Tuesday, December 27, 2011

Seward Park apartment for $33K: "Too Good to be True"

From The Low Down, news from the Lower East Side:

Grand St. Apartment for $33K: Too Good to be True
"...By contrast, a similar case that Salamon’s attorney, Richard Klass, is handling a few blocks away at the Hillman Housing Corp. has garnered no press attention. In that case, plaintiff Elena Slukina of Manhattan bid $180,000 on apartment #GD at 550H Grand St. in April, after the previous owner defaulted. Hillman is attempting to block that sale based on arguments similar to Seward Park’s, according to court documents filed in Supreme Court Sept. 16...."

Read more here:
http://www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2011/12/a-grand-street-apartment-for-33000-too-good-to-be-true.html/trackback


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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, December 12, 2011

Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

BY Barbara Ross
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Thursday, December 1 2011, 9:13 PM

"Linda Salamon thought she won the real estate lottery last May when she bought a $400,000 one-bedroom co-op apartment on the lower East Side for $329,000 at a public auction...."


"...Salamon declined to discuss her battle, but her lawyer Richard Klass said that under state law, the co-op board cannot exercise its right of first refusal because the sale is not voluntary; it was forced by the lender.

"He also noted that Seward Park's board was notified of the auction and could have bid on the apartment when Salamon won the unit...."



Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/seward-park-co-op-board-voids-sale-one-bedroom-auction-33g-article-1.985636#ixzz1gLglMXGb

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, November 21, 2011

Feeling a Million Bucks Better!

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Bad economic times over the past few years have seen the foreclosure of tens of thousands of properties across New York State (as well as around the country). One corporate landlord had two commercial rental buildings located in Brooklyn. Spread across those two buildings was a ‘blanket’ mortgage of $1.1 million (the term ‘blanket mortgage’ refers to one mortgage recorded against two or more properties). The buildings fell into foreclosure as a result of the landlord’s inability to pay the mortgage loan and the general economic downturn in the area. The corporation that owned the buildings and the individual owner who signed a personal guaranty of the mortgage loan were sued in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

On September 30, 2010, the two buildings were sold at the foreclosure auction sale by the court-appointed Referee as one combined lot for $574,000. The mortgage lender’s attorneys prepared the Referee’s Report of Sale and Statement of the balance due to the lender on the mortgage loan after the auction sale (the “deficiency”), which was computed as follows: Total due Plaintiff: $1,408,111.61. Amount of Bid: $574,000. Deficiency: $834,111.61.

After the foreclosure auction sale, the plaintiff-mortgage lender filed a motion with the court, asking the judge to grant a Deficiency Judgment against the corporation and the individual owner based upon his personal guaranty. The defendants did not receive notice of the motion. The motion was granted and the court entered a Deficiency Judgment against them for $902,506.17.

The individual guarantor (and now judgment debtor), came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal advice to challenge the Deficiency Judgment.


Deficiency Judgment:

Mortgage foreclosures in New York are governed by Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). The normal flow of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is: (a) filing and serving the Summons and Complaint; (b) having the court appoint a referee to determine how much is due to the lender on the mortgage loan; (c) granting the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, allowing the mortgage lender to “foreclose” the mortgage upon its collateral (security for the loan) – the house; and then (d) conduct an auction sale of the house to satisfy the debt owed.

Many times, the foreclosure auction sale of the property does not sell for enough money to pay off the debt due to the mortgage lender/bank. When a property is worth less than the amount due on the mortgage, the property is considered “underwater.” If, after the sale, the lender is still due money for its debt under the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the lender may bring a request for the judge to award a judgment for the balance of the money due for its debt – it is asking for a Deficiency Judgment to be entered against the person or people liable under the mortgage note (the term “deficiency” referring to the remaining shortage due to the bank). The procedure for requesting the Deficiency Judgment is laid out in RPAPL Section 1371, and it must be strictly followed.


Attacking the Validity of the Deficiency Judgment:

At the stage that the client retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to help, a game plan to attack the Deficiency Judgment had to be formulated and put into action. The entire file in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, including all of the pleadings, motions, and court orders had to be obtained from court and reviewed to see whether every step taken by the mortgage lender was proper – in other words, did the mortgage lender cross every “t” and dot every “i”?

1. Motion made after 90-day time limit. The Referee’s Deed from the auction sale was dated October 9, 2010. The date that the motion was served upon the defendants, January 11, 2011, exceeded the 90-day time limit specified in RPAPL 1371(2) by four days. New York case law has held that the 90-day time period in which to request that a deficiency be granted is considered a “statute of limitations” and, if not made within this period, it is time-barred. Thus, it was argued that the plaintiff-mortgage lender made the motion too late.

2. Improper calculation of the deficiency. In RPAPL 1371(2), it states that the deficiency is the amount owing less “the market value determined by the court or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher.” The plaintiff calculated the deficiency based upon the lower sale price ($574,000) instead of the higher appraised fair market value ($675,000), which would have resulted in a lower deficiency amount (by over $100,000).

3. Both properties were sold together as one combined lot. For some reason, the plaintiff opted to lump together two separate and distinct properties into one foreclosure sale. By conducting the sale of both properties at the same time, it was argued the plaintiff waived the right to claim a deficiency against the defendant. In Sanders v. Palmer, 68 NY2d 180 [1986], the Court of Appeals held that “there shall be separate sales of the security in such order as the court may fix, and an application after each sale and before the next occurs for determination of the deficiency resulting from the sale, for otherwise what remains due and payable from the additional security provided cannot be known.” Here, the plaintiff decided to sell both properties as a “package deal” without selling each property separately; therefore, the proper deficiency could not have been determined.

4. The personal guaranty was “limited” to $55,000. But, perhaps, the most glaring mistake in the foreclosure proceedings was that the personal guaranty of the individual owner (attached to the Complaint) stated on its face that it was limited to only $55,000 of the mortgage debt plus the legal expenses and costs associated with protecting the collateral. This was not brought to the attention of the judge when the plaintiff made the motion for the deficiency.

Based upon the several errors in the motion and procedures taken to obtain the Deficiency Judgment, the plaintiff-mortgage lender agreed to vacate and dismiss the Deficiency Judgment against the individual guarantor. Instead of owing the bank close to $1 million, he wound up owing $0!

— RAK

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.



