Showing posts with label litigation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label litigation. Show all posts

Monday, April 13, 2015

Tender of Payment

A seldom-used tactic in litigation is the "tender" of payment by a defendant of an amount which is believed to be due to the plaintiff. If the proper amount is tendered, and the plaintiff does not accept that amount, then the defendant will not be found liable for interest and court costs.

This legal tactic was successfully used by the author in a case involving the building of a large boys' yeshiva. The yeshiva purchased a building to tear it down and construct a new school. The prior owner took back a mortgage from the yeshiva for $900,000, with interest-only payments for 15 years and no prepayments allowed. Shortly after the purchase, the yeshiva obtained work permits to demolish the existing structure to build the new school building.

The mortgagee/prior owner brought an injunction action, claiming that the demolition of the existing structure violated the terms of the mortgage (a common clause in the form of mortgage states that the mortgagee's consent is needed before alteration of the structure on the mortgaged premises in order to protect the value of the collateral). During the course of ongoing court conferences, the yeshiva offered to pay off the mortgage in full, but the mortgagee was insistent on obtaining not only the principal amount of $900,000 but also the future 14 1/2 years' worth of interest (a windfall of about $1.2 million).

The mortgagee then decided to unilaterally declare a default under the mortgage, alleging that the disconnection of the water and electric lines amounted to an alteration of the structure; her attorney served an "acceleration notice," demanding the payment of the mortgage in full plus accrued interest.

From an initial review of the situation, it looked bleak for the yeshiva. But, upon further examination, the concept of "tender" saved the day! The yeshiva collected pledges totaling $911,000 (the principal amount plus accrued interest to the date of tender) and deposited that amount with the Clerk of Kings County as a "tender." A motion was then made to dismiss both the injunction and foreclosure actions based upon the tender.

The court held that there was a valid tender, since the mortgagee accelerated the mortgage note, seeking the unpaid principal amount with "accrued" interest. Based upon the ambiguity of the language of the mortgage note, "accrued interest" may have meant interest accrued only to the date of default or future interest past the date of default.

Tender can be effectively utilized in situations where the defendant expects to owe something to the plaintiff but nowhere near the amount claimed. A tender can place a greater onus on the plaintiff to substantiate additional damages. Further, it can be a good method of settling a case by offering the plaintiff an amount which it may be willing to accept to terminate the litigation.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2015 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, April 3, 2015

Debt Collection Tips: Motions to Dismiss Affirmative Defenses or Counterclaims

After a suit is filed against a debtor to collect upon a debt, the defendant will file an Answer which may include "affirmative defenses" or "counterclaims."  These allegations must be handled with vigilance from the onset to attempt successful recovery in the litigation.

An "affirmative defense" is a defense to a law suit which must be proved by the defendant.  Examples of affirmative defenses would include, e.g., bankruptcy, statute of limitations, improper service, and accord and satisfaction.  The notion is that those types of defenses would likely be determinative to the claim.  Therefore, the defendant must assert them in the Answer so as not to "surprise" the plaintiff-creditor at the time of trial.  Some affirmative defenses must be asserted either pre-Answer or in the Answer, or they are deemed waived by the defendant.  After receipt of the Answer, the plaintiff's counsel should scan the Answer to identify any affirmative defenses and assess their viability.  To the extent that an affirmative defense seems frivolous, meritless, or superfluous, an appropriate motion to dismiss the affirmative defense should be made sooner rather than later.  The court will then determine whether to sustain the affirmative defense or dismiss it from the onset of the litigation.

As to any counterclaims which may be asserted in the Answer, a careful review must take place as to whether it relates to the matter complained of in the complaint, or relates to a separate matter.  Sometimes, the plaintiff will have an insurance policy which covers the counterclaim, and the insurance company will provide a defense to the counterclaim separate from the prosecution of the underlying suit.  If it is deemed that the counterclaim "fails to state a valid cause of action," then an appropriate motion may be brought to dismiss the same.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, December 29, 2014

Cause of Action for Interference with Contract

A cause of action is properly alleged against defendants for their interference with contract when the following elements are set forth:

The Second Department held, in Miller v. Theodore-Tassy, 92 AD3d 650 [2012], that:
To prevail on a cause of action alleging tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must establish "the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party, defendant's knowledge of that contract, defendant's intentional procurement of the third-party's breach of the contract without justification, actual breach of the contract, and damages resulting therefrom" citing Lama Holding Co. v. Smith Barney, 88 NY2d 413, 424.
— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, December 19, 2014

Statute Of Limitations For Actions Against Public Authority

A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law §1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, December 12, 2014

An attorney maintains a common law and statutory charging lien in the judgment

Under common law, an attorney was originally only entitled to a lien upon the judgment but the scope of the charging lien was extended by statute [Judiciary Law §475] to give the attorney a lien upon the client's cause of action as well. The lien comes into existence, without notice or filing, upon commencement of the action or proceeding. See, Matter of Heinsheimer, 241 NY 361 [1915]. In Matter of Heinsheimer, Judge Cardozo stated,
If the attorney got possession of the fund, he had a general lien. If he did not get possession, his lien was for the services that brought the fund into existence. This charging lien still exists under our statutes. It has been enlarged to the extent that it now attaches to a cause of action even before judgment. ‘From the commencement of an action or special proceeding‘ the attorney now has a lien ‘upon his client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosoever hands they may come.‘ (Judiciary Law, Cons. Laws, ch. 30, sec. 475.) Except as thus changed, the charging lien is today what it was at common law.
The concept of protecting an attorney’s lien in litigation from inception through and after entry of judgment is an old one. As stated in the decision of Fischer-Hansen v. The Brooklyn Heights Railroad Company, 173 NY 492 [1903].

There is much learning in the books relating to the lien of an attorney upon a judgment for his costs as it existed before the statute, and though now virtually obsolete, it shows the fixed determination of the courts to protect attorneys against fraudulent settlements. The lien upon a judgment was not created by statute, but was ‘a device invented by the courts for the protection of attorneys against the knavery of their clients by disabling their clients from receiving the fruits of recoveries without paying for the valuable services by which the recoveries were obtained.’ Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 NY 157 [1889].

In Peri v. The New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, 152 NY 521 [1897], the Court of Appeals held that an attorney’s charging lien is a statutory lien “of which all the world must take notice, and any one settling with a plaintiff without the knowledge of his attorney, does so at his own risk.” In this case, that risk is borne by all of the defendants.

New York Judiciary Law Section 475 provides:
From the commencement of an action, special or other proceeding in any court or before any state, municipal or federal department, except a department of labor, or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, or the initiation of any means of alternative dispute resolution including, but not limited to, mediation or arbitration, or the provision of services in a settlement negotiation at any stage of the dispute, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come; and the lien cannot be affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and enforce the lien.
The Court of Appeals noted, in Matter of City of New York (United States of America-Coblentz), 5 NY2d 300 [1959], that the statute gives an attorney a lien on the cause of action which attaches to the judgment from the commencement of the action. In the decision, the Court stated that Section 475, in substance, declares the common law. The origin of an attorney's lien, whether as retaining or as charging, is obscure, but in all events, irrespective of type, has been recognized and enforced by the courts from very early times (see Fourth Annual Report of N. Y. Judicial Council, 1938, p. 49; 7 C. J. S., Attorney and Client, § 210 et seq.; 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, § 208 et seq.). The underlying purpose at both common law and now, by statute, is to protect an attorney against the ‘knavery of his client’ (Matter of Rosentover v. Weiss, 247 AD 137 affirmed 272 N.Y 557; Goodrich v. McDonald, 112 NY 157) and, being created by statute, does not require the giving of any notice in order to bring it into existence (Matter of Drake v. Pierce Butler Radiator Corp., 202 Misc. 935) for it is generally regarded as an equitable assignment to the attorney of the fund procured by his efforts to the extent of the amount of his lien (Matter of Herlihy, 274 AD 342).

