Tuesday, December 17, 2013

Good Guy Guaranty and Surrender Dates

When a tenant enters into a lease, they agree to pay all rent sums and in some cases additional rent as they become due and owing. When a tenant defaults on a lease, New York law does not require a landlord to mitigate their damages if they elect not to re-let the space, and the tenant remains liable for unpaid rent throughout the duration of the lease term.

Commercial leases executed between the landlord and tenant often include a personal guaranty executed by the tenant personally to ensure the payment of rent. A “Good Guy Guaranty” is a document executed by an individual or individuals of a corporation leasing space which, on the one hand, protects the tenant by limiting their liability under the lease in the event of default, and on the other hand, protects the landlord by allowing them to proceed against an individual person for any non-payment of rent that may accrue during the lease term.

In any scenario, Good Guy Guaranty generally apply to obligations that have accrued prior to the surrender of the leased space, and the accrued obligation remains due and owing even after the tenant has vacated the space. Russo v. Heller, 80 A.D.3d 531.

The surrender of the space, also known as the “Surrender Date” in a Good Guy Guaranty is a defined event in the guaranty that a guarantor/tenant is required to follow in order to limit his liability under the lease. Although the landlord cannot utilize a “hyper-technical interpretation” of the Surrender Date requirements, a tenant remains required to follow the conditions specified in the guaranty to surrender the space and thereby end any further personal obligations under the lease. 150 Broadway v. Shandell, 27 Misc.3d 1234(A).

If the tenant fails to abide by the terms of the Good Guy Guaranty, he may likely remain obligated for rent that will continue to accrue even after the tenant surrendered the space to the landlord. Broadway 36th Realty, LLC v. London, 29 Misc.3d 1238(A).

In Broadway, the “Surrender Date was defined as follows: “The date that Tenant shall have performed all of the following: (a) vacated and surrendered the demised premises to the Landlord free of all subleases or licensees and in broom clean condition (b) delivered the keys to the doors to the demised premises to Landlord, and (c) paid all sums due and payable under the Lease as Base Annual Rent or Additional Rent or other such charges to Landlord up until the date of (a) and (b) above.

In Broadway, the Court determined that since there were outstanding payments of additional rent due and owing, the tenant failed to comply with the requirements of the Surrender Date and the limitation of liability pursuant to the Good Guy Guaranty would not apply, thus tenant is liable for all rent that will accrue for the remainder of the lease term. Broadway at *5.

In this case, the Good Guy Guaranty provides as follows:
“Guarantor hereby absolutely, unconditionally, and irrevocably personally guarantees to Owner the full and prompt payment of rent due under the Lease payable by Tenant, its successors and assigns and the performance of all of Tenant’s other obligations under the Lease (including, without limitation, Tenant’s obligation to insure that the security deposit held in connection with the Lease shall be equal to the amount as required under the Lease). Notwithstanding the foregoing, if Tenant has performed all of its obligations under the Lease and is not in default AFTER August 1, 2011 (or if Tenant is in default but cures such default before the expiration of the applicable grace, notice and cure period), then the obligations of Guarantor thereafter shall only extend through the period up to and including the Surrender Date.’
The definition of Surrender Date pursuant to the lease is as follows:
“The date upon which Tenant shall have: (a) vacated, and caused all subtenants, assignees, and other parties claiming through or under tenant (other than those that have entered into a written occupancy agreement with Owner) to have vacated the demised premises and surrendered the same in the condition required pursuant to the Lease; (b) delivered all keys to the demised premises to Owner (c) executed and delivered to Owner an agreement pursuant to which Tenant agrees that the lease and any right of tenant to use or occupy the demised premises have terminated; and (d) all of Tenant’s obligations under the Lease shall have been performed including, without limitation, payment of all Rent then due and owing (the date on which all of the foregoing to occur shall be referred to herein as the ‘Surrender Date’).”
The facts in the instant case are as follows: From the execution of the lease on June 30, 2010 through September 30, 2011, tenant paid his rent (August and September rents were paid together on or about October 5, 2011). At that time, correspondence was received by the landlord from the guarantor, who had agreed to pay the rent due and owing provided the late fees were removed from the past balance.

Beginning with October’s rent, no further rent payments were made by the tenant. On April 25, 2012, the Marshal entered the property as part of an eviction and inventoried the premises. The premises were found vacant.

Landlord seeks payment of rent from October 2011 to the present, as it has not yet re-let the space, although the space has been marketed and is listed with a broker.

Conclusion:

Based upon the language of the Good Guy Guaranty combined with the case law, the tenant has failed to comply with the terms of the Good Guy Guaranty and Surrender Date and thus the accrual of rent continued throughout the term of the lease (June 30, 2015) for the following reasons:
1. Tenant was required to be current with rent AFTER August 1, 2011;
2. Guarantor was required to return the keys to the Landlord upon Surrender;
3. Guarantor was required to execute an agreement whereby tenant states all rights to the premises have terminated; and
4. All rent due and owing has been paid in full.

— by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate

Copyright 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, November 19, 2013

Abandonment under the Estates Powers and Trusts Law ("EPTL")

A parent is not supposed to outlive his/her children. This is a tragic truth that can only be enhanced when determining that child's estate. Due to the statute EPTL 3-1.1, a child under 18 dies intestate, meaning without a will.(1) The laws of intestacy clearly state that in the event the decedent is not married and has no children, his estate shall be inherited by the decedent's parents. But what happens when one of those parents has not been there for the child? Either due to divorce or other circumstances the child and parent do not have a relationship; is that parent still entitled to collect his distributive share of the child's estate?

The statute is clear. EPTL 4-1.1(a)(1) provides: "No distributive share in the estate of a deceased child shall be allowed to a parent if the parent, while the child is under the age of 21 years has failed or refused to provide for the child or has abandoned such child, whether or not such child dies before having attained the age of 21 years, unless the parental relationship and duties are subsequently resumed and continue until the death of the child."

In interpreting and applying this statute, the courts have been clear in their determination. The disqualification of a parent is premised upon either (1) a failure or refusal to support the child or (2) abandonment of the child.(2) Either of these can be the basis for denying a parent their right a distributive share of the child's estate, although neither is a necessary element in order to prove the other.(3) A parent's disqualification is determined by their relationship before the child turns 18, regardless of whether or not the child dies after 18. If the child dies intestate and one parent asserts abandonment by the other parent, an analysis is necessary to determine whether the parent asserting abandonment has sustained her burden.(4)

A parent has the duty to support his minor child in accordance with his means.(5) A failure or refusal to support a child financially can prevent that parent from receiving his distributive share. Financial support of a minor child must be shown by monies paid by the non-custodial parent to the parent with custody. Direct payments to the child are not included, nor are payments made to the child by others. Relying on others, including the state in the form of public assistance will result in the parent forfeiting his rights to any distributive share. The statute "imposes an equitable penalty upon parents who fail to fulfill their obligations of support under FCA 413."(6)

It is relatively easy to determine whether a parent takes on the responsibility of financially supporting his child. It is more difficult to determine whether a parent has abandoned his child. What is abandonment? The statute does not provide a definition of abandonment, so a review of the case law is necessary to determine how the term 'abandonment' is interpreted.

Case law has been clear on what constitutes 'abandonment.' Abandonment is a voluntary breach of neglect of the duty to care for and train a child and the duty to supervise and guide his growth and development."(7) There are limitless interpretations of the relationship between a parent and child and each one is unique. Therefore, how can a court determine that a particular parent has abandoned his child under the statute? There must be an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the parent/child relationship in order to make a determination.