Credits:
Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011.
Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc. www.TheInnovationWorks.com
Image at top: The Merry Fiddler, 1623, by Gerard van Honthorst (1590-1656). This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired. This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This image is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.

Tuesday, November 1, 2011

Who Are You and Why Are You Suing Me?! The Debt Buyer Phenomenon.



He got the Summons and Complaint from a process server in 2007. The name of the plaintiff suing the defendant was “New Century Financial.” He had never heard of the plaintiff and did not know why it was suing him. The Complaint claimed that the defendant had a Providian credit card account and owed money on the account. He remembered having an account with Providian a long time ago and also remembered making his last payment to Providian in the Fall of 2000. Many people still remember the fall-out of the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s, and the take-over of bank assets by the FDIC and RTC, including hard assets (such as buildings) and monetary instruments (such as promissory notes); those assets were sold to third party investors and collected upon by them. In the 1990s, an offshoot of that industry began in full force – the purchase of credit card charge-offs, auto loan deficiencies and other debts owed by consumers. Debt brokers began buying nationwide and statewide portfolios of debt, and selling them to debt buyers in every imaginable stratification. When the defendant in this case got sued by New Century Financial, he turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to defend himself against this debt buyer’s claims.


Statute of Limitations:

In almost every type of case that a person may bring against someone, there is a time in which that case may be brought, and once that time has passed, the “statute of limitations” for that type of case prohibits a late case from being brought. There are various reasons for this rule, including failing memories, loss of evidence, and fairness to litigants. According to New York State law, in Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Section 213(2), the statute of limitations to sue someone for breaching a contract is six years from the date of breach. In this case, one of the defenses put forth by the defendant was that his last payment to Providian was made in the year 2000, and the lawsuit was filed by New Century Financial in the year 2007; seemingly, the six-year statute of limitations period in which to bring the case had already passed. Since the defendant did not have records of all of his payments to Providian, there was an issue as to whether the last payment was, in fact, made in the year 2000.


Who are you and why are you suing me?!

More importantly, a much more compelling defense was asserted by the defendant that New Century Financial lacked “standing” to bring the case. The defendant admitted that he may have previously owed a balance on his credit card bill due to Providian; he even saved some of the old dunning letters that he received from Providian. But why was someone he never heard of before suing him for that balance. In addition to the statute of limitations, there is another fundamental of law, the issue of standing. When someone brings a lawsuit against another, he has to prove that he may legally do so; in other words, that he owns the claim he is bringing. One of the common problems in these so-called “debt buyer” cases is that the plaintiff cannot prove that it is the rightful owner of the debt allegedly owed by the defendant.The defendant took a very simple legal position – if Providian showed up to collect its debt, it may be due; but, the plaintiff cannot show it owns the debt. This called into question an evidentiary issue as to whether New Century Financial could prove the chain of title from Providian to itself. After pressing for disclosure of the purchase agreements and other evidence of the alleged assignment of the credit card account from Providian to New Century Financial, the debt buyer finally capitulated. New Century Financial agreed to discontinue the lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE (meaning that it cannot bring the lawsuit against the defendant again in the future).


Changes developing in the law:

Across the country, various governmental agencies have been busy trying to address the problems encountered between debt buyers and consumers. The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits many forms of harassment and abuse by debt collectors who collect debts owed by consumers to creditors. In recent years, the FDCPA has redefined the term “debt collector” to include "debt buyers" to curb their abuses. The New York City Administrative Code, which requires the licensing of debt collection agencies with the Department of Consumer Affairs, was amended to include debt buyers.By the directives of the Chief Clerk on May 13, 2009, new requirements came into action in the New York City Civil Court system to directly address two common problems with debt buyer cases. The first one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include an affidavit from the plaintiff or its attorney that it has “reason to believe that the statute of limitations has not expired.” The second one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include (a) an affidavit of sale from the original creditor and not an agent; (b) an affidavit from any intermediaries who owned the debt before assignment to the plaintiff; and (c) an affidavit from the plaintiff attesting to the chain of title from the original creditor to it.Without doubt, the changes being put into effect, coupled with the difficulties of debt buyers in obtaining documents and witnesses from the original creditor, will tilt the scales of justice towards consumers for some time.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Porträt eines Mannes mit Hellebarde (4th quarter of the 17th century). Artist: Aert de Gelder. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.



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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Seminar Announcement: "Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law"

In early November, Richard Klass will help present a seminar entitled The Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law.  This seminar, presented by the National Business Institute, will take place at the Hyatt Place Garden City, in Garden City, New York.  Information follows.


Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law

Date: Wednesday, November 09, 2011

Time: 9:00 am-4:30 pm

Location:
Hyatt Place Garden City
5 North Avenue
Garden City, NY

Facility Phone: 516-222-6277

NBI Product ID#: 57049ER

For more information and to register, click this link:


Program Description

Ensure Your Clients Get Paid
Winning a judgment against a bad debt doesn't necessarily mean cash in hand. Do you have a firm grasp of the procedures for legally collecting that debt? Are your recovery actions in compliance with the strict guidelines governing collection? Don't rush in unprepared. Maximize your chances for recovery with the practical steps provided in this strategic seminar. Enroll today!
  • Avoid collection activities that violate the FDCPA and/or state laws. 
  • Learn best practices for discovering debtor assets both pre- and post-judgment. 
  • Recognize what provisional and final remedies are available to creditors to collect what is owed. 
  • Walk through the procedural steps for executing wage garnishments, judgment liens, attachments and other methods of collection. 
  • Know the creditor's rights when collecting debt and when the debtor files for bankruptcy.


Who Should Attend

This basic-to-intermediate level seminar is primarily designed for attorneys and other legal professionals. Those who may also benefit from the collection techniques provided include: collection and loan officers, accounts receivable personnel, credit managers, bankers and controllers.