Other parties do not have the ability to destroy the attorney’s vested property rights in and to the Judgment. See, LMWT Realty Corp. v. Davis Agency, Inc., 85 NY2d 462 [1995] (“Manifestly, then, an attorney's charging lien is something more than a mere claim against either property or proceeds; an attorney's charging lien “is a vested property right created by law and not a priority of payment”).

In enforcing the charging lien, the attorney is not required to solely chase after his client for the money he is owed; he can also pursue the other defendants. In Haser v. Haser, 271 AD2d 253 [1 Dept. 2000], the court held that, under New York law, a plaintiff's attorney may enforce her statutory charging lien against the defendant's own assets, if he still possesses the settlement proceeds or knowingly paid them to the plaintiff so as to deprive the attorney of her compensation (citing to Kaplan v Reuss, 113 AD2d 184, 186-187, affd 68 NY2d 693; Fischer-Hansen v Brooklyn Hgts. R. R. Co., 173 NY 492, 502). The lien which attaches in the attorney's favor cannot be impaired by a collusive settlement.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, November 5, 2014

Klass in the News: Yoko Ono’s publicist sues Eataly for $20M after bouncer ‘beatdown’

By Julia Marsh and Natasha Velez
PageSix
August 29, 2014 | 11:52am

Maybe the security guards at Mario Batali‘s Eataly need to give peace a chance.

Yoko Ono‘s publicist is suing the Manhattan pasta emporium for at least $20 million after he was allegedly beaten up by bouncers, thrown through a glass window and then called a “p—–” and a “f—–.”

Kip Kouri, head of Tell All Your Friends PR, was trying to get a table at Eataly’s popular rooftop beer garden Birreria on July 17 when he was “violently assaulted by” 10 unnamed security guards, according to his Manhattan civil suit.

His attorney, Richard Klass, told The Post his client was at the Fifth Avenue eatery with his boyfriend, sister and stepmother and got into an argument with the hostess about his reservation....(more)


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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, October 15, 2014

Klass in the News: Eataly sued by Yoko Ono’s public relations agent, who restaurant rep says was 'visibly intoxicated'

Kip Kouri claims he was ‘thrown’ through a plate glass window by bouncers who also made homophobic remarks. In a statement, restaurant spokeswoman Cristina Villa said Kouri was 'acting as a potential threat to others.'

By Barbara Ross and Corky Siemaszko
New York Daily News
Published: August 29, 2014, 11:29am
Updated: August 30, 2014, 12:14am

What a pane!

Yoko Ono’s flack claims he was “thrown” through a plate glass window by three bigoted bouncers at celebrity chef Mario Batali’s eatery Eataly, and is now suing the operation for $10 million.

Kip Kouri claims in court papers the strongmen called him a “p---y” and a “f----t” and that he suffered a severe gash on one leg that required 60 stitches to close.

“It took a significant amount of force to do what they did,” Kouri’s lawyer, Richard Klass, said Friday. “This was a thick window.”...(more)



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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, October 8, 2014

Pay the Worker on the Day He (or She) Works

We can do it!, ca. 1942 - ca. 1943; Creator(s): Office for Emergency Management. War Production Board.

This guiding principle is so important that it is laid out in several passages throughout the Bible. It is incumbent upon an employer to pay the wages of its employees on a timely basis. If the employer does not pay its employees, New York State law provides employees with significant remedies, including an entitlement to monetary penalties against the employer over and above the unpaid wages and the recovery of attorney’s fees.

Some teachers in a private religious school were not paid their salaries for several months. The school’s administration claimed that, due to the nonpayment of tuition by a large number of the parent body, the school could not pay these teachers. In the meantime, however, the school continued to pay some of its teachers, business-as-usual. One of the teachers who was not paid her salary hired Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to help recover her unpaid wages.

100% liquidated damages under NY’s labor law

An action was brought on behalf of the teacher against the private religious school for the unpaid wages. The complaint also sought the additional amount of liquidated damages that may be awarded to an employee for wages owed by an employer on an unpaid wage claim. The entitlement to this additional element of damages (“equal to 100% of the total amount of the wages found to be due”) and reasonable attorney’s fees are provided for in New York State Labor Law §198(1-a). Specifically, Labor Law §198(1-a) provides, in relevant part:
In any action instituted in the courts upon a wage claim by an employee or the commissioner in which the employee prevails, the court shall allow such employee to recover the full amount of any underpayment, all reasonable attorney's fees, prejudgment interest as required under the civil practice law and rules, and, unless the employer proves a good faith basis to believe that its underpayment of wages was in compliance with the law, an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to one hundred percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due.
Under the above statute, an employer must be able to prove that it had a “good faith basis” to believe that its failure to pay its employees was in compliance with the law in order to avoid an award of liquidated damages. In this case, it was urged that the school had no valid basis for not paying its teachers.

Religious school can be sued in secular court

The religious school argued that the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution (separation of church and state) barred the government’s excessive entanglement in religion—in essence, stating that this dispute belonged in a rabbinical court. In response to this argument, it was urged that this case was not about religion; it was squarely and fundamentally about the breach of an employment contract.

Courts can apply ‘neutral principles of law’ to dispute

Respecting the place of religion in American society, courts will generally decline to involve themselves in disputes involving religious institutions except under limited circumstances. New York State’s highest court, the Court of Appeals, in Congregation Yetev Lev D’Satmar, Inc. v. Kahan, held that where the matter to be decided does not involve questions of discipline and doctrine but is a temporal matter, a court may inquire and consider the same in the light of the civil contractual rights and obligations of the parties. The Court of Appeals stated, “Civil disputes involving religious parties or institutions may be adjudicated without offending the First Amendment as long as neutral principles of law are the basis for their resolution (see First Presbyterian Church of Schenectady v. United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America). The “neutral principles of law” approach requires the court to apply objective, well-established principles of secular law to the issues.”

In Saffra v. Rockwood Park Jewish Center, Inc., the court held that issues surrounding a rabbi’s employment agreement with a synagogue were not an ecclesiastical matter but rather a matter dealing with a “mundane” contract to be construed by a court. New York law recognizes that “a religious corporation is liable on its contracts the same as any other corporation and, generally, questions concerning the contractual liability of a religious corporation are controlled by the principles governing the contractual powers and liability of corporations generally.” See, 92 N.Y. Jur.2d Religious Organizations, §16. Accordingly, the fact that the school was a religious school would be irrelevant to its liability for breaching its contractual obligations to its teachers for unpaid wages.

There were no religious issues or doctrines presented in this case; the action was brought solely to enforce the teacher’s contract rights to recover her unpaid wages for the period of time that she had already performed under her teaching contract. Faced with the arguments put forth by the teacher, the school relented and paid over $23,000 of back wages owed to the teacher, along with all of her legal fees and expenses.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits: Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011.
Marketing services by The Innovation Works, Inc. www.TheInnovationWorks.com.

Image on page one: We can do it!, ca. 1942 - ca. 1943; Creator(s): Office for Emergency Management. War Production Board.

Wednesday, October 1, 2014

Liability for not having safety devices

Binding precedents from all four Departments of the Appellate Division, including Second Department precedents hold that where it is uncontested that the plaintiff was injured as a result of falling from a ladder, and “at the time of his fall, there were no safety belts, nets, or other safety devices in the area, and he was not equipped with any safety devices. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1)” Denis v. City of New York, 54 A.D.3d 803, 803-804, 863 N.Y.S.2d 773, 773-774 (2d Dep’t 2008); see Lesisz v. Salvation Army, 40 A.D.3d 1050, 837 N.Y.S.2d 238, 240 (2d Dep’t 2007); Velasco v. Green Wood Cemetery, 8 A.D.3d 88, 89, 779 N.Y.S.2d 459, 459-460 (1st Dep’t 2004).