A father who paid child support, but made no effort to contact his son for the seven years between his remarriage and the child's death, despite living nearby was found to have abandoned his son, despite the fact that he paid child support.(8)

Similarly, a father who professed his long-distance love for his child but had no more than sporadic, infrequent visits did not reach the threshold of demonstrating his "natural and legal obligations of training, care and guidance owed by a parent to a child."(9) A claim the child's custodial parent 'poisoned' the child against the non-custodial parent will not be sufficient to overcome the burden of proof.(10)

A court's order limiting a parent's involvement is also not a valid excuse to avoid a determination of abandonment. Courts have clearly held, "while a court order restricting a parent to visitation may lessen the measure of such parent's obligation, it does not eliminate it. Rather the inquiry then becomes whether or not the parent has fulfilled this responsibility…"(11)

However, a father who was absent for nearly half a child's life due only to the fact that he did not know of the child's existence, and subsequently financially supported and attempted to participate was found to have not abandoned the child.(12)

A parent who has failed to fulfill his parental duties due to incompetency will not be held as abandoning his child so long as there is no history of non-support.(13)

A parent cannot prove his involvement in his child's life merely by asserting his love for the child or by stating his intent to have a relationship with the child. Actions speak louder than words. It is the actions of the parent accused of abandoning his child that will determine whether or not his parental duties were fulfilled, not his plan or intent or wish to spend time with the child during their life. A parent's absence in the child's life, as evidenced by a lack of knowledge regarding the child's health, education and well-being are strong indicators of abandonment and will support a court's denial of any distributive share of the child decedent's estate.

— by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate

Copyright 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

__________

(1) NY EPTL §3-1.1; N.Y. Prac., Trusts and Estates Practice in New York §7:61 (A person must be 18 in order to execute a will).

(2) In the matter of Wright, 20 Misc.3d 648 (2008); In the matter of Pessoni, 11 Misc.3d 245 (2005).

(3) Matter of Pridell, 206 Misc. 316 (1954) (Where the father paid child support to decedent's mother, he admits to having no relationship with the decedent, and was denied participation in decedent's estate); Matter of Musczak, 196 Misc. 364 (1949).

(4) Matter of the Estate of Clark, 119 A.D.2d 947 (1986).

(5) Matter of Gonzalez, 196 Misc.2d 984 (2003).

(6) Id at 988.

(7) Wright at 867; Pessoni at 247; Pridell at 318; N.Y. Prac., Trusts and Estates Practice in New York §7:63

(8) Pridell at 318.

(9) Gonzalez at 987.

(10) Pessoni at 549.

(11) Pridell at 318.

(12) The matter of the Estate of Ball, 24 A.D.3d 1062 (2005).

(13) Musczak at 367.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, October 29, 2013

Stone Cold


The business idea was a good one: one partner, we’ll call him “Salesman,” was experienced in the stone business. He would bring his knowledge and talents. The other partner, we’ll call him “Moneybags,” would bring his cash. Together, they would launch a business to import and distribute stone material from China. The plan was for Moneybags to invest money into the newly-formed corporation to be used to purchase the stone material, and Salesman was going to make profitable deals, moving the product to market through wholesalers.

In anticipation of launching the business, and in order to buy the stone material, Moneybags gave Salesman more than $250,000, a bit at a time. Every time Moneybags invested a chunk of money, Salesman gave him an “IOU” for the money. After a while, and after a series of exchanges which raised his suspicions, Moneybags became convinced that Salesman was diverting the seed money from the stone business and was using it instead for personal purposes. Thinking he had been defrauded, Moneybags began an action to recoup whatever he could of his original investment. The situation was dire and complicated, but it got worse. During this period, Salesman went on a business trip to Africa and died.

Substitution of wife/administrator as defendant

Before learning that Salesman had died, Moneybags had already brought a lawsuit against Salesman, through counsel other than Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for breach of contract and embezzlement. After Salesman died, Moneybags’ lawsuit was “stayed” or stopped from proceeding. According to law, when a defendant dies, there is a stay of the legal proceeding until someone is appointed to represent the estate of the deceased. CPLR 1015 (“If a party dies and the claim for or against him is not thereby extinguished the court shall order substitution of the proper parties.”). Salesman’s widow was appointed as the administrator of his estate. At this point, Moneybags sought help from Richard A. Klass. The first step was to substitute the wife/administrator as the defendant in place of her deceased husband.

Elements of Fraud and Conversion

The next, important, step was to amend the Complaint in the action to include various causes of action, including fraud and conversion against the estate of the defendant. To allege fraud, the Complaint contained the essential elements that (a) Salesman made representations to Moneybags about investing the money into buying stone material; (b) those representations were false and misleading; (c) that Salesman made those representations knowingly and with the intent and purpose of inducing Moneybags to invest the money; (d) that Moneybags justifiably relied on those representations to his detriment; and (e) he sustained damages. The Complaint also alleged that Salesman wrongfully took and converted the investment moneys for his own purposes and in derogation of Moneybags’ rights.

Rights as a Shareholder in the Corporation

Aside from alleging that Salesman was a fraudster who diverted his investment moneys into his own pocket, Moneybags also pursued rights afforded to him as a shareholder in a New York State corporation. New York Business Corporation Law Section 717 states that “A director shall perform his duties as a director, including his duties as a member of any committee of the board upon which he may serve, in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” (Similarly, Business Corporation Law Section 715(h) provides “An officer shall perform his duties as an officer in good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances.”)

Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Unless some “bite” could be put into the Complaint to allege that the wife and son may have some personal liability, Moneybags realized he was nearly certain to lose his entire $250,000 investment. Richard A. Klass amended the Complaint to allege numerous causes of action against not only the estate of Salesman but also his wife/administrator of the estate and son, including fraud, conversion, constructive trust, accounting, breach of fiduciary duties, aiding and abetting breach of duties, and unjust enrichment. Under New York law, a claim for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty consists of the following elements: (1) a breach of fiduciary duty, (2) that the defendant knowingly induced or participated in the breach, and (3) that the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breach. See, S&K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F2d 843 [2 Cir. 1987]. In this case, Moneybags alleged that the wife and son should be held liable to him, and not only Salesman’s estate.

The amendment of the Complaint to include numerous allegations against the several defendants pushed them to immediately settle the case for a substantial percentage of Moneybag’s initial investment.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, October 9, 2013

Anticipatory Repudiation

Anticipatory repudiation: This principle, known as the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation, provides that when there has been a repudiation of the contract by one party before the time for his performance has arrived, the other party may treat the entire contract as breached and commence suit without delay. 22A N.Y. JUR.2D Contracts § 444 (1996). Resort to this doctrine is at the election of the non-breaching party. See Sven Salen AB v. Jacq. Pierot, Jr., & Sons, Inc., 559 F.Supp. 503, 506 (S.D.N.Y.1983), aff'd, 738 F.2d 419 (2d Cir.1984). However, “there must be a definite and final communication of the intention to forego performance before the anticipated breach may be the subject of legal action. Mere expression of difficulty in tendering the required performance, for example, is not tantamount to a renunciation of the contract.” Rachmani Corp. v. 9 East 96th Street Apartment Corp., 211 A.D.2d 262, 629 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (1st Dep't 1995) (citations omitted). The doctrine of anticipatory breach thus obviates the need for the non-breaching party to postpone suit until the time for performance of the other party has expired.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, October 2, 2013

The “Merger” clause

The “Merger” clause: If the contract of sale contains the typical merger clause, which indicates that “all prior understandings and agreements between the parties are merged in this agreement....” this clause will bar any claim that the seller should be held liable for any representations or omissions. See, Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Edwards, 87 A.D.2d 935, 450 N.Y.S.2d 76, 78 (3d Dept.1982), aff'd 59 N.Y.2d 817, 464 N.Y.S.2d 739, 451 N.E.2d 486 (1983); Dorsey Products Corp. v. United States Rubber Co., 21 A.D.2d 866, 251 N.Y.S.2d 311, 313 (1st Dept.1964), aff'd 16 N.Y.2d 925, 264 N.Y.S.2d 917, 212 N.E.2d 435 (1965).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, September 25, 2013

Seller has no duty to disclose: New York

Seller has no duty to disclose: New York law does not impose a duty on a seller of real property to disclose information concerning the property.  See, Renkas v. Sweers, 10 Misc.3d 1076(A), 814 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Co), “Active concealment is some conduct, more than mere silence, by the seller that may create a duty to disclose information concerning the property (Gizzi at 881; Bethka v. Jensen, 250 A.D.2d 887,888 [3d Dept.1998] ). To recover damages for active concealment, “the plaintiff must show, in effect, that the seller or the seller's agents thwarted the plaintiff's efforts to fulfill his responsibilities fixed by the doctrine of caveat emptor” (Jablonski at 485).

Any potential fraud claim to be brought against a seller for failing to disclose a lawsuit involving the property and its circumstances would fail. Facts which are accessible as a matter of public record bar a claim of justifiable reliance necessary to sustain a cause of action for fraud. Grumman Allied Industries, Inc. v. Rohr Industries, Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 737 (2d Cir.1984); Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 603, 157 N.E.2d 597, 601 (1959); Most v. Monti, 91 A.D.2d 606, 456 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (2d Dept.1982).