Course Content
  1. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and State Collection Laws
  2. Ethical Issues in Collection
  3. How to Find Debtors and Their Assets
  4. Obtaining a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
  5. Collecting a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
  6. Creditors' Rights When a Debtor Files Bankruptcy

Continuing Education Credits:

Continuing Legal Education
CLE 7.20 - NJ
CLE 7.00 - NY*
Continuing Professional Education for Accountants
CPE for Accountants: 7.00

Institute of Certified Bankers
ICB: 6.75*

* denotes specialty credits


Agenda

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) AND STATE COLLECTION LAWS
9:00 - 9:45, Richard A. Klass
Scope of the FDCPA
Understanding the Actions Permitted or Restricted by the Act
Demand Letters: Pitfalls to Avoid
Liability and Defenses
State Collection Laws and Their Application/Preemption

ETHICAL ISSUES IN COLLECTION
9:45 - 10:45, Richard A. Klass
Communication With Clients and Other Parties
Disclosure Issues
Aggressive Collection Practices
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Reporting Professional Misconduct

HOW TO FIND DEBTORS AND THEIR ASSETS
11:00 - 12:00, Michael Cardello III
Prejudgment Discovery Methods
Personal vs. Business Assets
Replevin/Self-Help Repossession Considerations

OBTAINING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE
1:00 - 2:00, Michael Cardello III
Filing the Lawsuit
Service of Process
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
Judgments (Default, Summary, etc.)

COLLECTING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE
2:15 - 3:15, Kenneth H. Wurman
Post-Judgment Discovery
Judgment Liens
Wage and Bank Account Garnishment
Attachments
Writ of Execution/Seize and Sale by Sheriff
Charging Orders
Debtor Slow-Pay Motions
Turnover/Receivership
Exemptions by Debtors
Dealing With Fraudulent Transfers

CREDITORS' RIGHTS WHEN A DEBTOR FILES BANKRUPTCY
3:15 - 4:30, Michael D. Brofman


Speakers

RICHARD A. KLASS is an attorney in the Brooklyn office of Your Court Street Lawyer. Mr. Klass is an arbitrator for the small claims part of the civil court of the City of New York, County of Kings. He practices in the areas of collections, bankruptcy, debtor and creditor, commercial litigation, legal malpractice, medical malpractice, personal injury, real estate condominium law, family law, divorce, child custody and private placement adoption law, wills, probate, trusts and estates. Mr. Klass has written numerous articles and has lectured frequently for the Brooklyn Bar Association and New York County Lawyers Association, as well as other professional groups and organizations. Mr. Klass is a member of The American Association for Justice, the New York State Bar Association, the New York County Lawyers Association (chair, The Mentoring Program, Group Mentoring Program) and the Brooklyn Volunteer Lawyers Project (Pro Bono Counsel). He earned his B.A. degree from Hofstra University and his J.D. degree from New York Law School.

MICHAEL D. BROFMAN is a member in the New Hyde Park law firm of Weiss & Zarett P.C., where he practices in the areas of bankruptcy law, debtor/creditor rights, non-judicial workouts and commercial litigation. He has lectured for the Nassau County and New York State bar associations on topics relating to his areas of practice, and is a frequent lecturer for National Business Institute on bankruptcy and secured creditor topics. He is a member of the Nassau County (member, Bankruptcy and Bank sections) and the New York State (member, Committee on Bankruptcy Law and General Practice Section) bar associations, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the Volunteer Lawyer's Project Pro Bono Bankruptcy Panel. Mr. Brofman earned his B.A. degree from the State University of New York at Binghamton and his J.D. degree from Fordham University.

MICHAEL CARDELLO III is a partner in the Litigation Department of Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP, concentrating in business and commercial litigation. Mr. Cardello represents large and small businesses, financial institutions and individuals in federal and state courts. He has a wide range of experience that includes trials and appellate work in the areas of corporate disputes, shareholder derivative actions, dissolutions, construction disputes, equipment and vehicle leasing disputes and other complex commercial and business disputes. Mr. Cardello earned his B.A. degree in marketing, his M.B.A. degree in finance and his J.D. degree from Hofstra University. While in law school, he was associate editor of the Hofstra Law Review. Mr. Cardello is the current vice-chairman of the Commercial Litigation Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association and also is a member of the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Securities Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association. He lectures on discovery, trial practice, equipment and vehicle leasing issues and e-discovery.

KENNETH H. WURMAN is a partner in the law firm of Naidich Wurman Birnbaum & Maday, LLP, where his practice areas, for more than 30 years, include collections and real estate. Mr. Wurman is a lecturer for National Business Institute on collection matters. He earned his B.S. degree from the State University of New York at Albany and his J.D. degree from New England School of Law. Mr. Wurman is a member of the Nassau County and New York State bar associations.


For more information and to register, click this link:



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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Friday, October 7, 2011

Don’t Give Me a Black Russian!



IN 2006, the executor of the estate of a woman who owned a cooperative apartment in Brooklyn attempted to sell the apartment. She first made a contract with a black woman who had two children to sell the apartment for $160,000. The contract of sale provided (as almost all do in cooperative apartment sales) that the buyer had to apply to the coop board for approval of the sale. She applied to the coop board for approval; then, dissention came about between the resident board members and the sponsor-management company. Despite supposedly being “approved” by the residents on the board, the management company claimed that the board was not legally constituted; accordingly, no closing of title would be scheduled.


The buyer elected to file a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, charging that the coop engaged in discriminatory housing practices against her based upon her race. The NYS Division of Human Rights made a determination after investigation that there was “probable cause” to believe that the respondents engaged in discriminatory practices.The executor then attempted to sell the apartment to another person, a young Russian woman whom the board declined to even interview. It started to appear to the executor that a cooperative apartment owner’s fear of having every potential buyer denied, like a revolving door, was happening here.Faced with the possibility of the estate being left with a “dead asset”—an apartment that cannot be disposed of by the estate and continues to incur monthly maintenance charges, the estate turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to sue the coop board for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the proprietary lease and housing discrimination.


Breach of Fiduciary Duty:

According to New York State law, the directors of a corporation owe its shareholders a fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty of a director of a corporation consists of the obligation to perform his duties in good faith, without discriminatory practice, and with the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. See, Bernheim v. 136 East 64th Street Corp.,128 AD2d 434 [1 Dept. 1987]. In the Complaint against the coop, it was alleged that the coop board breached its fiduciary duty to the estate as the owner of shares of stock in the corporation and the proprietary lease to the apartment.In a similar case, in which the owner of a cooperative unit sued the board members for rejecting applicants for various reasons, including discriminatory ones, the court noted that the general deference granted to decisions of a cooperative corporation’s board of directors is not unlimited. If those board members act in a manner which is contrary to their duty to act fairly and impartially, courts may review claims of misconduct. Further, upon review, those claims of misconduct may prove actionable against the board members. See, Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp., 189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001].