In Velasco, 8 A.D.3d at 89, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 459-460, the Appellate Division, First Department expressly held as follows, directly refuting defense counsel’s ridiculous claim that the subject precedents do not stand for this proposition:
“Defendants argue that the ladder was in no way defective, and that the only cause of the accident was plaintiff's own negligence in helping to set up the ladder in soil and then using it even though he knew that his co-worker was not holding it. The argument overlooks plaintiff's evidence that no safety devices were provided to protect him in the event the ladder slipped. Given an unsecured ladder and no other safety devices, plaintiff cannot be held solely to blame for his injuries (see Davis v. Selina Dev. Corp., 302 A.D.2d 304, 305, 754 N.Y.S.2d 872; Bonanno v. Port Auth., 298 A.D.2d 269, 270, 750 N.Y.S.2d 7; cf. Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs., 1 N.Y.3d 280, 290, 771 N.Y.S.2d 484, 803 N.E.2d 757). Plaintiff's use of the ladder without his co-worker present amounted, at most, to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a section 240(1) claim (see Hernandez v. 151 Sullivan Tenant Corp., 307 A.D.2d 207, 208, 762 N.Y.S.2d 603).”
In Denis, 54 A.D.3d at 803-804, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 773-774, the express language of the Appellate Division, Second Department also directly contradicts the defense counsel’s specious contention:
“As the plaintiff was removing one of the guard frames, the ladder began to shake, causing him to fall to the ground. In his affidavit, the plaintiff asserted that at the time of his fall, there were no safety belts, nets, or other safety devices in the area, and he was not equipped with any safety devices. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff established his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability on the cause of action pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1) ( see Ricciardi v. Bernard Janowitz Constr. Corp., 49 A.D.3d 624, 853 N.Y.S.2d 373; Argueta v. Pomona Panorama Estates, Ltd.,39 A.D.3d 785, 786, 835 N.Y.S.2d 358; Boe v. Gammarati, 26 A.D.3d 351, 351-352, 809 N.Y.S.2d 550; Loreto v. 376 St. Johns Condominium, Inc., 15 A.D.3d 454, 455, 790 N.Y.S.2d 190; Guzman v. Gumley-Haft, Inc., 274 A.D.2d 555, 556, 712 N.Y.S.2d 45).”
Appellate Division, First, Second and Third Department precedents hold that a fall from a ladder or scaffold precipitated by the materials with which plaintiff was working or type of work that the plaintiff was performing, including (1) an electrician being shocked by live wires, (2) a person who fell from a ladder while working on a fence, or (3) a carpenter installing a sign falling from a ladder when the sign suddenly and unexpectedly came loose, sets forth a prima facie violation of the Labor Law, as “it is plain that the ladder he used was not an adequate safety device for the task he was performing, rendering defendants, who admittedly provided no safety devices, absolutely liable under section 240(1) [citations omitted].” Kadoic v. 1154 First Ave. Tenants Corp., 277 A.D.2d 66, 716 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (1st Dep’t 2000); see Castillo v. 62-25 30th Ave. Realty, LLC, 47 A.D.3d 865, 865-866, 850 N.Y.S.2d 616, 617-618 (2d Dep’t 2008); Lodato v. Greyhawk North America, LLC, 39 A.D.3d 491, 492-494, 834 N.Y.S.2d 242, 244-245 (2d Dep’t 2007); Quackenbush v. Gar-Ben Associates, 2 A.D.3d 824, 825, 769 N.Y.S.2d 387, 388 (2d Dep’t 2003); Gange v. Tilles Inv. Co., 220 A.D.2d 556, 558, 632 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (2d Dep’t 1995); Carino v. Webster Place Associates, LP, 45 A.D.3d 351, 352, 845 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (1st Dep’t 2007); Weber v. 1111 Park Ave. Realty Corp., 253 A.D.2d 376, 378, 676 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (1st Dep’t 1998); Quinlan v. Eastern Refractories Co., Inc., 217 A.D.2d 819, 820, 629 N.Y.S.2d 819, 820 (3d Dep’t1995).

