property (the estate) as a party and could not bring the claims it was claiming in its defense.

In granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the Judge held that the defenses and counterclaim of the defendant should be properly dismissed. Kodsi v. 115 Bay Ridge Ave. LLC, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 33740/2008, 6/28/2010.

It is very important that, upon receiving an Answer to a lawsuit from a defendant, the plaintiff immediately review the Answer to determine the nature of any defenses and counterclaims, as well as decide whether to ask the judge to “knock ‘em out” right away instead of waiting until trial.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
"Your Court Street Lawyer"

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Saturday, November 13, 2010

Honors and Appointments

We are pleased to announce that Richard A. Klass was recently appointed to Co-Chair of the Publications Committee of the New York State Bar Association's General Practice Section, as well as Co-Editor of One on Onethe publication of the General Practice Section.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, October 5, 2010

Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale

Typically, the sale of real estate involves the signing of a contract of sale between the owner of the real estate and the prospective buyer for a certain dollar amount. Each side is eager to close the transaction -- the seller wants the money from the closing to purchase another property and the buyer wants to move into the house.

Sometimes, the seller/owner of the real estate attempts to delay or cancel the contract of sale for various reasons, including that another party has come along offering more money to purchase the property than the contract price. The buyer is put into a position of bringing an action to enforce his/her rights under the contract of sale to purchase the property.

The right of the prospective buyer to bring an action for "specific performance" is an important one, which is based upon an old, "common law" theory that real estate is considered a "unique asset," for which a money judgment against the seller for breach of contract cannot recompense. The courts recognize that a certain piece of real estate cannot be replicated or replaced with another or with money.

The action to force the sale of real estate based upon a breach of contract starts with the filing of a Complaint with the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located. At or about the same time, the buyer will file a "Notice of Pendency" with the County Clerk. The "Notice of Pendency" or, as commonly known as the "Lis Pendens," is a document which serves as notice to the entire world that the buyer is laying an equitable claim to the ownership of the property and that an action is pending to determine the buyer's potential ownership rights therein. Any person who later contracts to purchase the property is effectively "on notice" of the buyer's claim and is taking substantial risk in proceeding in any transaction with the seller/owner of the real estate.

After the action is filed, the seller will have an opportunity to answer the Complaint. Then, typically, one of the parties will move for "summary judgment," asking the judge to decide whether there was a breach of the contract of sale and whether the buyer is indeed entitled to the specific performance of the contract of sale. If the judge decides that the buyer is entitled to purchase the property, then the judge will issue an Order directing the seller/owner to proceed to closing and tender a Deed to the buyer.

It is important for the prospective buyer to move quickly to file the Notice of Pendency when it appears that a breach of the contract of sale has or will occur, in order to ensure that there is constructive notice of the action for specific performance; otherwise, the buyer, albeit entitled to money damages, will no longer have the right to the property.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2004 and 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.



License Information

Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words "reprint permission request" in the subject line of the email.



Publishing Guidelines

Permission is granted to publish this article electronically in free-only publications, like a website or ezine (print and non-free publications require permission) as long as the resource box is included without any modifications. All links must be active. A courtesy copy is requested on publication (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com).

Article Title:
Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale

Article URL:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2004.html

Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com

Author's Firm's Website:
www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Word Count:
481 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]

* * *

Resource Box

About the Author:
Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Read the original article in context at:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2004.html

Additional articles by Mr. Klass may be found at: http://courtstreetlaw.com/articles/index.html.
Back issues from Mr. Klass' quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available at http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/index.html.
Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.

* * *

Wednesday, September 22, 2010

Announcing a Special Public Seminar on Bankruptcy

Bankruptcy Basics: a primer for the public
Moderated by Richard A. Klass

October 19, 2010
6 - 8 pm

Brooklyn Bar Association Meeting Hall
123 Remsen Street, Brooklyn Heights, New York

Topics will include:
1. Overview of the Bankruptcy Process
2. Differences between Chapter 7 (Liquidation) and Chapter 13 (Reorganization)
3. What to Expect at the Meeting of Creditors
4. The Automatic Stay: the Bankruptcy Law's "Stop Sign"
5. Discharging Debts (and what is not dischargeable)
6. Questions and Answers

Moderator:
Richard A. Klass

Speakers:
Hon. Elizabeth S. Stong
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York

David J. Doyaga, Sr.
Doyaga & Schaefer

Mary Fox
Pro Se Bankruptcy Law Clerk
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York

Light refreshments will be served.

To reserve a seat and for more information,
please contact:
Avery Eli Okin, Esq., CAE
E-mail: aokin@brooklynbar.org
Phone: (718) 624-0675

Directions:
By Subway:
2, 3, 4 or 5 to Borough Hall
A, C or F to Jay Street
M or R to Court Street

This program is a joint presentation of:
The Brooklyn Bar Association, The Brooklyn Bar Association Foundation, Inc., The Brooklyn Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Project, Inc., and the Brooklyn Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service.

This program does not provide CLE credit.