The Estate was “Personally Affected” by Discrimination:

Both New York Executive Law §296 and New York City Administrative Code §8-107 provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a cooperative housing corporation to discriminate against an applicant based upon his age, race, familial status or religion. Those statutes also provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, or compel the doing of any acts forbidden under those statutes. In Dunn v. Fishbein, 123 AD2d 659 [2 Dept. 1986], the court permitted a Caucasian person to maintain a claim that he was denied an apartment because his roommate was African-American. As was held in Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp.,189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001], if the plaintiff can show that she was adversely affected by reason of discrimination perpetrated against the prospective purchasers, she has a cognizable claim for discrimination. The Complaint alleged that the estate was personally affected by the unlawful discriminatory practices of the coop board and coop corporation.


“Reverse Holdover”:

The Complaint suggested the creation of a new cause of action under New York law—the concept of a “reverse holdover.” In this case, the estate claimed that the defendants effectively prevented the estate from exercising its right to sell the apartment to another party. Accordingly, it was urged that the defendants should be deemed to have effectively “purchased” the estate’s shares and leasehold interest in the apartment. By their alleged actions, it was claimed that the defendants had rendered this asset of the estate a “dead” asset—it could not be disposed of or sold!Generally, a tenant may be subject to eviction because of a substantial violation of the terms of the tenancy. In this situation, the reverse had occurred—the Complaint claimed that the defendants have committed a substantial violation of the estate’s tenancy. It is axiomatic that in every cooperative corporation, the right to sell a cooperator’s apartment is a valuable right, which ought not be irrationally or arbitrarily taken away. It is safe to say that the whim and caprice of coop boards is one of the prime reasons that people prefer to buy condominiums.In upholding the estate’s Complaint, the judge held that the estate had stated “cognizable causes of action.”Estate of Cameron v. United Management, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 2671/2008.During the pendency of the litigation, the estate found another buyer for the apartment, albeit at a lower price than originally negotiated with the first buyer. The estate, coop board, and management company settled the litigation—the estate sold the apartment for $139,000 and the defendants paid $35,000 to the estate.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Man in uniform beside building, yurt in background (1905-1915). Photographer: Prokudin-Gorskii, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1863-1944. Digital color composite made for the Library of Congress by Blaise AgĂĽera y Arcas, 2004. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.www.TheInnovationWorks.com.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

Making Sure the Guarantor is a “Good Guy.”



In 1997, a landlord rented a commercial space to a tire company pursuant to a commercial lease agreement. The tenant defaulted in the payment of rent, owing the landlord the claimed arrearage sum of $157,000. To collect the rent arrears, the landlord came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to recover.


When the lease was entered into, the president of the tenant executed the lease agreement both as president of the tenant and as personal guarantor of performance and payment of rent. The initial term of the lease agreement was for two years, and it provided for two-year renewal periods, with all of the terms and conditions of the original lease expressly reserved. The president of the tenant signed letter agreements extending the lease four times, the last time being December 20, 2004.


The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against the personal guarantor of the lease, seeking payment of all outstanding arrears; the guarantor cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the case. The guarantor contended that he was not a proper party, claiming that he notified the landlord in February 2005 that the tenant was going out of business and all of its assets were being transferred to a different entity, effective March 2005. The landlord refuted receiving this notice from the guarantor.


Motion for Summary Judgment:

The term “summary judgment” means that a litigant is claiming that there is no reason to have a trial (either by judge or jury) because the case can be decided based upon application of the law. A “motion” is basically a request for a judge to take some sort of action.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, as it deprives a party of his day in court, and should be granted when it is clear that there are no triable issues of fact. See, Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]. The burden is upon the moving party (the landlord in this case) to make a prima facie (Latin term for “by its first instance”) showing that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of any material facts. See, Giuffrida v. Citibank, 100 NY2d 72 [2003]. The failure to make that showing requires the denial of the motion regardless of the adequacy of the opposing papers. See, Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]. Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party (the tenant in this case) to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which necessitate a trial.


In this case, the judge decided that the landlord laid out its case that the tenant owed rent arrears. This was based upon the evidence submitted with the motion, including the written lease agreement, the letters extending the lease for several additional terms, and the rent ledger. The judge dismissed the evidence presented by the guarantor, which amounted to his affidavit and the supposed notice that the tenant was ceasing business and a new company would be the tenant going forward.


Restriction on Assignment of Lease:

The argument that the tenant had given notice of assignment of the lease to a new company was refuted by the specific provisions of the lease. A provision in a lease which restricts assignment or subletting, and requires the consent of the landlord prior to doing so, is enforceable. See, Matter of Clason Management Co. v. Altman, 40 AD2d 635 [1 Dept. 1972]. The lease agreement at issue had such a restriction, which explicitly barred the tenant from assigning or transferring the lease or subletting the premises unless the tenant obtained the prior written consent of the landlord. Thus, even if the landlord did receive the letter from the guarantor in February 2005, there was no showing that the mandated consent was ever procured from the landlord.


Enforceability of Personal Guaranty:

It is no secret to landlords that, unless the incoming tenant is a large corporation, a commercial tenant is essentially a shell entity whose assets can disappear overnight (nowadays, even large corporations could qualify). So, landlords insist upon obtaining signed personal guaranties from the principals of the corporate tenants. Sometimes, the guaranty will be for all lease obligations through the end of the lease term, and sometimes, the guaranty will be effective through the date the tenant physically moves out of the premises – the proverbial “good guy clause.”


In this case, the landlord obtained the guaranty through the end of the lease term, but still expected the guarantor to be a “good guy” and pay the rent. Generally, a guaranty is to be interpreted in the strictest manner. See, White Rose Food v. Saleh, 99 NY2d 589 [2003]. But it is also the case that a personal guaranty which contains language of a continuing obligation is enforceable and survives payment of the original indebtedness. USI Capital and Leasing v. Chertock, 172 AD2d 235 [1 Dept. 1991]. Thus, termination of a continuing personal guaranty requires compliance with the provisions governing termination expressly set forth in the guaranty. In the absence of some writing which addresses termination, a guaranty which is silent on that issue remains in full force and effect. See, Chemical Bank v. Geronimo Auto Parts Corp., 224 AD2d 461 [1 Dept. 1996]. In this case, the personal guaranty could not be canceled merely by the president of the tenant sending a notice, indicating that the old company was going out and a new one was coming in.