To the extent that there may be “latent” defects in the building, a duty to disclose a latent defect concerning the premises may be based (post-closing and upon later discovery) on the theory that where a buyer is not able to discover the defect in question through ordinary inspection and would not be willing to purchase the property if he or she knew of it, then a contract that is procured without disclosing such a defect is procured by fraud and misrepresentation. See, Young v. Keith, 112 A.D.2d 625, 492 N.Y.S.2d 489 (3d Dep't 1985); McMillen v. Marzacano, 277 A.D. 977, 100 N.Y.S.2d 240 (1st Dep't 1950). These allegations would require a high burden of proof.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, September 18, 2013

Doctrine of caveat emptor: New York law...

Doctrine of caveat emptor: New York law follows the long-standing tradition in the purchase of real property that a buyer has the duty to satisfy himself of the quality of the bargained-for purchase of the property without trying the seller. See Stambovsky v. Ackley, 169 A.D.2d 254, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 675–76 (1st Dept.1991); London v. Courduff, 141 A.D.2d 803, 529 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (1st Dept.). Further, the term to purchase the property “AS IS” is a specific contract disclaimer as to the condition of the property to be purchased and thwarts this breach of contract claim (see Mosca v. Kiner, 277 A.D.2d 937,939 [4th Dept.2000]; McManus v. Moise, 262 A.D.2d 370,371 [4th Dept.1999]).

Under the generally accepted doctrine in real estate transaction of caveat emptor or buyer beware, there is no duty upon the seller to disclose any information concerning the property (Caceci v. DiCanio Construction Corp., 72 N.Y.2d 52,57 [1988]).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, July 30, 2013

The Producer: overselling available interests

The Rehearsal Onstage (detail), c. 1874, by Edgar Degas (1834–1917).


Mel Brooks’ movie and musical The Producers may have been a fictional story of fraudsters selling more shares in the production of their Broadway show “Springtime for Hitler” than actually existed, but such fraudsters exist in real life, overselling available interests not only in Broadway productions, but in every type of investment, including real estate.

In this modern day The Producers story, a particular real estate broker (we’ll give him the name “Bob”) had a plan. The idea behind this particular investment was simple: purchase a house in Passaic, New Jersey; fix it up; and then resell it for a profit—the classic real estate “flip.” This broker solicited a number of investors. Each investor would purchase a membership interest in a limited liability company [LLC]. With the funds provided by the members, the LLC would buy the house. A contractor-partner would be hired to renovate the house. Each investor was promised a certain percentage of the net proceeds from the ultimate sale of the house. Unfortunately, the real estate market tanked, construction costs soared and the investment became a huge loss before construction was ever completed.

New Jersey state court action

One of the investors (we’ll call him “John”) brought a lawsuit in the Superior Court in New Jersey for breach of contract, misappropriation of funds, and fraud. In that case, the judge appointed a special fiscal agent (similar to a court-appointed receiver) to manage the operations of the house, list the house for sale, and take all steps necessary to sell the house and distribute the net proceeds to the LLC’s investors.

Real estate broker files for bankruptcy

Bob filed for personal bankruptcy in the New Jersey Bankruptcy Court to avoid his liability to the investors. John filed a lawsuit (known as an adversary proceeding) against Bob in the New Jersey bankruptcy case to have Bob’s liability in this house-investment-gone-wrong declared “nondischargeable.” (The adversary proceeding here was a mini-lawsuit inside of the bankruptcy case, intended to have the effect that Bob would remain liable to John for the collapse of the real estate deal.) In the adversary proceeding, John alleged that Bob brought too many investors into the deal without telling the other investors. A settlement was reached between John and Bob in the “adversary proceeding” and John negotiated with the bankruptcy trustee to purchase the house directly from the trustee to recoup some of his (John’s) losses.

Another investor (we’ll call her “Sally”) who lost money in the same Passaic real estate deal then sued John (now the owner of the Passaic real estate) in New York City’s Civil Court, claiming that John defrauded Sally by not including her in the buy-out of the house. This is when John sought help from Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer. The aim was to have Sally’s lawsuit, brought in New York, dismissed.

Lack of jurisdiction in the New York Civil Court

There is a basic concept involving any court system that a particular court maintains the authority (“jurisdiction”) to make decisions and orders over a particular controversy.

According to New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 302, New York State courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresidents under certain circumstances, when the defendant:

1. Transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. Commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3. Commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the state.
There is a separate rule as to when New York City’s Civil Court may exercise jurisdiction over cases because it is considered a court of “limited” jurisdiction (See Civil Court Act Section 202).

In asking the judge to dismiss the New York Civil Court case, Richard A. Klass argued that any action that could be brought by Sally must be brought in the State of New Jersey, and not in New York. The project-house was located in New Jersey; the LLC was a New Jersey entity; both the New Jersey Superior Court and New Jersey Bankruptcy Court had pending cases involving the house and the LLC; and all of the events transpired in New Jersey. It was urged that New York was the wrong forum for Sally to bring this dispute, citing to Epstein v. Sirivejkul, 48 NY2d 728 [1979]; Irrigation and Industrial Development Corp. v. Indag S.A., 37 NY2d 522 [1975].

The Civil Court judge agreed with the arguments of Richard A. Klass and determined that the New York Civil Court lacked jurisdiction over the case. The judge specifically found that the transaction in dispute occurred in New Jersey and the plaintiff presented no allegations that there was tortious conduct within New York State; also, the fact that there were existing proceedings in New Jersey courts confirmed the conclusion that New Jersey was the proper forum for any dispute. The court then dismissed the plaintiff’s case.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Surprise!


On a recent day, “Jack” (not his real name) went to an ATM to withdraw money from his bank account. To his surprise, he could not. Upon contacting the bank’s customer service department, he discovered that his bank account was restrained and could not be accessed. The bank’s representative informed him that there was a judgment against the joint accountholder—a friend, we’ll call him “Stan”—and this was the reason for the restraint on the account.

Jack remembered that many years ago, when he needed to travel to his home country for several months, he asked Stan if he could put Stan’s name on the bank account in case Jack needed someone to pay his bills while traveling. Ultimately, Stan never used the account—never wrote a check, never made a deposit, and never made any withdrawals. Unfortunately, years later, a creditor of Stan got a judgment against Stan and now, Jack, the primary account holder of the bank account, was paying the price.

Joint bank accounts and Banking Law Section 675

According to New York Banking Law Section 675, a joint bank account is presumed to belong to each of the accountholders—meaning that each person (and his judgment creditors) may access the full amount of the account. Specifically, this section of law provides that, except for fraud or undue influence, the making of deposits into a joint account is evidence that the depositor intended the account to be a joint tenancy. The burden of proving otherwise is upon the person who challenges title, which, in this case, would be the primary accountholder.

Once restrained, a creditor of one accountholder may be able to obtain half or all of the money in the joint account, according to differing court opinions. (One opinion, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Astoria Federal, 189 Misc.2d 475, holds the creditor is entitled to more than half of account, and another, Mendel v. Chervanyou, 147 Misc.2d 1056, holds that it is not). In any event, in this situation, Jack had the problem where all of the money in the account belonged solely to him and Stan never used the account.

“Convenience” bank accounts

Luckily, there is another concept that applied to this situation. The law recognizes that a bank account may be established as a quasi-joint account, where a person is added merely as a “convenience” to the primary accountholder. This convenience is typically done in situations where there is an elderly parent or disabled person who cannot easily travel to the bank to handle his banking needs.

The account may actually be set up in this exact form from its inception (Banking Law Section 678 authorizes this type of account), or it may operate as one where there is sufficient proof that adding the other name to the account was just for the convenience of the accountholder. Where the account is initially set up as a convenience account, the bank will indicate the same and any deposits will not be presumed to belong to each of the accountholders but just the primary one. Also, upon death of the primary accountholder, the other person will not have a right of survivorship in the account, but the moneys will pass to whomever the primary accountholder has designated in his Will or heirs at law. Where the account is not designated as a convenience account from the onset, Banking Law Section 675 will allow a party to rebut or disprove the general presumption that it was a true joint account—evidence may include the wording written in on the account application or signature card, sources of deposits, usage of the account, and the circumstances in which the account was set up.