In Gange, 220 A.D.2d at 558, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 810, the Appellate Division, Second Department held that an electrician who fell from a ladder after being shocked was entitled to recover under Labor Law § 240(1), as the ladder was an insufficient safety device to prevent him from falling after he was shocked:
“Furthermore, the fact that the plaintiff fell off of the ladder only after he sustained an electric shock does not preclude recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained as a result of the fall from the ladder (see, Izrailev v. Ficarra Furniture, 70 N.Y.2d 813, 523 N.Y.S.2d 432, 517 N.E.2d 1318).”
In Quackenbush, 2 A.D.3d at 825, 769 N.Y.S.2d at 388, the Appellate Division, Second Department explained its rationale in Gange, 220 A.D.2d at 558, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 810, as follows:
“The unrebutted evidence adduced at trial by the plaintiff, an electrician, demonstrated that the defendants, which opted not to call any witnesses or present any evidence at trial, did not provide him with proper protection from height-related dangers connected with his work, and that the ladder on which he worked was inadequate to prevent him from falling 14 feet to the floor after sustaining an electric shock in the course of connecting a ceiling fixture ( see Izrailev v. Ficarra Furniture of Long Is., 70 N.Y.2d 813, 815, 523 N.Y.S.2d 432, 517 N.E.2d 1318).”
In Weber, 253 A.D.2d at 378, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 176, the Appellate Division, First Department expressly adopted the Second Department’s rationale fromGange, 220 A.D.2d at 558, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 810:
Gange v. Tilles Investment Co., 220 A.D.2d 556, 632 N.Y.S.2d 808, is directly on point. There, the Appellate Division, Second Department stated (at 558, 632 N.Y.S.2d 808), ‘the fact that the plaintiff fell off the ladder only after he sustained an electric shock does not preclude recovery under Labor Law § 240(1) for injuries sustained as a result of the fall from the ladder (see, Izrailev v. Ficarra Furniture, 70 N.Y.2d 813, 523 N.Y.S.2d 432, 517 N.E.2d 1318).’”
In Weber, 253 A.D.2d at 378, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 176, the Appellate Division, First Department directly addressed and rejected the argument of the defendant’s herein, holding “[r]egardless of the method employed by plaintiff to remove the fence, the ladder provided to him was not an adequate safety device for the task he was performing and was a proximate cause of the fall and resulting injuries”:
“Plaintiff was entitled to partial summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) cause of action, where he was injured when he fell from a ladder while in the course of removing an eight-foot high fence at a construction site. Regardless of the method employed by plaintiff to remove the fence, the ladder provided to him was not an adequate safety device for the task he was performing and was a proximate cause of the fall and resulting injuries (see Ben Gui Zhu v. Great Riv. Holding, LLC., 16 A.D.3d 185, 791 N.Y.S.2d 43 [2005]; Dunn v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc., 272 A.D.2d 129, 707 N.Y.S.2d 420 [2000] ).”
Binding Appellate Division, First, Second and Fourth Department precedents expressly reject the defense that plaintiff’s negligently performing work outside exposed to the elements, including rain (as instructed by his employer) where it was foreseeable that this type of accident could occur, was the sole proximate cause of the accident, instead holding “[e]vidence of rain, or other ‘concurrent cause’, at the time of the accident does not create a triable issue of fact as to proximate cause where plaintiff has met her burden in establishing her § 240(1) claim [citations omitted]. If anything, the readily foreseeable occurrence of rainy conditions at an outdoor construction site highlights defendants' negligence in failing to provide the statutorily-prescribed safety measures.” Robinson v. NAB Const. Corp., 210 A.D.2d 86, 86-87, 620 N.Y.S.2d 337, 338-339 (1st Dep’t 1994); see Shipkoski v. Watch Case Factory Associates, 292 A.D.2d 587, 588-589, 741 N.Y.S.2d 55, 56-57 (2d Dep’t 2002) (Holding that “to establish a prima facie case pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard was foreseeable, and that an absent or defective protective device of the type enumerated in the statute was a proximate cause of the injuries alleged (see Felker v. Corning, Inc., 90 N.Y.2d 219, 660 N.Y.S.2d 349, 682 N.E.2d 950; Misseritti v. Mark IV Constr. Co., supra)” and this burden is met upon evidence of hazards caused by “neglect, vandalism, and the elements that the plaintiff's work on the third floor exposed him to a foreseeable risk of injury from an elevation-related hazard, and whether the absence of a type of protective device enumerated under Labor Law § 240(1) was a proximate cause of his injuries (see Gold v. NAB Constr. Corp., 288 A.D.2d 434, 733 N.Y.S.2d 681; Norton v. Park Plaza Owners Corp., 263 A.D.2d 531, 694 N.Y.S.2d 411; Avelino v. 26 Railroad Ave., 252 A.D.2d 912, 676 N.Y.S.2d 342).”); Callan v. Structure Tone, Inc., 52 A.D.3d 334, 335, 860 N.Y.S.2d 62, 63 (1st Dep’t 2008) (“Plaintiff worker, an electrician employed by third-party defendant subcontractor, was injured while installing ceiling lights over a weekend in an unventilated room where the temperature was estimated at over 100 degrees; he became dizzy from the heat, then nauseous, and fell from near the top of a 10-foot ladder. The worker recalled that as he attempted to reach down to grab hold of the ladder to stabilize himself, the ladder wobbled, he passed out, and both he and the ladder toppled over. Defendant was the general contractor at the work site, and deposition testimony of its project foreman corroborated the worker's testimony that prior complaints of excessive heat during weekend duty had gone unheeded. The unrefuted evidence of excessively hot work conditions, of which defendant had notice and control; the foreseeable consequence to workers who might suffer heat-related physical symptoms under such circumstances; and the lack of proper safety equipment afforded to elevated workers in light of these conditions, provided a basis for finding defendant strictly liable under Labor Law § 240(1) ( Arce v. 1133 Bldg. Corp., 257 A.D.2d 515, 684 N.Y.S.2d 523 [1999]; see also Cruz v. Turner Constr. Co., 279 A.D.2d 322, 720 N.Y.S.2d 10 [2001]).”); Reisch v. Amadori Const. Co., Inc., 273 A.D.2d 855, 857, 709 N.Y.S.2d 726, 728-729 (4th Dep’t 2000) (“We also reject Amadori's contention that, because plaintiff knew the plank was wet and complained about its safety before using it, there is an issue of fact whether the absence of safety devices was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. “It is well settled that the [plaintiff's] contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim based on Labor Law § 240(1)” (Stolt v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 918, 920, 597 N.Y.S.2d 650, 613 N.E.2d 556; see also, Robinson v. NAB Constr. Corp.,210 A.D.2d 86, 86-87, 620 N.Y.S.2d 337).”); Arce v. 1133 Bldg. Corp., 257 A.D.2d 515, 515-516, 684 N.Y.S.2d 523, 524 (1st Dep’t 1999) (“We note that even if the testimony of defendants' expert witness were sufficient to raise a fact question on the cause of plaintiff's fall, partial summary judgment would still have been properly granted to plaintiffs because defendants failed to provide proper protection to plaintiff, e.g., a scaffold, in the event he became overcome by heat, which was foreseeable under the circumstances (see, Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, Inc., 82 N.Y.2d 555, 562, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127, 626 N.E.2d 912; Robinson v. NAB Constr. Corp., 210 A.D.2d 86, 620 N.Y.S.2d 337).”).

In Robinson, 210 A.D.2d at 86-87, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 338-339, the Appellate Division, First Department expressly rejected the contention that a worker’s performing assigned work outside in the rain was the sole proximate cause of his fall from an elevated worksite, holding:
“Evidence of rain, or other “concurrent cause”, at the time of the accident does not create a triable issue of fact as to proximate cause where plaintiff has met her burden in establishing her § 240(1) claim (see, Iannelli v. Olympia & York Battery Park Co., 190 A.D.2d 775, 776, 593 N.Y.S.2d 553, citing Joyce v. Rumsey Realty Corp., 17 N.Y.2d 118, 122, 269 N.Y.S.2d 105, 216 N.E.2d 317). If anything, the readily foreseeable occurrence of rainy conditions at an outdoor construction site highlights defendants' negligence in failing to provide the statutorily-prescribed safety measures.”
In the instant action, the uncontroverted evidence shows that plaintiff fell when he was shocked by the welding equipment he was forced to use outside in the rain without any shelter being provided (see Shipkoski, 292 A.D.2d at 588-589, 741 N.Y.S.2d at 56-57; Callan, 52 A.D.3d at 335, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 63;Robinson, 210 A.D.2d at 86-87, 620 N.Y.S.2d at 338-339), plaintiff shook, the ladder shifted, sank into the mud, and he and the ladder fell to the ground as a result of the failure to provide any adequate safety devices in violation of Labor Law § 240, so plaintiff has demonstrated a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240(1) cause of action. See id.; Kadoic, 277 A.D.2d at 66, 716 N.Y.S.2d at 387; Davis, 302 A.D.2d at 305, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 872; Costello, 305 A.D.2d at 447, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 80-81; Peter, 300 A.D.2d at 289-290, 750 N.Y.S.2d at 772-773.

The failure to provide safety devices may be a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries sufficient to remove the “sole proximate cause” defense from the case and support the grant of summary judgment to an injured worker. See Denis v. City of New York, 54 A.D.3d 803, 803-804, 863 N.Y.S.2d 773, 773-774 (2d Dep’t 2008); Boe v. Gammarati, 26 A.D.3d 351, 352, 809 N.Y.S.2d 550, 550-551 (2d Dep’t 2006); Brandl v. Ram Builders, Inc., 7 A.D.3d 655, 777 N.Y.S.2d 511, 511-512 (2d Dep’t 2004); Wallace v. Stonehenge Group, Ltd., 1 A.D.3d 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451 (2d Dep’t 2003); Ranieri v. Holt Construction Corp., 33 A.D.3d 425, 822 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“Plaintiff, a sheet metal worker employed by a subcontractor, was injured when he fell from an unsecured ladder with no safety devices provided to protect him. This activity fell within the ambit of Labor Law § 240(1), and the failure to supply plaintiff with a properly secured ladder or any safety devices was a proximate cause of his fall (see Samuel v. Simone Dev. Co., 13 A.D.3d 112, 786 N.Y.S.2d 163 [2004]; Velasco v. Green Wood Cemetery, 8 A.D.3d 88, 779 N.Y.S.2d 459 [2004]). There is no reasonable view of the evidence to support defendants' contention that plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injury, nor is there a triable question of fact as to whether he was solely to blame.”); Peralta v. American Telephone And Telegraph Company, 29 A.D.3d 493, 494, 816 N.Y.S.2d 436, 436-437 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“Unrefuted evidence that the unsecured ladder moved, combined with evidence that no other safety devices were provided to plaintiff, warranted a finding that the owners were absolutely liable under Labor Law § 240(1), notwithstanding claims of comparative negligence (see Velasco v. Green Wood Cemetery, 8 A.D.3d 88, 779 N.Y.S.2d 459 [2004] ), or unsupported claims that plaintiff's conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injuries.”); Morales v. Spring Scaffolding, Inc., 24 A.D.3d 42, 47-49, 802 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-46 (1st Dep’t 2005); Serrano v. 432 Park South Realty Co., LLC, 8 A.D.3d 202, 779 N.Y.S.2d 198, 199 (1st Dep’t 2004); Velasco v. Green Wood Cemetery, 8 A.D.3d 88, 89, 779 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1st Dep’t 2004); Morin v. Machnick Builders, Ltd., 4 A.D.3d 668, 669-670, 772 N.Y.S.2d 388, 390-391 (3d Dep’t 2004); Bonanno v. Port Of Authority Of New York And New Jersey, 298 A.D.2d 269, 270, 750 N.Y.S.2d 7, 8 (1st Dep’t 2002) (“No other safety devices were provided to prevent the fall. Nor does the evidence suggest that plaintiff's own actions were the sole proximate cause of his injury. Thus, plaintiff, as a matter of law, was entitled to recover on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim. Plaintiff was under no obligation to show that the ladder was defective in some manner (Klein v. City of New York, 222 A.D.2d 351, 635 N.Y.S.2d 634, affd. 89 N.Y.2d 833, 652 N.Y.S.2d 723, 675 N.E.2d 458) or to prove that the floor was slippery to make out a Labor Law § 240(1) violation. It was sufficient to show the absence of adequate safety devices to prevent the ladder from sliding or to protect plaintiff from falling. (Orellano v. 29 East 37th Street Realty Corp., 292 A.D.2d 289, 740 N.Y.S.2d 16.)”).