In granting the landlord’s motion for summary judgment, the judge held that the personal guarantor is liable to the landlord, based upon his guarantee of the tenant’s lease obligations. Ribellino v. Fleet 2000, Inc. and Rosenfeld, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 7501/2008 [Decision dated October 7, 2009].


— Richard A. Klass, Esq.



©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: The Lady with the Veil (Marie-Suzanne Giroust) (1768). Artist: Alexander Roslin. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.


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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Sunday, August 21, 2011

$401,452.59 Surplus Moneys: The Extra Bit Left Over!


In the typical mortgage foreclosure proceeding, the mortgage lender (or “mortgagee”) brings an action against the homeowner to foreclose on its mortgage against the real estate, generally because the homeowner (or “mortgagor”) failed to make payments on the loan. The mortgage is the legal document recorded by the mortgagee against the mortgagor property to provide the collateral for the making of the loan. In case of default in payment, the mortgagee has the right to sell the collateral to satisfy the remaining balance due on the loan (most foreclosure proceedings are judicial sales, where a court has authorized the sale, as opposed to ‘non-judicial’ sales in limited circumstances). Sometimes, in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff is not the holder of a mortgage but rather has another type of lien against the real estate, such as a tax lien for unpaid real estate taxes, mechanic’s lien (for building supplies or labor performed), or judgment lien.

Once the mortgagee or lienor has obtained a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, it can then sell the real estate. The mortgage foreclosure proceeding culminates with the public auction of the mortgagor’s real estate to the highest bidder. At that point, the property is sold to the bidder, who pays the sale price to a court-appointed referee.

Definition of Surplus Moneys:

If the amount paid by the successful bidder at the auction sale exceeds the amount due to the mortgagee according to the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, then there is created a special fund of the left-over purchase price called the “Surplus Moneys.” For example, if the mortgagee is due $200,000 and the property sold for $300,000, the remaining sale price of $100,000 is the surplus. According to Article 13 of New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), there is a procedure for the former homeowner (and other junior lienors, such as second mortgagees, judgment creditors or other lienholders) to petition the court for the release of the surplus moneys.

Fighting over $401,452.59 Surplus Moneys:

In 2005, the owner of a building in Brooklyn failed to pay his property taxes. A foreclosure proceeding was brought based on the tax lien, and the building was sold at auction. The referee paid off the tax lien and then deposited the remaining surplus moneys of $401,452.59 into court. The building owner died, leaving his second wife and children as his survivors. He had been married previously and, as part of his and his first wife’s divorce case, had agreed to pay her half of the value of the building. The first wife and one of the owner’s children retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to pursue the payment of their respective shares of the surplus moneys.

The various heirs to the estate of the owner, along with the first wife, filed motions in court to have a “surplus moneys referee” appointed to determine who would be entitled to what portion of the surplus moneys. The second wife alleged that the first wife was not entitled to any portion of the surplus moneys, claiming that she was previously paid by the decedent for her portion – but she could not find proof of the alleged payment. A hearing was held before the surplus moneys referee, who determined that the first wife should receive her half-share of the moneys of over $200,000, along with accrued interest.

The balance of the surplus moneys were to be distributed according to New York’s Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) Section 4-1.1, which comes into play when someone dies without a Will. (This is the reason that making a Last Will and Testament is very important!) According to the EPTL, the balance of the surplus moneys were to be distributed as follows: (a) the first $50,000 plus half of the remaining balance paid to the second wife; and (b) the other half of the remaining balance paid to the surviving children, evenly divided among them.

After the completion of the hearing, the referee rendered a report, setting forth the manner of distribution. Then, an Order confirming the report and directing the distribution was signed by the Judge. At the conclusion, each of the clients received her fair share of the surplus moneys in full with interest.


-- Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, August 9, 2011

Announcement: Distinguished Service Award for Richard A. Klass


Announcement:

On May 11, 2011, Richard A. KlassYour Court Street Lawyer, was presented with the prestigious Distinguished Service Award by the Brooklyn Bar Association. This award, presented by Association President Andrea Bonina, recognized the accomplishments of Mr. Klass in founding the BBA's Mentoring Committee. The Mentoring Committee was formed to assist lawyers in obtaining advice on the practice of law, including finding a job, starting a law firm, resumĂ© building, and how-to help. It is with great honor that Mr. Klass serves to help the legal community in enhancing their opportunities and developing professionalism.



-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Monday, August 1, 2011

Amendment to Bankruptcy Petition Worth Millions!


A brother tried to help his sister, and it almost cost him millions of dollars. Based upon the brother’s good credit, his sister bought a house in Queens in his name. At some point, she was unable to keep up with the mortgage payments and the house fell into foreclosure.


On the eve of the foreclosure sale, the brother filed bankruptcy to “stay” the sale. In the mad rush to save the family home (which, unfortunately, is common these days!), the brother did not understand something very important: the personal injury lawsuit he filed years earlier, relating to a construction work-site injury in which he was severely injured, was an “asset” of his to be listed in his bankruptcy petition. Unfortunately, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed because the brother could not make the mortgage or bankruptcy plan payments. The house was later sold at foreclosure sale.


State Court Motion to Dismiss:

Subsequently, the defendants in the state court personal injury case asked the judge to dismiss the case based upon the failure of the plaintiff/injured person to list the pending lawsuit as a “contingent asset” in his bankruptcy petition. Substantial New York case law, going all the way up to the New York State Court of Appeals, has held that the failure to list the asset in the petition is fatal to the continuance of the personal injury case – every case on point says the injured person’s lawsuit gets dismissed without any recovery, no matter how grave the injury.

 

Uncharted Course to Be Taken:

Faced with this apparently insurmountable challenge, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was brought in to help save the man’s personal injury case. The strategy developed was to return to the Bankruptcy Court to seek to amend or fix the petition to reflect the existence of the personal injury claim. This was trail-blazing!


In determining that the debtor/personal injury plaintiff should be permitted to amend his bankruptcy petition to list the claim as an asset, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Craig stated: “This Court has not found any statute, rule or precedent that provides that a debtor’s right to amend expires upon dismissal of the case, or that the order dismissing the case must be vacated before schedules, statements or lists may be amended.” In re Severius Raggie, New York Law Journal 7/9/2008.