Jack’s attorney searched the internet for “exempt property and accounts” for more information and found an article by Richard A. Klass on the subject of the Exempt Income Protection Act (EIPA).* After getting the run-around from the creditor’s attorney for almost three weeks, Jack decided to retain Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer.

Upon sending proof regarding the fact that the account belonged to the primary accountholder and that the debtor was on the account only for convenience purposes, along with a letter explaining the law and threatening to sue for attorney’s fees, the creditor’s attorney confirmed the next day that the account would be immediately released.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

* The article, entitled “Analysis of Exempt Income Protection Act,” may be found at www.courtstreetlaw.com/articles/debt-collection-articles/Analysis-of-Exempt-Income-Protection-Act.html

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Photograph on page one: ATM in Santillana, 2008, by Handige Harrie. Artwork released by author into the public domain.

Friday, May 31, 2013

What do you do if you are sued for a credit card debt?

Without doubt, one of the most important financial tools used in this country is the credit card. While the first credit card was actually metal-plated and similar to a military dog tag, today’s credit card may take the form of a plastic card with magnetic strip or merely using the combination of numbers to make all sorts of purchases. At this point, the usage of credit cards by consumers is as ubiquitous as maintaining a bank account or driving a car; in fact, many products and services can only be purchased through the use of a credit card. As a result, most consumers in this country have two or more credit cards.

At some point, some consumers will find themselves in a downturn of events due to loss of employment, reduction of salary, illness or divorce, where they may become unable to maintain payment of the balances due on the credit card accounts. Once that happens, the accounts go into delinquency. Due to financial reporting requirements imposed upon banks, credit card delinquencies go through different stages, where the collection of past due amounts will first be attempted internally through the bank’s collection department, then through outside collection agencies, and then eventually through litigation by law firms throughout the country. Consumers who have defaulted on their credit card accounts are very familiar with the persistent telephone calls at all hours from debt collectors (who may be located in this country or calling from overseas call centers) and letter-writing campaigns which could make the post office proud (indeed, many consumers who file bankruptcy cite the annoyances of debt collectors as one of the chief reasons for the filings).

It is important for the consumer to understand that, from the perspective of the creditor, settling the debt and collecting a portion of the credit card debt is the main objective. This means that attempts to settle the credit card with the consumer will be pushed by the creditor at every stage of the process. For certain consumers, this is very beneficial, as significant savings can be accomplished through a reduced lump-sum payment.

Once the almost-terrifying debt collectors’ campaign has ended, and the debt is still owed, the bank will either pursue collection of the debt itself or by selling the debt to another company, either of which will commence a law suit against the consumer to obtain a judgment.

The first step that the collection law firm will take is to file the case in the appropriate local court where either the consumer/former accountholder resides or where the account was opened. The initial document filed with the court will be a “Summons” (which is typically accompanied with the Complaint, which specifies the details of the claim against the consumer). The credit card company will be referred to as the “plaintiff” and the consumer will be referred to as the “defendant” in the Summons.  The next step after the Summons is filed with the court is for the process server to serve a copy of the Summons on the defendant, informing him that a law suit has been filed and that he needs to respond to the Summons and plead any defenses to the case.

Once served, the defendant must serve and file his “Answer.” The filing of the Answer will also place the case onto the court’s pre-trial conference calendar. Each side will have an opportunity to conduct discovery of the other’s evidence, including obtaining copies of credit card applications, agreements, and account statements.

After both parties have completed discovery proceedings, one of them (usually the plaintiff) will make a motion to the judge for “summary judgment,” meaning that there is no need for a trial of the facts and the court should award judgment in favor of one of the parties. If the court grants the motion, then the successful party can enter the judgment (either dismissing the case or awarding a monetary amount). If the motion is denied, then the case will proceed to a trial.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, April 30, 2013

529 Plans in Bankruptcy

Americans rely on easy credit in order to fund their lifestyles.  We are lured by good credit terms, the desire to buy a home, and the need to pay for things like education and home improvements.  We do our best to save for our future, putting money into Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or 401Ks, money that is not to be used until retirement.  When we have children we consider their futures and the ever increasing costs of college, and we want to save for our children’s future education by opening Education IRAs or 529 Savings Plans.

In New York State, when someone obtains a money judgment against you, they have several remedies in order to obtain payment of the judgment, including garnishing your wages, putting a lien on bank accounts and other property held in your name.  This may include a 529 Savings Plan.  CPLR section 5205 provides several exemptions to protect debtors.  It lists several types of property that cannot be reached by creditors.  CPLR 5205(j) provides protection for New York 529 Savings Plans by exempting and thus protecting from creditors a New York State 529 Savings Plan in an amount not exceeding $10,000.   This is good news and bad news for debtors.  It protects smaller 529 plans from being plundered by a creditor, but if you’ve saved for many years, the 529 Savings Plan may exceed the $10,000 balance and is thus open season for a creditor looking for repayment of an outstanding debt.

Bankruptcy can offer better protection for a debtor who is trying to protect a 529 Savings Plan he has created for his children.  Bankruptcy Code 541(b)(6) provides that funds placed in an 529 Savings Plan 1 year or longer before the date the debtor files for bankruptcy is not property of the bankruptcy estate if the designated beneficiary is a child, stepchild, grandchild or step-grandchild, and the funds contributed do not exceed the total contributions permitted.  In addition, in order to ensure debtors have not transferred assets to exempt accounts in preparation of filing bankruptcy, any contributions made between year one and year two before filing are limited to a total contribution of $5,850. The exemption regarding an education IRA is similar in nature to the 529 Savings Plan, but include a requirement that the account could not be pledged to have credit extended to the debtor.  This language can be found in Bankruptcy Code 541(b)(5).

Therefore, for individuals who are contemplating bankruptcy but are concerned about 529 Savings Plans they have established for their children can now rest easy in the knowledge these accounts may be protected and may not be reached by creditors.

— by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate
Law Office of Richard A. Klass

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

Buyer’s Remedies when Seller Will Not Convey Real Property

Welton Grange, Cowgate, Welton by David Wright
Photograph copyr. David Wright. 25 August 2007


Over the last several years the real estate market has had its share of ups and downs.
 It was not so long ago that several offers above the asking price would be placed on a single parcel of property.  Today, although the real estate market is not as “hot” as it once was, sales of real estate are on the climb again, and with that there are always issues that may arise.


As a buyer, what happens when you find the perfect house, on the perfect street and enter into a contract of sale. Then when you try to perform your obligations under the contract, the seller stands in your way.  Then after you file a Lis Pendens (Notice of Pendency) and commence litigation to force the seller to sell you the property (also known as specific performance), you learn there was another buyer who preceded you and also did not close.  What are your rights and remedies?

Although one would generally assume the adage, “first in time equals first in right,” that is not necessarily the case.  First, the question to ask when there are multiple purchasers is whether, as the second purchaser, you are a bona fide purchaser.

A bona fide purchaser is a purchaser who purchases property for value innocent of any circumstance that would bear upon the seller’s right to sell the property.  Therefore, if you are the purchaser of a parcel of property without having any knowledge that another buyer already purchased the land, then you are a bona fide purchaser.  If, however, you are somehow aware of any prior contracts of sale, you are deemed to have knowledge and will no longer be entitled to hold the title of bona fide purchaser.

How does a buyer establish they are a bona fide purchaser?  When a buyer purchases property, he must record his deed to the property at the clerk’s office of the county where the property is located. If a buyer fails to record the deed and a subsequent purchaser purchases the same parcel, the second purchaser is a bona fide purchaser and will have preference over the initial purchaser because the second purchaser did not have knowledge of the earlier conveyance, so long as the second purchaser records their deed prior to the first purchaser.

The principles of a bona fide purchaser are not that different when there is one seller, multiple purchasers each holding a contract of sale.  RPL §294(1) provides, “An executory contract for the sale, purchase or exchange of real property, or an instrument canceling such a contract, or an instrument containing a power to convey real property, as the agent or attorney for the owner of the property, acknowledged or proved, and certified, in the manner to entitle a conveyance to be recorded, may be recorded in the office of the recording officer…”

If there has not yet been a closing, RPL §294(1) permits a purchaser to record their contract of sale.  By recording the contract of sale, the purchaser is placing everyone on notice of their interest in purchasing the property.  If there are multiple purchasers, the first purchaser to record their contract of sale will have rights superior to any other potential purchaser, regardless of whether a down payment has been paid to the seller.

