Striking the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action

When a former client sues his attorney for legal malpractice, the defendant-attorney/law firm will almost invariably put forward, as part of its defense of the law suit, the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations. In New York State, the period in which an attorney may be sued (whether for a tort [civil wrong] or breach of contract) is generally three (3) years from the date of malpractice. If the client does not sue the attorney/law firm within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, then the case is “time barred” and may be dismissed as having been filed too late.


When the defendant attorney alleges in his Answer to the law suit that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, it is essential to deal with the issue as soon as practicably possible. One effective way is to make a motion to the trial judge to “strike” (or dismiss) the Affirmative Defense from the Answer. Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3211(b) provides that a party may move to strike an affirmative defense.

Affirmative Defense – Statute of Limitations:

In a recent case, the defendant law firm asserted the Affirmative Defense that the legal malpractice action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss the Affirmative Defense. The motion requested that this affirmative defense be stricken, since it was alleged that the plaintiff-injured person brought the action within the applicable three-year statute of limitations period, as specified in CPLR 214(6).

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In the recent case, the allegation of legal malpractice against the defendant law firm was that there was a ‘blown’ statute of limitations because the law firm did not timely sue the potentially liable party. In that situation, the New York State Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 79 NY2d 777 [1991], the Court of Appeals held:

A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law §1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.

In the case, the plaintiff’s incident was alleged to have occurred on June 4, 2003. According to Public Authorities Law §1276, an action would have to have been brought against the LIRR within one year and thirty days after the incident. The defendant law firm was alleged to have failed to timely do so and the time in which to do so passed on their ‘watch.’

The Continuous Representation Toll:

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is ‘tolled’ during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

In the case, the defendant law firm was alleged to have continuously represented the injured plaintiff up until August 2007, as represented by the proceedings brought on his behalf and the correspondence between the parties. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations in which to sue the defendant law firm for legal malpractice for having missed the opportunity to have sued the proper party for the incident that resulted in the client’s injury started ticking when the law firm no longer represented him.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Asking the Court to Grant Partition and Sale of Jointly-Owned Property

In a recent case, in which Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, represented one of three owners of real property asked the trial judge to grant ‘summary judgment’ against the other owners, granting his motion to partition and sell the real property at auction. In support of the motion, it was requested that the court grant partition and sale, in accordance with Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law [RPAPL] Article 9.

It was also requested that the court order the distribution of the net proceeds  from the auction sale of the real property to the parties in one-third interests, along with crediting the plaintiff for the moneys paid at closing when the property was first purchased.

RPAPL Section 901 provides that one who holds an interest in real property as a tenant in common may bring an action against the other tenants-in-common for the partition or sale of the property. The action was brought by Plaintiff as a tenant-in-common against the other two owners. The Plaintiff had to prove the following:

A: Plaintiff is ‘seised’ with an interest in the Property:

In the action, there was no issue of fact that Plaintiff had a right to possession of the property as a co-tenant, which is all that is needed to maintain an action for partition and sale. See, Dalmacy v. Joseph, 297 AD2d 329 (2d Dept. 2002). He was one of the three owners of the property, as indicated on the face of the Deed.

Pursuant to RPAPL 915, it was requested that the court issue an Order determining the parties’ rights, shares, and interest in and to the property.

B: Physical partition would be prejudicial:

Then, the plaintiff had to show that the property could not be physically partitioned in order to sell the entire property as one. In that case, a physical partition of the house would not have been practical and without prejudice to the owners, given that it was a three story brownstone. See, e.g. Cheslow v. Huttner, 13 Misc.3d 1224(A) (Sup. Ct., NY Co. 2006) (physical partition of a townhouse would be greatly prejudicial to the owners); Donlon v. Diamico, 33 AD3d 841 (2d Dept. 2006) (plaintiff established her entitlement to summary judgment directing the sale of the property because partition alone could not be made without great prejudice to the owners).

Based upon RPAPL 915, where it would be prejudicial to the owners to physically partition the property, the court should direct the property to be sold.

C: Plaintiff should be credited for the down payment:

Since partition, although statutory, is equitable in its nature, the court may compel the parties to do equity between themselves when adjusting the proceeds of the sale. Oliva v. Oliva, 136 AD2d 611. It has been held that a court may consider, among its factors of considering the equities of the partition and sale action, the down payment made by a co-tenant. Perrin v. Harrington, 146 AD 292.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Plaintiffs Should Be Permitted to Amend the Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3025

Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3025 authorizes the amendment of a pleading in an action, including the Complaint of the plaintiff. According to subsection (b) of CPLR 3025, leave of court is needed to amend a pleading once issue has joined; however, it should be freely given to a party.

New York courts have held that, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the amendment of a pleading should be freely granted by a court. See, Kushner v. Queens Transit, 97 AD2d 432 (2d Dept. 1983); Sotomayor v. Princeton Ski Outlet Corp., 199 AD2d 197 (1st Dept. 1993). It is also well established law that a motion to amend a pleading should be freely given absent a showing by an opposing party of surprise or prejudice. Zacher v. Oakdale Islandia Ltd. Partnership, 211 AD2d 712 (2d Dept. 1995); Santori v. Met Life, 11 AD3d 597 (2d Dept. 2004).


In a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, it was urged that, since the action had not been pending for a significant period of time, and was not on the eve of trial, no prejudice could be shown by defendants to the amendment of the Complaint. See, e.g., Kopel v. Chiulli, 175 AD2d 102 (2d Dept. 1991). Case law has held that delay in seeking to amend the Complaint does not bar such relief. Haven Associates v. Douro Realty Corp., 96 AD2d 526 (2d Dept. 1983).


Finally, Plaintiff provided the trial court with a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to be served upon the defendants. See, Anderson Properties Inc. v. Sawhill Tubular Division Cyclops Corp., 149 AD2d 949 (4th Dept. 1989).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.