Interplay between “Closed” and “Closed”:

At first glance, the court noted that the bankruptcy case was marked “closed.” The judge was skeptical that an amendment to the petition could be made because Bankruptcy Rule 1009 provides that “a voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.”


However, in relying upon the decision in In re Critical Care Support Services, 236 BR 137, it was pointed out that a case can only be “closed” when the assets of the bankruptcy estate have been fully administered. The term “closed,” as used in Bankruptcy Rule 1009 and Bankruptcy Code §350, does not encompass “dismissed” cases. Thus, an Order dismissing a case accomplishes a completely different result than an Order closing it would; essentially, upon dismissal of a bankruptcy case, all of the debtor’s rights in his property revert back to him.


Separately, the court also held that, as part of accepting the debtor’s amendment, it could reject the amendment when “the facts and circumstances presented indicate that the amendment was filed in bad faith, fraudulent or prejudicial.” Citing to In re Nye, 250 BR 46. In this case, Judge Craig held that there was no evidence of bad faith, fraud or prejudice; the state court defendants’ argument that granting the amendment would “reward” the debtor was not persuasive. In the absence of any evidence that the debtor deliberately omitted the personal injury claim from his schedules to defraud his creditors, permitting the debtor to amend did not reward wrongdoing.


After Judge Craig granted the debtor’s motion to amend his bankruptcy petition, the state court defendants in the personal injury lawsuit withdrew their motion to dismiss the case. The plaintiff’s case is now winding through the New York State Supreme Court towards a trial, in which his serious injuries will be considered by a jury.


— Richard A. Klass, Esq.


©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Selbstporträt mit fĂĽnfzig Jahren, by Giovanni Fattori, 1884; Porträt der dritten Ehefrau, by Giovanni Fattori, 1905. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Thursday, July 7, 2011

$73K Buys $200,000 House, Thanks to Debtor’s "Hat Trick" Screw-up.



The foreclosure auction of the defendant’s Staten Island house came up on a Wednesday at 9:30AM. The courtroom was packed with people ready to bid on the house. The Referee announced the sale of the house, took bids, and struck down the sale at $73,000 to the successful bidder.


Moments later, the Referee informed the successful bidder that one of the two owners of the house had filed bankruptcy at 9:26AM; therefore, the foreclosure sale was invalid and the bidder should take back his bid deposit. At that moment, the successful bidder called Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer about whether the sale was indeed invalid.


Automatic Stay Operates as a “Stop” Sign:

People normally file for bankruptcy protection for one or both of two reasons: (1) to discharge debt; and (2) to “stay” (or stop) proceedings against the debtor, such as foreclosures, lawsuits, repossessions, evictions, etc.


Under Bankruptcy Code §362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court imposes an automatic stay upon creditors from taking certain actions, including specifically auctioning off the debtor’s house (Note: there are exceptions which may apply). Generally, actions taken after the filing of the bankruptcy petition are null and void, as if they never occurred. In this particular situation, the foreclosure auction happened 4 minutes after the bankruptcy filing. Under normal circumstances, the automatic stay would have voided this sale and the successful bidder would have merely gotten back his bid deposit, without getting the house.


Before the drastic changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 (under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act [BAPCPA]), debtors would go in and out of bankruptcy to prevent their houses from being sold. Since BAPCPA, it has gotten more difficult for debtors to get the benefit of the “Stop” sign – the first filing will trigger a stay, the second filing a briefer stay, and the third filing no stay unless requested. These “Stop” signs begin to feel like a “Hat Trick,” where one player scores three times.


Searching for Details:

The first step in trying to salvage the foreclosure sale for the successful bidder was reviewing every document filed in the bankruptcy case. This included the “bare bones” petition and the “Credit Counseling Certificate.” This Certificate states that the debtor completed a credit counseling course within six months before the bankruptcy filing, which must be done in order to be eligible to file bankruptcy. Upon very close review, it appeared that the debtor simply took the old, expired Certificate from her prior bankruptcy case the year before (more than 6 months old) and filed the same one again – a big but little-noticed “no-no.”


Upon further digging, it appeared that the co-owner of the house had previously filed bankruptcy and there was an order terminating the stay a year earlier. Also, the debtor had both unsuccessfully filed a bankruptcy before and had filed the current one without complying with the rules, including paying the court’s filing fee.


Validation of Post-Petition Foreclosure Sale:

The Court found that grounds existed to warrant the annulment or termination of the automatic stay and validation of the foreclosure sale. Citing to several cases, the court identified various factors that should be considered in determining whether to validate a post-petition foreclosure sale, including whether:


(1) the creditor had actual or constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and, therefore, of the stay;
(2) the debtor has acted in bad faith;
(3) there is equity in the property of the estate;
(4) the property is necessary for an effective reorganization;
(5) grounds for relief from stay exist and a motion, if filed, would have been granted prior to the violation;
(6) failure to grant retroactive relief would cause unnecessary expense to the creditor;
(7) the creditor has detrimentally changed its position on the basis of the action taken;
(8) the creditor took some affirmative action post-petition to bring about the violation of the stay; and
(9) the creditor promptly seeks a retroactive lifting of the stay and approval of the action taken. In re Campbell, 356 BR 722 (WD Mo.2006); In re Williams, 257 BR 297 (Bankr.WD Mo. 2001).


Reviewing the facts of the particular situation, the Court found “ample support” for annulling the stay retroactively and validating the post-petition foreclosure sale. These facts included the bare bones petition filed by the debtor with the expired Certificate, her case being filed on the same date as the auction sale, her significant prior experience in bankruptcy, and the negative effect to the successful bidder’s (an independent third party) rights.


In granting the successful bidder’s motion, the Bankruptcy Judge determined that the “debtor’s failure to act in good faith in this case warrants the annulment of the automatic stay and the validation of the petition day foreclosure sale.” In re Annie Williams, US Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 1-09-44856-dem [Decision dated January 27, 2010]. Since the Bankruptcy Court validated the foreclosure sale, the successful bidder achieved his desired result – the purchase of the Staten Island house, valued at more than $200,000, for $73,000.


— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.


Credits:
Staudacherhaus at the Tegernsee, by artist August Macke (1887-1914).
Photo of Richard Klass by Tom Urgo, 2008.
Law firm business communications services provided by
The Innovation Works, Inc.