Once a purchaser has recorded the contract of sale with the clerk’s office in the county in which the property is located, they may then pursue their rights of specific performance under the contract.  Commonly in land sale contracts, there is language that allows a party to demand specific performance of the other party.  Specific performance allows a person to demand the other party to perform under the contract rather than to seek money damages. Avila v. Arsada, 34 A.D.3d 609; citing Varon v. Annino, 170 A.D.2d 445, 446; LaMarche v. Rosenblum, 50 A.D.2d 636, 637.   When a purchaser sues a seller for specific performance, the seller cannot claim as an affirmative defense that the purchaser is not ready, willing and able to close.  Courts have determined that when a seller fails to adhere to their obligations under a contract of sale, their actions are deemed to be an anticipatory breach of the contract which waives the buyer’s obligation to perform under the contract.  Gjonaj v. Sines, 69 A.D.3d 1188.  The purchaser’s lack of performance under the contract (i.e. inability to close which arose from seller’s breach) does not prevent the purchaser from exercising their right to obtain specific performance from the seller.

While this remedy, in theory, appears relatively simple and straightforward, there can be complications.  In order to record a contract of sale, the contract must be executed by both parties before a notary public. Common practice is such that people rarely if ever execute a contract of sale before a notary public.  Without a notarized contract of sale, a purchaser trying to force the seller to sell the property may end up unsuccessful.

Another remedy, which can be instead of specific performance or in addition to specific performance, is damages.  It is well settled that a purchaser, if they can establish the seller has willfully or deliberately failed to perform under the contract of sale, can obtain loss of the bargain damages, which are above and beyond the nominal damages specified in the contract of sale. Janoff v. Sheepshead Towers, Inc., 22 A.D.2d 950; Mokar Props v. Hall, 6 A.D.2d 536.

Therefore, the adage “buyer beware” may hold true in many situations, in certain circumstances, the seller, particularly as it relates to real property, may be forced to sell property under the specific performance clause in the contract of sale.

— by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate
Law Office of Richard A. Klass

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.


Art credit:
Welton Grange, Cowgate, Welton, by David Wright.
Copyright David Wright. 25 August 2007

This image was taken from the Geograph project collection. See this photograph's page on the Geograph website for the photographer's contact details. The copyright on this image is owned by David Wright and is licensed for reuse under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 2.0 license.


Friday, April 12, 2013

Requirement of Stating License Information in a Complaint Against a Consumer

Dunkin Donuts may want us to believe that “America runs on Dunkin,” but the truth is, America runs on its service industry.  In our everyday lives there are people who provide a service to us; whether it is waiting on us in a restaurant, a physician or health care worker taking care of us, or a contractor working on our homes.  America’s service industry is a vital part of our economy and everyday lives.

But what happens when the service provider is not paid for his services?  How can that person collect money that is due them?  Someone who has not been paid for services rendered can file a lawsuit seeking to collect unpaid monies from a consumer/client.

New York’s Civil Practice Law & Rules (the CPLR) Section 3015 provides some guidance when a service provider decides to file a lawsuit against a consumer/client to pay sums due and owing.  Depending on the location or venue of the lawsuit and the type of industry that provided the service, a plaintiff may be required to include in his complaint his license number.

CPLR 3015(e) was recently amended to state that when a plaintiff starts a lawsuit against a consumer, the plaintiff must include in the complaint the name on the license, the license number and the government agency which issued the license if the plaintiff is required to be licensed by the Department of Consumer Affairs of the City of New York, Counties of Nassau, Putnam, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester. CPLR 3015(e) provides:

(e) License to do business. Where  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action against  a  consumer  arises  from the plaintiff's conduct of a business which is required by state or local law to be licensed by the department of consumer affairs  of  the  city  of  New  York,  the  Suffolk  county department  of  consumer  affairs,  the Westchester county department of consumer affairs/weight-measures, the county of Rockland, the county  of Putnam  or  the  Nassau  county  department  of  consumer  affairs,  the complaint shall allege, as part of the cause of action,  that  plaintiff is  duly licensed and shall contain the name and number, if any, of such license and the governmental agency which issued such license; provided, however, that where the  plaintiff  does  not  have  a  license  at  the commencement  of the action the plaintiff may, subject to the provisions of rule thirty hundred twenty-five of this article, amend the  complaint with  the  name  and number of an after-acquired license and the name of the governmental agency which issued such license or move for  leave  to amend  the  complaint in accordance with such provisions. The failure of the plaintiff to comply with this subdivision will permit the  defendant to  move for dismissal pursuant to paragraph seven of subdivision (a) of rule thirty-two hundred eleven of this chapter.

The initial purpose of this legislation was to place the burden on a “home improvement contractor” to establish it was licensed to perform the work at the time the work was performed.  Courts have consistently held that a failure to have a license at the time the work was performed will preclude the contractor from commencing an action.  Working without  a license or obtaining a license after the work was performed is too late, and will result in the lawsuit getting dismissed. (This pleading requirement, which initially began to address issues concerning home improvement contractors, was expanded to include all of the different types of licenses issued by the government agency).

The requirement of the plaintiff to include its license information in the complaint does not mean anyone who needs a government license to perform their work must include their license number.  The Court in NCSPlus v. WBR Management, 37 Misc.3d 227, 949 NYS2d 317 [Sup.Ct., Nassau Co. 2012], determined that the plaintiff, who was a debt collection agency, was not required to include its license information in the complaint because the dispute did not involve a “consumer credit transaction” against a consumer but rather between a debt collection agency and a merchant. (The term “consumer credit transaction” means a transaction where credit is extended to an individual and the money which was the subject of the transaction was primarily for personal, family or household purposes).

Therefore, it is important to remember that if you are a licensed service provider who decides to sue a customer or client, you may need to include your license information in your summons and complaint or you risk having your case thrown out.


— by Elisa S. Rosenthal, Esq.,
Associate
Law Office of Richard A. Klass

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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

“Then I'll huff and I'll puff, and I'll blow your house in!”


Those famous words were said by the Wolf in the fairy tale Three Little Pigs. Sometimes, municipalities have to say those same words to homeowners whose buildings become so damaged that they have become “unsafe.”

The “unsafe structures” law

There is a common recognition that an unsafe or dangerous structure constitutes a threat to the public’s health, safety and welfare, and the sealing or removal of the structure is an exercise of a municipality’s police powers to protect the public. For this reason, municipalities enact building codes to ensure that owners keep and maintain their buildings.

In New York City, Administrative Code Section 26-236 provides that, immediately upon receipt of a report by an officer or building department employee that a structure is unsafe or dangerous, the Department of Buildings is to make a formal report, which triggers quick action. The next step is to notify the building owner within 24 hours of the duty to remedy the unsafe or dangerous condition. If no action by the owner is immediately taken, then the Buildings Department must order a survey of the unsafe structure, which survey (together with a report) acts as the basis of a law suit in the Supreme Court.

So important to the public is the remediation of an unsafe structure, that Administrative Code Section 26-239 states that the “determination of the issue in an unsafe structure proceeding shall have precedence over every other business” of the court. Once the trial has taken place (“without delay”), the court then issues a “precept” directed to the Superintendent of Buildings to repair or secure the unsafe structure.

Knock-down of the client’s building

The client bought a building in Brooklyn from a bank that had recently foreclosed on the property and took back the building (what is commonly referred to as an “REO” – real estate owned property in a bank’s inventory). At about the same time that the client bought the building, the City of New York determined that the building was an unsafe structure and notified the bank. The notice informed that a court proceeding would be held in the Supreme Court, Kings County on April 22nd to determine the building to be an “unsafe structure” pursuant to the New York City Administrative Code.

When the client bought the building, he had the intention of renovating it. The client hired an architect who drew up plans to utilize the skeleton of the building and its basic plumbing and heating systems. The plans filed with the Buildings Department provided for the rehabilitation and renovation of the building. The architect’s plans were allegedly approved by the Department. The architect then met with the Buildings Department’s Borough Commissioner on April 10th; assurance was allegedly made to the architect that a work permit based upon the approved plans would be issued, allowing the “rehab” of the building to start. Allegedly, the Buildings Department noted the approval of plans with the City’s Department of Housing Preservation and Development. Unfortunately, on April 15th, prior to the upcoming court date, the City demolished the building. To add insult to injury, the City placed a lien on the building for the demolition costs.