In Morin, 4 A.D.3d at 669-670, 772 N.Y.S.2d at 390-391, the Appellate Division held as follows, directly substantiating plaintiff’s position and directly refuting defense counsel’s specious contention:
“The only elevation related safety device provided to plaintiff was the extension ladder. No ropes or other safety devices were provided to secure the ladder and prevent it from slipping, nor were harnesses provided to prevent plaintiff from hitting the ground if the ladder did slip.... Accordingly, plaintiff established that defendants violated Labor Law § 240(1) and such violation was a cause of his injury (see Tavarez v. Weissman, 297 A.D.2d 245, 246 247 [2002]; Squires v. Robert Marini Bldrs., supra at 808 809; Dennis v. Beltrone Constr. Co., 195 A.D.2d 688, 689 [1993]). As this statutory violation was a proximate cause of plaintiff's fall, plaintiff's own actions cannot be the sole proximate cause of his fall (see Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City, supra at * 6 n 8).”
Similarly, in Serrano, 8 A.D.3d at 202, 779 N.Y.S.2d at 199, the Appellate Division, First Department held as follows:
“Plaintiff established that his accident was attributable to a lack of proper safety equipment and/or the failure to secure the ladder upon which he was working. Even if plaintiff had been negligent in continuing his work in his coworker's momentary absence, no triable issue would therefore be raised as to whether liability should be imposed upon defendant pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), since such negligence would not be susceptible of characterization as the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's harm (see Dasilva v. A.J., Contr. Co., 262 A.D.2d 214).”
The Second Department reached the identical result in Wallace, 1 A.D.3d at 589, 767 N.Y.S.2d at 451:
“The plaintiffs established their entitlement to partial judgment as a matter of law on the issue of liability by presenting evidence that no safety devices were provided (see Taeschner v. M & M Restorations, 295 A.D.2d 598, 745 N.Y.S.2d 41). In opposition, the defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding liability. While a plaintiff cannot recover where his or her conduct was the sole proximate cause of his or her injuries (see e.g. Lozada v. GBE Contr. Corp., 295 A.D.2d 482, 744 N.Y.S.2d 464), that defense was not available to the defendants under the circumstances of this case (seeVacanti v. Habasit Globe, 283 A.D.2d 935, 724 N.Y.S.2d 240; DiVincenzo v. Tripart Dev., 272 A.D.2d 904, 709 N.Y.S.2d 271).”; see also Denis, 54 A.D.3d at 803-804, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 773-774 (quoted above in paragraph 25).
Defendant also claims that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate which safety devices could have been employer to prevent his accident, purportedly preventing plaintiff from proving a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. This contention is both factually and legally incorrect. The defendant’s argument is legally deficient, as binding Appellate Division, First and Third Department precedents which hold “[t]he plaintiff is not ‘required to present evidence as to which particular safety devices would have prevented his injury’ [citations omitted].” Cangialosi v. Gotham Const. Co., LLC, 865 N.Y.S.2d 892, 897-898, 22 Misc.3d 189, 193 (Sup.Ct. Kings County 2008) (Jack M. Battaglia, J.); see Cody v. State, 52 A.D.3d 930, 931, 859 N.Y.S.2d 316, 318 (3d Dep’t 2008) (“Nor was claimant required to prove what additional safety devices would have prevented his injury (see Noble v. AMCC Corp., 277 A.D.2d 20, 21, 714 N.Y.S.2d 495 [2000]). Thus, defendant violated Labor Law § 240(1) as a matter of law (see Kyle v. City of New York, 268 A.D.2d at 196-197, 707 N.Y.S.2d 445; Reed v. State of New York, 249 A.D.2d 719, 720, 671 N.Y.S.2d 820 [1998]), and this violation clearly was a proximate cause of claimant's injury (see Meyers v. State of New York, 30 A.D.3d at 928, 817 N.Y.S.2d 735; Pearl v. Sam Greco Constr., Inc., 31 A.D.3d 996, 997-998, 819 N.Y.S.2d 193 [2006]).”); Noble v. AMCC Corp., 277 A.D.2d 20, 21, 714 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496-497 (1st Dep’t 2000).

In Noble, 277 A.D.2d at 21, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 496-497, a precedent relied on by defendant in its memorandum of law in opposition to plaintiff’s cross-motion, the Appellate Division, First Department expressly rejected the defendant’s contention:
“Assuming plaintiff's slide down the boiler was caused by his hitting his head on an overhead pipe, the cramped quarters in which he was working made such an occurrence foreseeable, and thus required the provision of a safety device (see, Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 N.Y.2d 555, 561-562, 606 N.Y.S.2d 127, 626 N.E.2d 912; Arce v. 1133 Bldg. Corp., 257 A.D.2d 515, 516, 684 N.Y.S.2d 523). Moreover, any comparative negligence by plaintiff would not be a defense to the section 240(1) violation in failing to provide a safety device (see, Ortiz v. SFDS Dev., 274 A.D.2d 341, 342, 712 N.Y.S.2d 94, 96, citing, inter alia, Stolt v. General Foods Corp., 81 N.Y.2d 918, 597 N.Y.S.2d 650, 613 N.E.2d 556). Nor was plaintiff required to present evidence as to which particular safety devices would have prevented his injury (see, Guillory v. Nautilus Real Estate, 208 A.D.2d 336, 338, 624 N.Y.S.2d 110, appeal dismissed and lv. denied 86 N.Y.2d 881, 635 N.Y.S.2d 943, 659 N.E.2d 766).”

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, July 28, 2014

Klass in the News: Yoko Ono Publicist Kip Kouri Injured at NYC Restaurant, Alleges Homophobic Harassment

By Andrew Hampp
Billboardbiz
July 25, 2014 6:00 PM EDT


Link to original article: Yoko Ono Publicist Kip Kouri Injured at NYC Restaurant, Alleges Homophobic Harassment

Kip Kouri, founder of Tell All Your Friends PR, is one of the most familiar and well-liked faces on the New York indie-rock circuit, repping everyone from Yoko Ono to Les Savy Fav to Guided By Voices to white-hot duo Sylvan Esso.

But a recent visit to Eataly, Mario Batali's food emporium in New York's Gramercy Park, ended in a violent altercation with the wait staff, leaving Kouri in stitches after allegedly being thrown through a plate glass window by a security guard. Kouri declined public comment while he sought legal counsel, but clients like Frenchkiss Records' Syd Butler and Miniature Tigers began tweeting in Kouri's defense, suggesting the incident was a hate crime and that a security guard used homophobic slurs against Kouri....