-----------
copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

-----------
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, September 1, 2010

The Significance of "ECF" [Electronic Case Filing] in the Courts

The above headline seems a strange topic for this blog. It does not address a particular area of law, or seem to relate to most people other than lawyers. However, this is not so, and is an important development of which the general public should be aware.

Only until a couple of years ago, the "modus operandi" of various activities relating to a court case, ranging from filing the initial papers to researching archived files, was to make a trip to the actual courthouse. That traditional courthouse is rapidly being replaced with the "virtual" courthouse.

The general process is that documents are uploaded from an attorney's computer (typically in "Adobe" format) to the court's server for electronic filing. Once uploaded, the file becomes a part of the court's case file. The court also provides a manner in which people who either do not have a computer or do not have internet access can either deliver a diskette to the clerk or scan documents into terminals at the courthouse.

For security purposes, each attorney is given a password to permit access. That access password must be protected, as it is treated the same as an attorney's signature.

In 2003, when I first wrote this article, Electronic Case Filing had begun to be used as the only method filing in several New York area courts, including the Bankruptcy Courts, the federal District Courts, and a pilot project in a couple of New York State Supreme Courts.

ECF has significant benefits for various interested parties:
1. The courthouse eliminates almost all paper storage of files, along with court personnel associated with file handling.
2. Files or papers will not be lost, misplaced, or destroyed; unfortunately, these problems have been routine occurrences.
3. Attorney and non-attorney filers are able to file documents at any time, even when the courthouse is closed.
4. The public is able to view any filed document in an electronic case file at any time and from any place.
5. Judges are able to easily review documents.
The ability to view documents online from anywhere is probably the most important part of the ECF evolution. The instantaneous viewing of documents can be a tremendous advantage in making decisions. For instance, the viewing of a debtor's bankruptcy petition online moments after it is filed can afford a creditor sufficient time to determine whether to discharge or whether its claim has been properly listed. Further, the creditor may obtain information on property co-owned by the debtor with a non-filing party. Another example is that ECF access provides the opportunity to verify information given by a credit applicant.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2003 and 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

New Property Registration System Helps New York City Owners

Last month, New York City went operational with its new “Notice of Recorded Document” System, as part of ACRIS [Automated City Register Information System]. As many people are already aware, several years ago, New York City started electronic recordation of deeds, mortgages, and other types of instruments pertaining to real estate, including buildings, houses, condominiums and cooperative apartments. ACRIS was designed to make these recorded instruments easily accessible to the public.

Now, the City Register has taken the ACRIS program a significant step forward, by introducing the Notice of Recorded Document System. The system allows users to log in at http://a836-acris.nyc.gov/nrd/ and register with the website. Registrants are limited to those with an interest in the subject property, such as owners, lienors, managing agents and executors/administrators.

The user can register to receive notification by email or text of any instrument recorded against the subject property. This may be very useful in preventing deed theft, mortgage fraud or loss of interests in the property.



Partial screen of the new "Notice of Recorded Document" System,

part of ACRIS, at http://a836-acris.nyc.gov/nrd/ .




— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010

The $1.2 Million Shopping Disaster

At her local supermarket, a shopper bought her groceries and started to walk out the front door of the market with her cart. As she walked out, the entire door at the exit came unhinged from the frame and slammed down on her. The door managed to slice off the rear portion of her leg, taking out part of her calf. The result was a painful ordeal, requiring extensive medical treatment.

The shopper decided to retain Richard A. Klass, “Your Court Street Lawyer,” to pursue her claim for personal injuries based upon the negligence of the supermarket. An action was brought in the Supreme Court, Kings County against the supermarket, alleging negligence for the fallen door.


Res Ipsa Loquitur:

The Latin term “Res Ipsa Loquitur” means the “thing speaks for itself.” It refers to the legal principle that a court may infer negligence when the nature of the accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen without negligence. In New York, the general rule is that an injured party can establish this claim against the defendant/liable party by proving three elements:
1. The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and
3. It must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.
Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Authority, 67 NY2d 219 [1986].
The circumstances of this injury fit well within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It certainly could be said that doors to supermarkets do not completely come unhinged without negligence.


Structured Settlement:

On the eve of trial, the defendant was eager to settle the case, given the likelihood that a charge of res ipsa loquitur would be given. The parties discussed settlement in terms of a “structured settlement,” which would allow the defendant’s insurance carrier to pay less money but would maximize the money for the injured shopper.

Structured settlements are those where the settling party purchases an insurance product, typically an annuity policy, that pay the injured person a certain amount of moneys per year over a certain number of years. The benefit for the settling party is the payment of a reduced present-value amount for the policy instead of a higher lump-sum payment. It can also be attractive to an injured person since it will generally be guaranteed tax-free income payable over a period of years and allow for settlement of the claim instead of the risk of losing at trial.