Claim and law suit

The building owner came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for help. Now that the entire building was demolished, there was tremendous added expense to the rehab of the building, given that all new building systems would have to be installed and the shell was no longer there.

Notices of claim were filed with the City of New York and its agencies. Once the requisite period of time for the City to act on those notices passed, a law suit was filed against the City. The action listed several causes of action including negligence, trespass to property, interference with quiet enjoyment of property and violation of due process rights since the building was demolished before the court proceeding.

The City agreed to settle the law suit by payment for the loss of the building (based upon the difference in fair market values for the property pre-demolition and post-demolition) along with cancellation of the demolition lien.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

-----------
copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, January 4, 2013

Analysis of Exempt Income Protection Act

By Richard Klass, Esq.
"Your Court Street Lawyer"




On January 1, 2009, New York State enacted new measures relating to the restraint of debtors’ bank accounts, through the enactment of the Exempt Income Protection Act (“Act”).

The Act materially changes the process of restraints on debtors’ bank accounts, and the steps that each party to the process must take. The Act imposes new requirements on (a) the bank, to identify and analyze the source(s) of income and deposits into an account; (b) the judgment creditor’s attorney, to issue new exemption notices and forms, and appropriately address claimed exemptions by the debtor; and (c) the debtor, to timely raise any exemption claims upon restraint of an account. Since this process is “brand new” to New York law, the manners in which all of these parties, as well as the court system address the process will evolve from practice and procedure.

To begin the analysis, it is important to first see from where it came. In the past, all attorneys for judgment creditors had to resolve the issue of whether to release a debtor’s restrained bank account upon the debtor’s claim that the moneys contained in the account were exempt funds. Normally, the attorney would ask the debtor to provide proof (through account statements or other documents) regarding the claim, at which point either the attorney would consent to release the account or the debtor would bring an Order to Show Cause to claim the exemption. Part of the considerations of the Legislature in enacting the Act was that the threat of the continued restraint of the bank account, especially where the debtor needed immediate access to the moneys, without fair consideration of any exemptions, created a perceived presumption of uneven bargaining positions between the parties.

Another component of the process that played a part in the passing of the Act was the increased ease of the banking institutions to create or identify accounts containing only exempt moneys. The increased ease is due to the “direct deposit” and “electronic payment” features now common – the banking institutions are now better able to quickly determine the source of funds in an account, for the most part.

The Act amended or added the following sections of Article 52 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules: (a) CPLR 5205 – Exemptions; (b) CPLR 5222 – Effect of Restraint; (c) CPLR 5222-a – Exemption Notice and Claim Process; (d) CPLR 5230 – Property Executions; (e) CPLR 5231 – Income Executions; and CPLR 5232.

CPLR 5205: The new subdivisions (a) create a new exemption; (b) without limiting any other exemptions; and (c) define the term “banking institution.” Most importantly, the new exemption provides that, if “statutorily exempt payments” are made electronically or by direct deposit into a judgment debtor’s account at a banking institution, then $2,625 (original amount was $2,500 but increased in 2012) is exempt from application to satisfaction of a money judgment. The time frame indicated is within 45 days prior to service of the restraining notice.

The key is that the direct deposits or electronic payments must be “readily identifiable” by the banking institution as statutorily exempt payments. This new language will allow the bank to analyze, prior to restraint, whether the debtor’s account should be restrained from the onset – before the debtor needs to provide any other documentation to establish an exemption. Obviously, as more payment systems, businesses, and governmental agencies move towards direct deposit and electronic payments, the identification process will become even easier; the bank’s internal procedures ought to identify the source of deposits to determine whether any moneys came into the account during the 45-day period which would trigger the $2,625 exemption.

CPLR 5222: The section which authorizes the “restraint” of debtor accounts was amended to (a) revise the notice sent to debtors, either before or with the restraining notice; (b) add an additional presumed exemption for wages; and (c) save debtor’s bank fees for unlawful restraints.

Concerning the revisions to the notice sent to debtors, a specific form must be utilized, which includes additional exemptions not found in the prior notice and more notice concerning the rights of the debtor to obtain free legal counsel or proceed in court without counsel.

As to restraints placed upon a debtor’s account, CPLR 5222 now contains two presumed exemptions, one being that mentioned in CPLR 5205 above, regarding “statutorily exempt payments.” The other new exemption is the presumption that the first $1,920 in an account (which figure adjusts based upon the greater of the state or federal minimum hourly wage) is deemed exempt as wages, unless a court determines that those funds are unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of the debtor and his dependents. This subdivision very effectively takes out of play the restraint of most debtor bank accounts – unfortunately, most debtors live “hand-to-mouth” and bank accounts tend not to contain more than $1,920.

The issue as to bank charges was resolved. Many times, debtors would pay bank fees of $100-$200 for the restraint of their accounts, whether or not the restraint was proper. Now, if the restraint is unlawful, the bank cannot charge any fees to the debtor. This seemingly applies to accounts belonging to debtors who file for bankruptcy prior to restraint, but this issue is left for future determination.

CPLR 5222-a: Perhaps the section that will cause the most stress and confusion to all involved parties, this section sets up the method for notifying debtors of exemptions and the process for lifting the restraints on accounts pursuant to those exemptions. These rules apply to a Sheriff or Support Collection Unit as well as judgment creditors.

First, the judgment creditor’s attorney must now serve (1) two copies of the restraining notice; (2) one copy of the new “exemption notice;” and (3) two copies of the new “exemption claim form.” The specifics of the notice and form are written into the statute.

Second, within two days after the bank receives the above process and notices, it must serve copies upon the debtor by mail.

Third, within twenty days of the postmarked date of the bank’s mail, the debtor must complete the “exemption claim form” (marking the appropriate claimed exemption) and serve one copy on the judgment creditor’s attorney and one copy on the bank.

Fourth, the bank must serve a notice to the judgment creditor’s attorney that it will release all funds in the debtor’s account within eight days unless the judgment creditor interposes an objection to the exemption. Separately, the judgment creditor, upon receipt of the exemption claim form, must instruct the bank to release the account within seven days unless it is objecting to the exemption.

If the account contains commingled funds (exempt and non-exempt moneys), the accounting principle of “lowest intermediate balance” shall be applied. This will require an analysis as to whether withdrawals from the account, which will be considered to be made from non-exempt funds first, reduce the portion of non-exempt funds to a level that necessitates the release of all or a portion of the funds. Most creditors’ counsel agree that, in all likelihood, this accounting principle will result in the release of the restrained account.

The manner in which the judgment creditor’s counsel may object to a claimed exemption is by moving for an Order under CPLR 5240, and including an affirmation showing a factual basis upon which there is reasonable belief that the account contains non-exempt funds. The hearing on the motion will be noticed for seven days after service of the moving papers (* note the divergence from the notice of motion requirements under CPLR 2214). The exemption claim form is deemed prima facie evidence at the hearing, and the burden of proof will be on the creditor (which will be a heavy burden, especially if the debtor does not provide appropriate proof of the claimed exemption). Once the court issues an Order on the motion (to be done within five days of the hearing), the judgment creditor’s attorney must serve a copy of the Order on the bank and the debtor within two days thereafter.

Scary stuff!: If the court determines that the creditor’s objection was asserted in bad faith, the debtor will be awarded costs, reasonable attorney’s fees, actual damages, and an amount not to exceed $1,000.

CPLR 5230/5231/5232: These sections relate to both Property and Income Executions issued by the judgment creditor’s counsel to the Sheriff (or Marshal within New York City). The amendments to these sections mirror the changes mentioned above, and apply to levies made by the Sheriff upon debtor accounts.

The following forms contain the changes pursuant to the Act:

1. CPLR 5222 Notice to Debtor
2. Exemption Notice
3. Exemption Claim Form
4. Property Execution
5. Income Execution

Note: Where the debt owed is either to New York State and its agencies or municipal corporations OR if owed for child support, spousal support, maintenance or alimony, then the above rules concerning restraints are not applicable and the restraining notice should state at the top in 16-point bold type: “The judgment creditor is the State of New York, or any of its agencies or municipal corporations AND/OR the debt enforced is for child support, spousal support, maintenance or alimony.”