...Kouri declined comment, but deferred to his lawyer Richard Klass, who responded to Billboard in a statement: "Mr. Kouri vehemently denies the allegations made in the statement of Eataly's representative. Mr. Kouri was at Eataly with his stepmother, sister and boyfriend, and a disagreement arose concerning the mishandling by Eataly of Mr. Kouri's reservation. Mr. Kouri proceeded to leave the store after being harassed by Eataly's staff, including being called homophobic slurs and enduring the staff's homophobic hand gestures at him.

"As Mr. Kouri was exiting," Klass continued, "three security guards became physical and began to push Mr. Kouri, his stepmother and sister, all the while calling him names. The security guards then tackled Mr. Kouri and threw him through a glass door, causing him to sustain serious injuries. Footage from Eataly's security cameras were reviewed by the New York City Police Department and the investigation of the matter is pending."



-----------
copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, January 29, 2014

Lenders “Livin' la Vida Loca” till HETPA Ended The Fiesta


In 2006, New York State enacted the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act (“HETPA”) for the purpose of affording greater protection to homeowners who face foreclosure proceedings against their homes. HETPA was instrumental in addressing increasingly rampant swindling where con men, proposing to “help” homeowners out of foreclosure, instead, stole homes and home equity from homeowners through deed/equity thefts and other mortgage foreclosure “rescue” scams. HETPA also gave borrowers greater protection from mortgage lenders (by adding extra steps) in those cases where borrowers couldn’t make mortgage payments and fell into default or foreclosure. HETPA changed certain parts of the Banking Law, Real Property Law (“RPL”), and Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (“RPAPL”).

HETPA spoils all the lenders’ fun

Among the changes put into place by HETPA were:

(i) requiring that, at least 90 days before the foreclosure proceedings are brought, a written notice (the RPAPL §1304 notice*) be served upon the “borrower” by regular and certified mail;

(ii) extending the service of a similar type of “RPAPL §1304 notice” or “90-day notice” called a “pre-disposition notice” upon homeowners who own cooperative apartments, as now required by Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Section 9-611. It is important to note that, unlike houses which are considered “real property,” cooperative apartments are considered “personalty” in some regards — a person who buys a cooperative apartment is actually buying shares of stock in the cooperative housing corporation and a proprietary lease associated with a particular apartment. Before the enactment of HETPA (as amended by the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act of 2009), a co-op unit owner’s shares and proprietary lease could be quickly foreclosed and auctioned off in a matter of a couple of months. Now, the lender has to wait at least 90 days from the pre-disposition notice to exercise its “non-judicial foreclosure” rights and auction off the collateral (the shares of stock in the cooperative housing corporation) for the loan on the cooperative apartment;

(iii) requiring the lender or mortgage servicer to file within 3 days of service of the RPAPL §1304 notice certain information with the New York State Superintendent of Financial Services and provide proof of filing; and

(iv) requiring that a statutorily-specific notice to the homeowner/mortgagor about foreclosure, be served together with the Summons and Complaint (RPAPL §1303 notice**) when foreclosure proceedings are commenced.

You’re a “borrower”? Says who?

Who is considered a “borrower” who must be served with the RPAPL §1304 notice?

All of the RPAPL noticing requirements under HETPA pertain to residential home loans and are designed to give borrowers notice of default in their mortgage payments or other obligations. Two recent court cases resolved an issue unaddressed in the enactment of HETPA and, more specifically, RPAPL §1304, namely: under the statute, what is the definition of a “borrower” who is entitled to the various notices from the lender or mortgage servicer? As you will see from these recent court cases, this is an important issue.

The Second Department held in Aurora Loan Services LLC v. Weisblum, 85 A.D.3d 95, 103 [2 Dept. 2011] that "[P]roper service of the RPAPL §1304 notice containing the statutorily-mandated content is a condition precedent to the commencement of the foreclosure action. The plaintiff's failure to show strict compliance requires dismissal." From this holding, it is certainly apparent that the failure of the mortgage lender/foreclosing plaintiff to serve the RPAPL §1304 notice is fatal to the foreclosure proceedings commenced — before the case can be filed, this first step of serving the notice must be taken.

In Aurora Loan Services LLC v. Weisblum, the mortgaged property was owned by a husband and wife. Only the husband signed the note but both the husband and wife signed the Consolidation, Extension and Modification Agreement (commonly known as a “CEMA”) to secure the note signed by the husband along with a prior mortgage. Before the mortgage lender brought its foreclosure proceeding to foreclose its consolidated mortgage upon the house, it served the RPAPL §1304 notice on the husband who signed the note. However, the lender did not serve the notice on the wife, arguing that she was not a signatory on the note, but only the CEMA. In addition, they argued that service upon her was unnecessary because the wife was not defined in the terms of the note as the “borrower” and, therefore, the plaintiff/mortgage lender was not required to serve the 90-day notice upon her pursuant to RPAPL §1304.

In Aurora Loan Services LLC v. Weisblum, the Second Department stated that the co-mortgagor wife (who signed the CEMA but not the note) was deemed a “borrower” under RPAPL §1304 who was also entitled to receive the 90-day notice prior to the commencement of the foreclosure.

In the follow-up case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Miller, [Sup. Ct. Rockland Co. Index No. 4256/2011, Dec. 11, 2013], the issue was whether a co-mortgagor who did not sign the note was also deemed a “borrower,” under RPAPL §1304, and, therefore, should have also been served with the requisite 90-day notice. In this case, the mortgage lender (Wells Fargo Bank) provided the court with a copy of the purported notice that it allegedly served upon one of the defendants (the husband) and did not provide any proof of service of the requisite RPAPL §1304 notice upon the other defendant (the wife). In response, Wells Fargo Bank argued that the defendant/co-mortgagor wife signed only the mortgage and not the underlying promissory note. The underlying promissory note was signed only by the husband. The bank averred that the wife was not a “borrower” within the meaning of the statute and, therefore, was not entitled to the 90-day notice.

Messing with the wrong borrowers

In response, Richard A. Klass, Esq.Your Court Street Lawyer, successfully argued to the court that both husband and wife were indeed entitled to be served with the 90-day notice required by RPAPL §1304. Specifically, the lender’s own documents were put before the court to prove that the co-mortgagor wife was a “borrower” even under the bank’s definition (on the mortgage’s first page, in the section entitled “Words Used Often In This Document,” the word “Borrower” is stated as “ISRAEL MILLER CHAYA B. MILLER”).

In Aurora Loan Services LLC v. Weisblum, the Second Department recognized the provision in the mortgage instrument that the lender had the right to “enforce its right” against the subject property. Similarly, in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Miller, the mortgage stated: “each of us is fully obligated to keep all of Borrower’s promises and obligations contained in this Security Instrument. Lender may enforce rights under the Security Instrument against each of us individually or against all of us together.”

The court was urged, by the defendants/homeowners in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Miller, that it should recognize, similar to the co-mortgagor in the Aurora Loan Services LLC v. Weisblum case involving a CEMA, that the co-mortgagor wife who did not sign the underlying note has a significant interest in protecting her home from loss in a foreclosure. The design and purpose of RPAPL §1304 is to apprise all owners of residential homes that they risk losing their homes because an obligation was not met (“fair warning”). This initial step of the 90-day notice (which is a “condition precedent” to a foreclosure proceeding) adds an extra layer of support to homeowners who face imminent foreclosure but might find a means to remedy an impending predicament: where their property is in foreclosure; their credit history is damaged; and their lending alternatives have disappeared. Moreover, the non-defaulting property owner who put up her home as collateral for a loan to her spouse deserves to know of her spouse’s default and apprised of her rights prior to the institution of the foreclosure proceeding. Otherwise, the results would be severely harsh and inequitable.