-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Tuesday, June 14, 2011

How the “Continuous Representation” Doctrine Helps Injured Clients


In legal matters, there is an attorney-client relationship from the moment that the attorney is consulted by the client until the matter concludes. If, during the term of this relationship, the attorney was negligent or commits malpractice in the matter, the client may have a claim against the attorney for legal malpractice. Sometimes, the malpractice is committed at the early stages of litigation and not at the conclusion; for instance, an action may have started in Year 1, malpractice was committed in Year 2, and the action concludes in Year 6. The question then becomes whether or not the client may pursue a claim against the attorney for the malpractice committed in Year 2, when the statute of limitations period may have already passed.


CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.


The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].


In order to protect clients The Court of Appeals has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra.


The Continuous Representation Toll

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: [art critic] Diego Martelli in Castiglioncello by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.


-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Saturday, May 21, 2011

“Busting” the Trust!

A Trust was created by a woman in her Last Will and Testament (testamentary trust), leaving her children and their issue (children) as the sole beneficiaries of the trust. The Children’s Trust was formed as a “mixed” discretionary trust; meaning that the trustees maintain the discretion to pay moneys to the beneficiaries of the trust but the trust itself is a spendthrift trust, whereby the beneficiaries cannot invade the trust or, in other words, take out money themselves. A “discretionary” trust is typically set up to give the trustees the authority to pay money (either principal or interest) as they see fit, considering the lifestyle and resources of the beneficiary. A “spendthrift” trust prohibits the beneficiary, creditors of the beneficiary, or any other person from taking money out of the trust.

The “deadbeat” parent

A couple was married and had two children. The husband was one of the children of the woman who set up the trust. They got divorced and the two children lived with the wife. As part of the Judgment of Divorce, the husband was ordered to pay child support and yeshiva tuition for the couple’s daughter. The husband failed to pay the court-ordered amounts. The judge granted money judgments against the husband to pay child support arrears, tuition and legal fees. Enforcement of the money judgments proved fruitless. The wife brought proceedings to punish the husband for contempt of court. The judge found that the husband was guilty of contempt of court and even granted an Order of Contempt, allowing for the husband’s arrest for not paying child support. The husband and his assets could not be located – the typical case of a “deadbeat parent.”

Unfortunately, the wife was, perhaps, more down and out than most people. She was ill and unable to work; not eligible for social security disability income; and living off of her adult son’s meager income and public assistance through food stamps. Her daughter was going to be expelled from school for nonpayment of three years’ worth of tuition. That’s when the wife’s divorce lawyer referred her to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for help.

Looking at invading the Children’s Trust

Generally, a trust can be made invincible – no one can gain access to the moneys or property contained in it, not even the beneficiary. The “settlor” (the one who sets up the trust and funds it) appoints a trustee who will carry out her wishes and follows the directions contained in the trust document.

In this particular trust, the beneficiaries were listed as “the Child and the Child’s issue.” Clearly, the Children’s Trust envisioned the trustees giving money not only to the “deadbeat parent” but also to his children, including the daughter who was about to be kicked out of school.

An Order to Show Cause was brought in New York State Supreme Court to (a) have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband; (b) restrain the trustees from paying any money out of the trust to the “deadbeat” parent; and (c) sequester, or set aside, enough money from the trust to pay future child support until the daughter’s age of majority.

The guiding light of Judge Nathan Sobel

The issue of “busting” a trust set up by a grandparent for the benefit of a grandchild was brought up in a case over 40 years ago, in a case of first impression, before the beneficent Surrogate of Kings County, Judge Nathan Sobel. In Matter of Chusid, Judge Sobel first stated the general proposition that a testator may dispose of his own property as he pleases. Among other things, a testator may create a trust for the benefit of an infant or improvident person, so that the beneficiary does not squander the money. However, Surrogate Sobel stated the oft-cited principle which applied to this situation (and, unfortunately, to so many others): “No man should be permitted to live at the same time in luxury and in debt.”

While recognizing that the general purpose of a discretionary trust is to protect the trustee from unreasonable demands of a beneficiary or from creditors’ claims, it does not insulate or protect the trustee from responsibility to and reasonable directions from a court. Further, as stated in the Chusid opinion, this “is particularly true where the income beneficiaries are dependent children who will either starve or become public charges if the trustees refuse to exercise discretion in their favor.” Judge Sobel then held that the trustee’s discretion yields to and is subordinate to the equity powers of the court to direct payment for the support of minor dependent children.

After argument of the Order to Show Cause, with the opposition of the trustees of the Children’s Trust, the judge made the determination that the wife was entitled to “bust” the trust open to have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband from the principal and interest of the trust. The judge ordered the trustees of the Children’s Trust to pay the following amounts: (a) 82,350 for yeshiva tuition; (b) 43,329 for child support arrears; and (c) $3,960 for school transportation expenses; he also ordered the trustees to sequester $53,891 for future child support payments.

— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Art credits: Leute am blauen See, by August Macke (1887-1914).

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Sunday, May 1, 2011

Notice to Admit: The Power of a Piece of Paper


In the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) – the “Game Book” of civil practice in New York State courts, there is a little-used device called the “Notice to Admit.” While not as often utilized by attorneys as it ought to be, it can pack a powerful punch to the other side in litigation.


As most of us know, the old days of Perry Mason pulling out a trick at trial have greatly diminished due to the introduction into the legal process of a phase in the litigation known as “discovery.” During the discovery phase, each adversary is permitted to inspect and “discover” relevant documents and information pertaining to the lawsuit, through the use of various discovery techniques. Those discovery techniques may include, among other things, inspecting the books and records of a business, asking questions known as “interrogatories,” performing a physical examination, viewing photographs or videos made of the scene of an incident, and inspecting the geographic location of an area which is the subject of the litigation. Among those discovery techniques, there is the Notice to Admit.


CPLR Section 3123 provides that: “a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter of the genuineness of any papers or documents, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any photographs, described in and served with the request, or of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry.” It is further provided that, if the latter party fails to respond, the effect is that the matter shall be deemed “admitted.”


In Rodriguez v. Moreno, it was alleged that, in 1994, the owner of a 2-family house in Brooklyn had to leave this country in a hurry and needed cash. He made an agreement with his tenant that, in exchange for $30,000 cash and the continued payment of the mortgage on the house, the tenant could effectively purchase the house from him. To memorialize their understanding, the owner and his tenant went to the owner’s attorney to sign documents.