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com for any questions.


FORM 1


NOTICE TO JUDGMENT DEBTOR

Money or property belonging to you may have been taken or held in order to satisfy a judgment which has been entered against you. Read this carefully.

YOU MAY BE ABLE TO GET YOUR MONEY BACK

State and federal laws prevent certain money or property from being taken to satisfy judgments. Such money or property is said to be "exempt". The following is a partial list of money which may be exempt:
  1. Supplemental security income (SSI);
  2. Social security;
  3. Public assistance (welfare);
  4. Spousal support, maintenance (alimony) or child support;
  5. Unemployment benefits;
  6. Disability benefits;
  7. Worker's compensation benefits;
  8. Public or private pensions;
  9. Veteran's benefits;
  10. Ninety percent of your wages or salary earned in the last sixty days;
  11. Twenty-six hundred twenty-five dollars ($2,625) of any bank account containing statutorily exempt payments that were deposited electronically or by direct deposit within the last forty-five days, including but not limited to your social security, supplemental security income, veterans benefits, public assistance, workers’ compensation, unemployment insurance, public or private pensions, railroad retirement benefits, black lung benefits or child support payments;
  12. Railroad benefits; and
  13. Black lung benefits.
If you think that any of your money that has been taken or held is exempt, you must act promptly because the money may be applied to the judgment. If you claim that any of your money that has been taken or held is exempt, you may contact the person sending this notice.

Also, YOU MAY CONSULT AN ATTORNEY, INCLUDING ANY FREE LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS IF YOU QUALIFY. You can also go to court without an attorney to get your money back. Bring this notice with you when you go. You are allowed to try to prove to a judge that your money is exempt from collection under New York CPLR sections 5222(a), 5239 and 5240. If you do not have a lawyer, the clerk of the court may give you forms to help you prove your account contains exempt money that the creditor cannot collect. The law (New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, Article 4 and Sections 5239 and 5240) provides a procedure for the determination of a claim for an exemption.

Very truly yours,


Rich Klass, Esq.



FORM 2


CIVIL COURT: CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS
--------------------------------------------------------XIndex No. 123/2009
ABC COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
-against-
JOHN DOE,
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------X

EXEMPTION NOTICE
As required by New York Law

Your bank account is restrained or “frozen.”

The attached Restraining Notice or Notice of Levy by Execution has been issued against your bank account. You are receiving this notice because a creditor has obtained a money judgment against you, and one or more of your bank accounts has been restrained to pay the judgment. A money judgment is a court’s decision that you owe money to a creditor. You should be aware that FUTURE DEPOSITS into your account(s) might also be restrained if you do not respond to this notice.

You may be able to “vacate” (remove) the judgment. If the judgment is vacated, your bank account will be released. Consult an attorney (including free legal services) or visit the Court Clerk for more information about how to do this.

Under state and federal law, certain types of funds cannot be taken from your bank account to pay a judgment. Such money is said to be “exempt.”

DOES YOUR BANK ACCOUNT CONTAIN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF FUNDS?
  1. Social security;
  2. Social security disability (SSD);
  3. Supplemental security income (SSI);
  4. Public assistance (welfare);
  5. Income earned while receiving SSI or public assistance;
  6. Veterans benefits;
  7. Unemployment benefits;
  8. Payments from pensions and retirement accounts;
  9. Disability benefits;
  10. Income earned in the last 60 days (90% of which is exempt);
  11. Workers’ compensation benefits;
  12. Child support;
  13. Spousal support or maintenance (alimony);
  14. Railroad retirement; and/or
  15. Black lung benefits.
If YES, you can claim that your money is exempt and cannot be taken. To make the claim, you must (a) complete the EXEMPTION CLAIM FORM attached; (b) deliver or mail the form to the bank with the restrained or “frozen” account; and (c) deliver or mail the form to the creditor or its attorney at the address listed on the form.

You must send the forms within 20 DAYS of the postmarked date on the envelope holding this notice.

You may be able to get your account released faster if you send to the creditor or its attorney written proof that your money is exempt. Proof can include an award letter from the government, an annual statement from your pension, pay stubs, copies of checks, bank records showing the last two months of account activity, or other papers showing that the money in your bank account is exempt. If you send the creditor’s attorney proof that the money in your account is exempt, the attorney must release that money within seven days. You do not need an attorney to make an exemption using the form.



FORM 3


CIVIL COURT: CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS
--------------------------------------------------------XIndex No. 123/2009
ABC COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
-against-EXEMPTION
JOHN DOE,CLAIM FORM
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------X

Name and address of judgment creditor or attorney
(To be completed by judgment creditor or attorney)
Address A
Name and address of financial institution
(To be completed by judgment creditor or attorney)
Address B
RICHARD A. KLASS, ESQ.
16 Court Street, 28th Floor
Brooklyn NY 11241
BANK
1 Court Street
Brooklyn
 NY 11201

Directions: To claim that some or all of the funds in your account are exempt, complete both copies of this form, and make one copy for yourself. Mail or deliver one form to Address A and one form to Address B within twenty days of the date on the envelope holding this notice.

** If you have any documents, such as an award letter, an annual statement from your pension, paystubs, copies of checks or bank records showing the last two months of account activity, include copies of the documents with this form. Your account may be released more quickly.

I state that my account contains the following type(s) of funds (check all that apply):
( ) Social security;( ) Income earned in the last 60 days (90% of which is exempt);
( ) Social security disability (SSD);( ) Wages while receiving SSI or public assistance;
( ) Supplemental security income (SSI);( ) Payments from pensions and retirement accounts;
( ) Public assistance;( ) Workers’ compensation benefits;
( ) Veterans benefits;( ) Disability benefits;
( ) Child support;( ) Spousal support or maintenance (alimony);
( ) Unemployment insurance;( ) Railroad retirement or black lung benefits;
( ) Other (describe exemption):

I request that any correspondence to me regarding my claim be sent to the following address:
________________________________________________________________________________
(FILL IN YOUR COMPLETE ADDRESS)

I certify under penalty of perjury that the statement above is true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Date: _________________
_________________________________
SIGNATURE OF JUDGMENT DEBTOR



FORM 4


CIVIL COURT: CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS
--------------------------------------------------------XIndex No. 123/2009
ABC COMPANY,
Plaintiff,EXECUTION WITH
-against-NOTICE TO
JOHN DOE,GARNISHEE
Defendant.
--------------------------------------------------------X

TO THE SHERIFF (or MARSHAL) OF ANY COUNTY, GREETING:

WHEREAS, in an action in the Civil Court of the City of New York, County of Kings, between ABC Company, as Plaintiff, and John Doe, as Defendant, a judgment was entered on February 3, 2009, in favor of Plaintiff and against John Doe, Defendant, 123 Main Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, in the amount of $1,000, of which $1,000, together with interest from February 3, 2009, remains due and unpaid;

WHEREAS, a transcript of judgment was filed with the Clerk of the County of Kings on February 3, 2009;

NOW, THEREFORE WE COMMAND YOU to satisfy the said judgment from the real and personal property of the above-named judgment debtor, and the debts due to him; and that only the property in which said judgment debtor, who is not deceased, has an interest or the debts owed to him shall be levied upon or sold hereunder; and to return this Execution to the Clerk of the above-captioned court within 60 days after issuance unless service of this Execution is made within that time or within extensions of that time made in writing by the attorney for the judgment creditor.

PURSUANT to CPLR 5205(l), $2,625 of an account containing direct deposit or electronic payments reasonably identifiable as statutorily exempt payments, as defined in CPLR 5205(l)(2), is exempt from execution and the garnishee cannot levy upon or restrain $2,625 in such an account.

PURSUANT to CPLR 5222(i), an execution shall not apply to an amount equal to or less than 90% of the greater of 240 times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed in the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 or 240 times the state minimum hourly wage prescribed in Labor Law 652 as in effect at the time the earnings are payable, except such part as a court determines to be unnecessary for the reasonable requirements of the judgment debtor and his or her dependents.