Action Dismissed

In reaching the ultimate decision to dismiss the foreclosure proceeding brought by Wells Fargo Bank, the Supreme Court Justice held: “Therefore, pursuant to the Weisblum case, supra, the Court finds that Defendant Chaya B. Miller is a ‘borrower’ for the purposes of Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law §1304, and Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the strict mandates of that statute require dismissal of the action without prejudice.”
— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

*The language of the letter for the RPAPL §1304 notice:

The RPAPL §1304 notice must be accompanied by a list of at least five housing counseling agencies. The language of the letter for the RPAPL §1304 notice is as follows:


YOU COULD LOSE YOUR HOME. PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING NOTICE CAREFULLY

As of ..., your home loan is ... days in default. Under New York State Law, we are required to send you this notice to inform you that you are at risk of losing your home. You can cure this default by making the payment of ..... dollars by .....

If you are experiencing financial difficulty, you should know that there are several options available to you that may help you keep your home. Attached to this notice is a list of government approved housing counseling agencies in your area which provide free or very low-cost counseling. You should consider contacting one of these agencies immediately. These agencies specialize in helping homeowners who are facing financial difficulty. Housing counselors can help you assess your financial condition and work with us to explore the possibility of modifying your loan, establishing an easier payment plan for you, or even working out a period of loan forbearance. If you wish, you may also contact us directly at .......... and ask to discuss possible options.

If this matter is not resolved within 90 days from the date this notice was mailed, we may commence legal action against you (or sooner if you cease to live in the dwelling as your primary residence.)

If you need further information, please call the New York State Department of Financial Services' toll-free helpline at (show number) or visit the Department's website at (show web address)”.


~ ~ ~

**The specific notice for RPAPL §1303:

The specific notice, to be delivered with the Summons and Complaint, must be printed in big bold letters on colored paper and read as follows:

HELP FOR HOMEOWNERS IN FORECLOSURE

New York State Law requires that we send you this notice about the foreclosure process. Please read it carefully.

Summons and Complaint

You are in danger of losing your home. If you fail to respond to the summons and complaint in this foreclosure action, you may lose your home. Please read the summons and complaint carefully. You should immediately contact an attorney or your local legal aid office to obtain advice on how to protect yourself.

Sources of Information and Assistance

The State encourages you to become informed about your options in foreclosure. In addition to seeking assistance from an attorney or legal aid office, there are government agencies and non-profit organizations that you may contact for information about possible options, including trying to work with your lender during this process.

To locate an entity near you, you may call the toll-free helpline maintained by the New York State Department of Financial Services at (enter number) or visit the Department's website at (enter web address).

Foreclosure rescue scams

Be careful of people who approach you with offers to “save” your home. There are individuals who watch for notices of foreclosure actions in order to unfairly profit from a homeowner's distress. You should be extremely careful about any such promises and any suggestions that you pay them a fee or sign over your deed. State law requires anyone offering such services for profit to enter into a contract which fully describes the services they will perform and fees they will charge, and which prohibits them from taking any money from you until they have completed all such promised services.

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copyr. 2014 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation in Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, December 18, 2012

Right to Surplus Moneys

In certain cases, the Referee in the foreclosure action conducted a sale of the subject real property generates surplus moneys after an auction sale, which are then deposited with the court. After filing of the Referee’s Oath and Report of Sale after foreclosure auction sale, a party can move for confirmation of the Report of Sale more than 3 months but not later than 4 months after the filing of the Report of Sale. RPAPL §1355. Further, upon confirmation of the Report of Sale, and on motion of any party prior to or within 3 months of confirmation of the Report and Sale claiming the surplus moneys which have arisen from the foreclosure auction sale, the Supreme Court shall determine the priorities in such surplus moneys and order distributions thereof. RPAPL §1361.

The Second Department has held that the failure to move to appoint a Referee in a Surplus Money Proceeding following foreclosure of a mortgage within the time prescribed by statute is a mere irregularity which, in the absence of prejudice of any substantial right of a party, may be disregarded. Associated Financial Services, Inc. v. Davis, 183 AD2d 686, 583 NYS2d 274 (2d Dept. 1992).

The potential issue of a defendant or claimant not having filed an Answer or Notice of Appearance in the foreclosure action is not relevant as to whether that party may pursue recovery of surplus moneys. It is well settled that a defendant who defaulted in answering the foreclosure action is not precluded from proving its lien in Surplus Money Proceeding. Riverhead Savings Bank v. Garone 183 AD2d 760, 583 NYS2d 483 (2d Dept. 1992), citing to The Dime Savings Bank of Brooklyn v. Pine Drive Associates, Inc., 28 Misc.2d 648, 212 NYS2d 111 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1961). Further, a second mortgagee/lienor, as a party named in the foreclosure action, is not required to file a Notice of Claim to Surplus Moneys in order to preserve its right to satisfaction of its lien from surplus proceeds of a foreclosure sale. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Grant, 224 AD2d 656, 639 NYS2d 72 (2d Dept. 1996) (“As a party to the foreclosure action, the respondent, secondary mortgagee Marine Midland Bank, was not required to file a notice of claim to the surplus moneys in order to preserve its right to the satisfaction of its lien from the surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale.”).

Where, under a mortgage foreclosure sale, a surplus is realized, and the premises are at the time of such sale subject to a second mortgage, the respective rights of the parties will be determined as of the date of the foreclosure sale. Elsworth v. Woolsey, 19 AD 385, 46 NYS 486 (1st Dept. 1897), affirmed, 154 NY 748, 49 NE 1096 (1897). New York courts have held that those respective rights in the surplus moneys, as enunciated by Elsworth, transfer from the “res” of the action, to wit: the land, to the surplus moneys. In Roosevelt Savings Bank v. Goldberg, 118 Misc.2d 220, 459 NYS2d 988 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1983), the court held:
"Surplus money realized upon a foreclosure sale is not a general asset of the owner of the equity of redemption, but stands in the place of the land for all purposes of distribution among persons having vested interests or liens upon the land. Surplus money takes the place of the equity of redemption, and only one who had a vested estate or interest in the land sold under foreclosure which was cut off by the foreclosure sale, is entitled to share in the surplus money, with priority in each creditor determined by the filing date of his lien or judgment."

— by Richard A. Klass


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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Affidavit of Service Is Primary Proof


The Second Department held, in National Heritage Life Insurance Co. v. T.J. Properties Co., 286 AD2d 715 [2d Dept. 2001], that the affidavit of service of a process server constitutes prima facie evidence of valid service. An affidavit of service by a process server which specifies the papers served, the person who was served, and the date, time, address and sets forth facts showing that service was made by an authorized person, and in an authorized manner, constitute prima facie evidence of proper service. See, Maldonado v. County of Suffolk, 229 AD2d 376 [2 Dept. 1996].

The bare denial of service is insufficient to rebut prima facie proof of proper service pursuant to CPLR 308 created by a process server’s affidavit. Wunsch v. Cerwinski, 36 AD3d 612 [2 Dept. 2007].

by Richard A. Klass


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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Consolidation of Actions

Consolidation is generally favored in the interested of judicial economy and ease of decision-making where cases present common questions of law and facts, unless the opposing party demonstrates that consolidation will prejudice a substantial right. See, Rist v. Comi, 260 AD2d 890 (3d Dept. 1999); Progressive Insurance Co. v. Vasquez, 10 AD3d 518 (1st Dept. 2004); Eagle Pet Service Co., Inc. v. Pacific Employers Insurance Co., 102 AD2d 814 (2d Dept. 1984).

It is not necessary, for purposes of consolidation, that all parties or all issues be common to both actions. See, Fourteen Sharot Place Realty Corp. v. Miceli, 125 AD2d 634 (2d Dept. 1986). The commonalities of the actions and the pressing need for judicial relief may constitute sufficient bases for consolidation of actions.


by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Saturday, April 7, 2012

When Do Two Feet Matter? When $16,728,000 Rides on It!