The owner’s attorney drafted the documents necessary to transfer title to the house, including a Deed. The owner signed the documents, and the attorney held onto the originals. The agreement was, once the tenant paid off the last of the mortgage payments on the house, the Deed would be released to him from the attorney’s escrow. This arrangement continued for 13 years.


In 2007, the tenant discovered that the owner, who still held title to the house, was trying to sell it to someone else. The only proof of the agreement he had was a photocopy of the front side of the Deed that the owner signed 13 years earlier. Unfortunately, the owner’s attorney had been disbarred years earlier and was nowhere to be found; also gone were the original documents.


Quick Action Was Needed

Armed with only a skimpy photocopy of the first page of the Deed, which had the signature of the owner, the tenant hired Richard A. Klass, Esq., to bring an action under New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) to enforce his rights to the house. Since the owner was actively trying to sell the house, and had signed a contract to sell the house to someone else, quick action to stop the sale was needed. With the filing of the Summons and Complaint, a Notice of Pendency (also known as a “lis pendens”) was filed against the house, which operates as notice to outsiders that someone is laying claim to ownership of the house.

The owner denied the agreement, since there was no proof of the agreement between himself and the tenant. He also claimed that the mortgage payments made by the tenant were intended as rent.


Proving the Copy To Be a Duplicate of the Original

The next, important step was to nail down through the discovery phase the proof of the agreement. In general, contracts relating to the sale of real estate require written proof under a legal doctrine known as the Statute of Frauds. Since here, there was no writing other than the photocopy of the Deed, the lawsuit appeared to be futile.


The admissions requested were as follows:
  1. That the attached Deed was signed by the defendant on September 1, 1994.
  2. That the attached Deed was prepared by the defendant’s attorney, or on his behalf by a member of his staff or office.
  3. That the defendant’s attorney prepared the attached Deed at the request of, or on behalf of the defendant.
  4. That the original of the attached Deed was taken into escrow by the defendant’s attorney at or about the time of execution thereof.
Despite being served with this Notice to Admit, the defendant failed to respond to it within the 20-day time frame in which to respond. By virtue of his not timely responding, the above allegations were deemed “admitted.”


Since it was now admitted that the owner signed the Deed in favor of the tenant, and the Deed was to be held in escrow by his attorney, the terms of the agreement were arguably established in a manner allowed by the Statute of Frauds. Coupled with the fact that the tenant made all of the mortgage payments for 13 years, the owner elected to settle the case instead of proceeding to trial.


— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Der Schindanger in Livorno by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.

-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Thursday, April 7, 2011

A New Way to Award Attorney's Fees



The “American Rule” governs most cases in United States’ courts, where each party to the litigation bears its own costs and attorney’s fees (as opposed to the “English Rule,” according to which the loser of the litigation is chargeable with the winner’s attorney’s fees). There are three exceptions to the “American Rule,” which are when there is:

(a) an agreement between the parties pertaining to attorney’s fees;
(b) a statute which awards reasonable attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party;” or
(c) a court rule provides for attorney’s fees.


Out With The “Old” Ways

Generally, courts around the country use one of two methods to determine the amount of “reasonable attorney’s fees” to be awarded to a party: (1) the “lodestar” method and (2) the “Johnson” twelve-factor method (these methods were the two existing methods endorsed by the US Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 US 424 (1983)).

The “lodestar” method figures out the reasonable attorney’s fee to be awarded — which is basically the product of the attorney’s usual hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked (for example: $3,500 attorney’s fees award based on 10 hours of the attorney’s hourly rate of $350). After figuring out the product, the fee may be adjusted by the court as part of the court’s fee-setting method — a starting point (if you will) for an initial estimate before considering the particulars of the case’s circumstances.

The “Johnson” method came about from a case titled Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court envisioned a one-step inquiry into attorney’s fees, based upon twelve factors, allowing the court to rely more on its experience and judgment with both the attorney and type of case involved. Market forces, which generally influence the hourly rate charged, are not to be the sole determining factor under this method.

In theory, courts that adopted the “lodestar” method were expected to consider fewer variables than the “Johnson” method; in practice, however, many courts consider the same set of variables under both methods to arrive at a fee amount. Some court decisions held that the “Johnson” factors should be applied after applying the “lodestar” calculation; some held that many of the “Johnson” factors were subsumed into the initial calculation.


The Presumptively Reasonable Fee

In a Decision rendered in April 2007 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Association v. County of Albany, the Second Circuit held that it was abandoning the traditional “lodestar” method in favor of the concept of the “presumptively reasonable fee.” (The Second Circuit Court of Appeals covers cases in the federal courts of New York and Vermont). The Decision actually stated that the term, “lodestar method,” was a metaphor that has “deteriorated to the point of unhelpfulness.”

The Second Circuit decided to switch over to a new method of figuring out the reasonable attorney’s fee to be awarded to a prevailing party termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.” This new way asks the court to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables, including the reasonable hourly rate that a paying client would be willing to pay if he was able to negotiate with his attorney. In determining that, the court should consider, among other things, the “Johnson” factors and the fact that a reasonable, paying client would likely want to spend the minimum amount necessary to effectively litigate the case.


The Forum Rule

The Decision also highlighted a particular issue involved in setting fees — the “forum rule.” To determine the general hourly rate, the court has to consider the “community” in which the court sits; in federal courts, it has generally been the geographic area of the district in which the court is located. The Second Circuit recognized that that area could be skewed, depending on the district. So, the court clarified that a district court may use an out-of-district rate (or a rate in between in-district and out-of-district) if it is clear that a reasonable, paying client would have paid the higher rate; however, the court will presume that a client will either hire counsel located within the district or counsel whose rates are consistent with those of local counsel. The presumption may be rebutted if it can be shown that hiring higher-priced, out-of-district counsel was reasonable under the circumstances.

Like all considerations involved in deciding whether to bring a lawsuit against someone, the issue of attorney’s fees is an important one. Without effective, compensated counsel, a litigant with a true cause may be deprived of “his day in court.” Fee-shifting statutes and agreements for attorney’s fees ensure that each side to a dispute knows the risks of his conduct — whether it be the breach of a contract or commission of an act that a statute or court rule is designed to protect.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2007 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Der Angriff auf die Madonna Scoperta (Die Schlacht von Montebello). Artist: Giovanni Fattori, 1860. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
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