The injured shopper settled the case with the defendant supermarket for $1.2 million, with a structured settlement, which will provide her with sufficient income for a very long time.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Art credits: Anatomy of the Human Body (Figure 438). 1918, by Henry Gray (1825–1861)
copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, July 19, 2010

The Importance of Saving Proof of Payment

In 1994, tax payments were made to the NYC Department of Finance for several parcels of real property by a client. In 2001, unbeknownst to the client, the Department of Finance unilaterally reversed the payments made, added interest, created tax liens, and bundled up the liens for public auction sale.

My firm commenced an action against the City of New York in 2002, after learning of the tax lien sales, to declare that the payments made in 1994 had truly been made, and that the Department of Finance acted without authority in reversing the credits. Luckily for the client, he saved the receipts issued by the Department of Finance when he made the payments in 1994 (which receipts are stamped onto the tax bills and actually given to the taxpayer).

The case culminated with the City of New York agreeing to reverse all of the unauthorized charges in 2001, reversing the tax lien sales, and clearing the tax delinquencies on the client's account. A Win!What does this teach? The importance of retaining proof of payment in various situations. Here, proof of payment was crucial in winning the case.

Common proofs of payment include a check or credit card statement, showing that the bill was paid. Other forms of proof may be a store receipt, credit card receipt, or paid invoice. If cash is tendered, a signed receipt should be obtained.

The general rule of thumb is that most business records should be maintained for safekeeping for seven years. Many advocate saving records for much longer, if feasible given space considerations.

The ability to prove payment of a debt or bill comes in handy in various situations, including:

1. Many parents pay the custodial parent their child support payments by cash; sometimes, the custodial parent has kept poor records, and will allege non-payment. The burden of proving payment will fall upon the person charged with making the support payments.

2. Distribution companies, such as food wholesalers, will have the drivers pick up payments at the time of making delivery of goods. The driver may not account for the payments, and the store will be forced to show payment of the invoices.

3. Tenants of smaller rental buildings or two-family houses will pay the landlord (who generally lives at the building) by cash and fail to obtain a rent receipt. Afterwards, the landlord may commence an action for non-payment in the Housing Court, and the tenant will be without proof of payment of the rent.

Since the general burden of proof of payment falls upon the person liable for the same, it is critical that proof be obtained at the first instance and maintained. This will ensure that later mistakes or intentional denials of payment are disproved.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, May 26, 2010

The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction

Almost every parcel of real property within New York City is assessed taxes on an annual basis. When these real estate taxes are not paid, tax liens are created by law which "attach" to the property. The tax lien, similar to other liens, serves as notice to the public that the City has a claim against the property. Traditionally, New York City was enabled by statute to bring "in rem" proceedings to foreclose on the lien and, thus, become the owner of the property.

In 1996, New York City's Administrative Code was amended to include an article permitting the City to sell at auction these real estate tax liens. This was done partly to shift the administrative burden of collecting the tax liens outside of the City's system; it was also partly done to get the City immediate money from the sale of the liens from third parties.

The change of process from "in rem" proceedings to the sale of tax liens, affects owners of real property against which tax liens exist in important ways:

1. Unlike in the past, where the City may have been perceived as almost lethargic in collecting the tax arrears, this new process motivates the purchaser of the tax lien to immediately take action to collect on the lien, including the bringing of a foreclosure action in the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located.

2. The statute gives the purchaser of the tax lien a high rate of interest on the tax lien until paid, plus an award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses for the prosecution of the foreclosure action.

3. Once the tax lien is sold, it is removed from the records of the City. Unless the homeowner inspects the tax lien records in the City Register's office, the tax lien information will not appear on the owner's tax bill. This may cause confusion, with the assumption that no older tax arrears are due.

Prior to the sale of a tax lien, the City is required to provide notice to the owner of the subject property and to the public. The owner will be sent notice by mail at the registered address for such owner (which, in some cases, may be different than the property's address). The public will receive notice by virtue of advertisements of the sale published in newspapers.

Once the tax lien is sold, the purchaser will send notification to the owner of the property. Further, the purchaser will afford the owner the opportunity to satisfy the lien prior to the commencement of a foreclosure action. In the event that payment is not made, a foreclosure action will be commenced for the unpaid tax arrears as indicated in the tax lien, along with a request for interest and attorney's fees. After a Judgment of Foreclosure is entered, the property will be auctioned off to first satisfy the lien and, then, to pay off junior lienors. Any surplus moneys left over will be turned over to the owner of record.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
©2003 Richard A. Klass


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This article was originally published in the legal newsletter LawCURRENTS.
The firm's website: CourtstreetLaw.com
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


License Information

Creative Commons License
The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words "reprint permission request" in the subject line of the email.

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Article Title:
The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction


Article URL:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2003.html


Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.


Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com


Author's Firm's Website:
www.CourtStreetLaw.com


Word Count:
504 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]
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Resource Box

About the Author:
Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


Read the original article in context at:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2003.html
Additional articles by Mr. Klass may be found at: http://courtstreetlaw.com/articles/index.html.
Back issues from Mr. Klass' quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available at http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/index.html.

Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.

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