In 2006, a developer entered into a contract to purchase a large industrial warehouse in Greenpoint, Brooklyn, in order to convert the property into residential housing. The Contract of Sale provided for a purchase price of $16,728,000.

The contract was amended and extended eight times in order to provide for several issues to be resolved. Among those issues, there were tenant buy-out agreements concerning the several remaining commercial tenants. During the entire process, the developer was required to make several types of payments to the seller (separate from the large down payment) towards the operating costs of the property. The developer made substantial payments to the seller, including Surrender Agreements, Tenant Buy-Outs, Operating Expenses, and Security Costs. The property finally became completely vacant, and a closing was to be scheduled in 2007.


Title Defects Raised – Especially Chimney Protrusion

As is common in real estate contracts, there was a clause that all title “defects” were to be cured before closing. A title defect is generally defined as an issue relating to ownership or possession of the property, the legal description of the property to be sold or liens affecting the property – or, more to the point, a title defect is one that a reputable title company believes would render title unmarketable. In this case, the survey revealed that a chimney from an adjoining property was protruding two feet into the property to be sold.


The title defect was raised to the seller’s attorney by the developer. In response, the seller’s attorney claimed that the title defect was insignificant and was being raised as a delay tactic and was without merit. To that end, the seller declared a certain date as the “time of the essence” date for the closing. If the developer did not close on that date, then the down payment and all of the operating costs would be deemed forfeited to the seller. Needless to say, that date came and passed, and the seller declared the developer in breach of the contract, entitling the seller to retain the moneys.


Your Court Street Lawyer, Richard A. Klass, was then retained by the developer to ensure that the down payment moneys would not be lost and title would transfer to the buyer under the Contract of Sale.


Quick Action Was Needed

The first step was to file, along with the Summons and Complaint, a Notice of Pendency (also known as a Lis Pendens) against the Block and Lot of the property. This is a statutory creation under New York’s Civil Practice Law and Rules Article 65. This document gives notice to the entire world that there is a dispute which affects the title, use or possession of real property. The filing of this Notice preserves the rights of the buyer from a seller transferring title to the property in contract, as whoever buys the property is deemed to have knowledge of the dispute.


Simultaneously, the Complaint against the seller was filed with the County Clerk’s Office, which contained several allegations against the seller, including that:


(a) the developer fully complied with the Contract of Sale and was entitled to “specific performance” because real estate is considered a “unique” asset that cannot be replicated (the law recognizes that each piece of real estate is distinct);


(b) the electronic communication from the seller’s attorney to the buyer’s attorney concerning the “time of the essence” closing date did not comply with the “notice” provision of the Contract of Sale (it is always important to check the notice provision of any contract to see how notices to the other side are to be sent, e.g. certified mail, overnight delivery, etc.);


(c) the seller failed to actually “tender” the Deed to the property by coming to the place of closing, as required by the contract (the non-breaching party to a real estate contract must show that it showed up at the place and time indicated in the contract to deliver the Deed, even if the other side does not come; thus, recognizing that the breaching party could potentially show up at the last minute to actually close the transaction); and


(d) the title defects rendered title to the property unmarketable and uninsurable; thus, the developer was entitled to the return of all of its down payment and operating costs.


In New York, it is well settled that in order to place a contract vendor (seller) in default for a claimed failure to provide clear title, the purchaser must first tender performance and demand good title. See, Capozzola v. Oxman, 216 AD2d 509. Following that line, a tender of performance by the purchaser is excused only if the title defect is not curable. See, Cohen v. Kranz, 12 NY2d 242. The law also recognizes that a purchaser may opt to waive a title defect concerning the property in order to close title.


The end result of this case was that, despite the claim of the seller that the developer breached the contract and it was entitled to retain all of the moneys paid, the seller agreed to extend the date of closing for an additional month to facilitate the closing of title to the developer.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Dorfstraße by Giovanni Fattori, 1903-1904.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Force ‘Em to Sell! The Right to Specific Performance



In the typical real estate transaction, the seller is interested in selling the property, the buyer is interested in buying it, and the Contract of Sale is merely used to memorialize the deal and as the basis for the buyer to obtain a mortgage commitment from a mortgage lender. The closing takes place; everyone leaves happy!

Sometimes, however, the seller fails or refuses to comply with the Contract of Sale and sell the property to the buyer. In that circumstance, the legal ramifications of the Contract of Sale come into play. This was the situation in a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, “Your Court Street Lawyer,” and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau last month.

In Korzeniewski v. Estate of Poswolsky, the plaintiff wanted to buy a house in Long Beach, New York. Through a local real estate broker, he found a nice house owned by an 86-year old man looking to sell his house so he could downsize to an apartment. The Contract of Sale was signed, with a sale price of $465,000, in October 2003. Each side had been represented by counsel.

In November 2003, the owner/seller entered into the Nassau University Medical Center complaining of pains, and a pacemaker was installed. The medical records of the hospital had notations that the seller was sometimes disoriented and suffering from dementia. In December 2003, after voluntarily checking himself out of the hospital three weeks earlier, the owner died.

After the owner’s death, his son was appointed the executor of his estate by the Surrogate’s Court. The son/executor informed the buyer that he believed that the real estate broker took advantage of his father, and that the house was really worth more than $200,000 above the original $465,000 sale price. Accordingly, the son disavowed the Contract of Sale, indicating that he would only sell the property to this buyer if he paid the additional moneys.


Real estate is “unique property”:

One of the tenets of contract law is that real estate is considered a “unique” property – one which cannot be substituted with another. That is, just like a snowflake, one piece of property is not the same as any other. Since the house is unique, and no monetary award for breaching of the contract would satisfy the buyer, the buyer brought an action for specific performance against the son/executor. The substance of the action was the request for the judge to direct the executor to “specifically” perform the contract and transfer the Deed to the property for the original sale price.


Lack of evidentiary proof of dementia:

At the conclusion of discovery in the case, including the taking of depositions of the parties and the attorney for the owner/decedent (who happened to be a distant cousin of the owner), a motion was brought for summary judgment in favor of the buyer, awarding him specific performance of the contract. Attached as part of the proof in support of the motion was the petition filed by the executor with the Surrogate’s Court, in which he indicated that the value of the house was $500,000 at the time of death (less than 10% more than the sale price negotiated four months earlier).

In response, the executor put forth two proofs that his father was suffering from dementia and, therefore, lacked the mental capacity to sign the Contract of Sale, namely: (a) the medical records from Nassau University Medical Center (where the notations of dementia appeared in the records); and (b) the affidavit of a neurologist who neither examined the decedent nor consulted with any of his personal physicians, but relied solely upon the medical records which post-dated the signing of the Contract of Sale.


No need for a trial – just make the seller perform the real estate contract:

In granting summary judgment to buyer (which meant that the judge did not believe that there existed any factual issues to be decided by trial), the judge enforced the terms of the Contract of Sale to make the executor “specifically” perform the contract and sell the property for the original sale price. Relying upon case law, the judge found that the buyer proved that he “substantially performed [his] contractual obligations and was willing and able to perform the remaining obligations, that defendant was able to convey the property, and there was no adequate remedy at law.”

In disregarding the executor’s proofs, the judge found that he did not meet his burden of proving that the decedent was incompetent (in order to refute the presumption that people are considered mental competent and capable of making a contract). According to well settled law from the NYS Court of Appeals (Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board), the focus of the inquiry is whether the person’s mind was so affected as to render him wholly incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction at issue. In this case, the executor did not offer any proof that his father was so affected by dementia that he was unable to enter into the Contract of Sale. Further, there was no proof that he was forced or coerced into signing the contract.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2007 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Der Steigbügel. Artist: Giovanni Fattori. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.