NOTICE TO GARNISHEETo:
Address:
BANK
1 Court St., Brooklyn NY 11201

WHEREAS, it appears that you are indebted to the judgment debtor, or in possession or custody of property not capable of delivery in which the judgment debtor has an interest, including the following specified debt and/or property:
all savings, checking, and time deposit accounts; safe deposit boxes; loan security; etc.

NOW THEREFORE, you are required by CPLR Section 5232(a) forthwith to transfer to the Sheriff all personal property not capable of delivery in which the judgment debtor is known or believed to have an interest now in or hereafter coming into your possession or custody including any property specified in this notice; and to pay to the Sheriff, upon maturity, all debts now due or hereafter coming due from you to the judgment debtor; and to execute any documents necessary to effect such transfer or payment; and

TAKE NOTICE, that until such transfer or payment is made, or until the expiration of 90 days after the service of this Execution upon you, or such further time as is provided by any Order of the Court served upon you, whichever event occurs first, you are forbidden to make or suffer any sale, assignment, or transfer of, or interference with, any such property, or pay over or otherwise dispose of any such debt, to any person other than the Sheriff, except upon direction of the Sheriff or pursuant to an Order of the Court; and

TAKE FURTHER NOTICE, that at the expiration of 90 days after a levy is made by service of this Execution, or of such further time as the Court, upon motion of the judgment creditor has provided, this levy shall be void except as to property or debts which have been transferred or paid to the Sheriff, or as to which a proceeding under CPLR Sections 5225 or 5227 has been brought.

Dated:Brooklyn, New York
January 1, 2013
________________________
RICHARD A. KLASS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
16 Court Street, 28th Floor
Brooklyn, New York 11241


FORM 5


CIVIL COURT: CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS

Index No. 123/2009
ABC COMPANY,
Judgment CreditorINCOME EXECUTION

Judgment Debtor (name and last known address):
John Doe
123 Main Street
Brooklyn, NY  11201
To the Enforcement Officer,
GREETING:

A judgment was entered in the within court in favor of Judgment Creditor and the particulars are as follows:
Court of Original Entry:Entry Date:Original Amount:Amount Due:Interest from:
Civil Court, Kings County2/3/09$1,000.00$1,000.002/3/09

The judgment was recovered against John Doe, Defendant, and transcripted with the Clerk of Kings County on February 3, 2009.

This Execution is issued against John Doe, whose last known address is: 123 Main Street, Brooklyn, NY 11201, and whose social security number is 123-45-6789, and who is receiving, or will receive wages of $500.00 for each weekly pay period from the Employer. "Employer" herein shall include any payor of money to Judgment Debtor. The Employer's name and address is:
XYZ Warehouse, 25 Court St., Brooklyn, NY 11201

You are directed to satisfy the judgment with interest together with your fees and expenses out of all moneys now and hereafter due and owing to Judgment Debtor from the Employer pursuant to CPLR §5231.

Directions to Judgment Debtor: You are notified and commanded immediately to start paying to the Enforcement Officer serving a copy of this Income Execution on you: installments amounting to 10% (but no more than the limits set forth in I. Limitations below) of any and all salary, wages, or other income, including any and all overtime earnings, commissions, or other irregular compensation received or hereafter to be received from your Employer and to continue paying such installments until the judgment with interest and the fees and expenses of this Income Execution are fully paid and satisfied, and if you fail to do within 20 days, this Income Execution will be served upon the Employer by the Enforcement Officer.

Directions to the Employer: You are commanded to withhold and pay over to the Enforcement Officer serving a copy of this Income Execution upon you: installments amounting to 10% (but no more than the limits set forth in I. Limitations below) of any and all salary, wages, or other income, including any and all overtime earnings, commissions, or other irregular compensation now or hereafter becoming due to Judgment Debtor until the judgment with interest and the fees and expenses of this Income Execution are fully paid and satisfied.

Dated:Brooklyn, New York
January 1, 2013
________________________
RICHARD A. KLASS, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
16 Court Street, 28th Floor
Brooklyn, New York 11241
718-643-6063


IMPORTANT STATEMENT

This Income Execution directs the withholding of up to 10% of Judgment Debtor's gross income. In certain cases, however, state or federal law does not permit the withholding of that much of Judgment Debtor's gross income. The Judgment Debtor is referred to New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, Section 5231 and United States Code, Title 15, Section 1671.

I. Limitations on the amount that can be withheld:
A. An Income Execution for installments from a judgment debtor's gross income cannot exceed 10% of the judgment debtor's gross income.
B. If a judgment debtor's weekly disposable earnings are less than the greater of 30 times the current federal minimum wage ($7.25 per hour) or $217.50, or the New York State minimum wage ($8.00 per hour) or $240.00, no deduction can be made from the judgment debtor's earnings under this Income Execution.
C. A judgment debtor's weekly disposable earnings cannot be reduced below the amount arrived at by multiplying 30 times the greater of the current federal minimum wage ($7.25 per hour) or $217.50, or the New York State minimum wage ($8.00 per hour) or $240.00 under this Income Execution.
D. If deductions are being made from a judgment debtor's earnings under any orders for alimony, support, or maintenance for family members or former spouses, and those deductions equal or exceed 25% of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings, no deduction can be made from the judgment debtor's earnings under this Income Execution.
E. If deductions are being made from a judgment debtor's earnings under any orders for alimony, support, or maintenance for family members or former spouses, and those deductions are less than 25% of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings, deductions can be made from the judgment debtor's earnings under this Income Execution. However, the amount arrived at by adding the deductions from earnings made under this Execution to the deductions made from earnings under any orders for alimony, support, or maintenance for family members or former spouses cannot exceed 25% of the judgment debtor's disposable earnings.
Note: Nothing in this notice limits the proportion or amount which may be deducted under any order for alimony, support, or maintenance for family members or former spouses.

II. Explanation of limitations:
Definitions: a) Disposable earnings - Disposable earnings are that part of an individual's earnings left after deducting those amounts that are required by law to withheld (for example: taxes, social security, and unemployment insurance, but not deductions for union dues, insurance plans, etc.); b) Gross Income - Gross Income is salary, wages, or other income, including any and all overtime earnings, commissions, and income from trusts, before any deductions are made from such income.

Illustrations regarding earnings:

If disposable earnings is:

Amount to pay or deduct from earnings under this
Income Execution is:
a) 30 times the greater of the federal minimum wage ($217.50) or the New York State minimum wage ($240.00) or less.No payment or deduction is allowed.
b) more than 30 times the greater of the federal minimum wage ($217.50) or the New York State minimum wage ($240.00) and less than 40 times the greater of the federal minimum wage ($290.00) or the New York State minimum wage ($320.00).The lesser of: the excess over the greater of 30 times the federal minimum wage ($217.50) or the New York State minimum wage ($320.00) in disposable earnings, or 10% of gross earnings.
c) 40 times the greater of the federal minimum wage ($290.00) or the New York State minimum wage ($320.00) or more.The lesser of: 25% of disposable earnings or 10% of gross earnings.

III. Notice: You may be able to challenge this Income Execution through procedures provided in CPLR §§5231(i) and 5240.
If you think that the amount of your income being deducted under this Income Execution exceeds the amount permitted by state or federal law, you should act promptly because the money will be applied to the judgment. If you claim that the amount of your income being deducted under this Income Execution exceeds the amount permitted by state or federal law, you should contact your employer or other person paying your income. YOU MAY CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY, INCLUDING LEGAL AID IF YOU QUALIFY. New York law provides two procedures through which an Income Execution can be challenged.
CPLR 5231(i) - Modification: At any time, the judgment debtor may make a motion to a court for an Order modifying an Income Execution.
CPLR 5240 - Modification or protective order: supervision of enforcement: At any time, Judgment Debtor may make a motion to a court for an Order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending, or modifying the use of any post-judgment enforcement procedure, including the use of Income Executions.

Return (for Sheriff's or Marshal's use only)
( ) Fully satisfied on: _____________________( ) Unsatisfied
( ) Partially satisfied: _____________________$___________
( ) Because I was unable to find the Garnishee (Employer) within my jurisdiction, I returned this Income Execution to Judgment Creditor's Attorney on: ______________________.
Date and time received:_________________________
( ) Marshal, City of New York
( ) Sheriff, County of


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Analysis of Exempt Income Protection Act
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Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.
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copyr. 2013 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.