LawCURRENTS™

Home! Sweet Home!

2012-03-07T09:53:00.000-05:00

The homeowner had a bunch of problems. Not only was he saddled with over $30,000 in credit card debt spread across several credit card accounts, he had also just received the Summons and Complaint, filed by his mortgage lender, seeking to foreclose on the mortgage recorded against his home. He was delinquent on his mortgage and owed many months’ worth of mortgage arrears. This homeowner is one of the tens of thousands of homeowners across the State (and more across the country) who have fallen into foreclosure with little help or support. Fortunately for the homeowner, he came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for help.

Establishing the Best Strategy

In order to establish the best strategy for the particular situation, the house’s fair market value first had to be considered.

Many homeowners have seen their property values drop so low that their houses are “underwater,” meaning they owe more on their mortgage than the house is worth. In such circumstances, there are different strategies which may be taken by homeowners, including offering the lender a deed in lieu of foreclosure or staying in possession of the house for as long as possible until the foreclosure auction sale. In this case, the homeowner was unsure of his house’s fair market value, so he was advised to hire a licensed appraiser for an honest, unbiased opinion as to the value of the house. The appraisal came back and showed that the amount due to the mortgage lender on the outstanding mortgage was nearly equal to the fair market value. The homeowner and his wife liked their home and neighborhood, so he wanted to figure out a way to save the house, if possible.

Defending the Mortgage Foreclosure Case

The foreclosure proceeding brought by the mortgage lender had to be answered. The homeowner answered the Complaint and also brought Counterclaims against the lender, alleging that the lender engaged in predatory lending practices, fraud, and violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). Filing the Answer and Counterclaims placed an obstacle in the path of the mortgage lender and helped slow down the foreclosure process.

As another part of slowing down the mortgage lender’s case, discovery demands were served, including a request for copies of all documents signed at the closing, when the mortgage was first obtained. It is crucial to a homeowner’s defense of a mortgage foreclosure case, in a time when affidavits are “robo-signed” by non-bank representatives, original documentation is lost by mortgage departments, and mortgages lack assignment from the original lender, that all documents be reviewed for their authenticity and truthfulness.

A Dollar Can Be Stretched Only So Far!

After establishing that the house was not very much “underwater” and that the homeowner wanted to keep the house, the next step was to consider how to pay the mortgage, property taxes and other carrying charges of the house. The homeowner’s take-home salary could only go so far — he could not afford to make the regular monthly mortgage payment as well as the minimum payments on all the various credit card accounts. However, if he could shed the credit card debt, he could more easily afford all of his other expenses.

“Straight” Bankruptcy

Generally, homeowners have to file a “Chapter 13” bankruptcy case to save their home. In a Chapter 13 case, a monthly payment plan over a three- to five-year term is proposed by the debtor, reviewed by the trustee, and then approved or denied by the Bankruptcy Judge. However, in the present situation, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case was not necessary because there was no equity in the house to protect (net equity being the fair market value of the house less the balance due on the mortgage). Accordingly, the decision was made to file a “Chapter 7” bankruptcy case. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy case — also known as a “straight bankruptcy” — is a legal proceeding in which all of the debtor’s ‘unsecured debts’ (such as credit cards, personal loans and lines of credit) are discharged or extinguished. Once the bankruptcy case was filed, the homeowner benefited from the automatic stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Basically, these provisions act as a “Stop Sign” against creditors, prohibiting them from taking any collection actions against debtors. When this homeowner/debtor received his Discharge, by which he discharged or extinguished all of the unsecured credit card debt, he was left with only the mortgage debt (also known as ‘secured debt’ because the house is collateral for the loan).

Mortgage Foreclosure Proceeding — Round Two!

In New York State, when a homeowner/defendant puts in an appearance in a mortgage foreclosure case, the court puts the case onto its Foreclosure Settlement Conference calendar and schedules a conference between the mortgage lender and the homeowner. The purpose of the conference is to see whether there is any way to mediate and settle the dispute, including exploring the loan modification process.

In our present situation, with the bankruptcy case over and the homeowner coming straight out of his Chapter 7 case with his Discharge of all other debts (his “fresh start!”), the mortgage foreclosure proceeding was placed back onto the Supreme Court’s Foreclosure Settlement Conference calendar. Pursuant to the conference, the homeowner applied for loan modification with the mortgage lender and provided all documentation required, including the application, and his tax returns and paystubs.

With no outstanding credit card debt, the homeowner’s salary clearly demonstrated that he had more than sufficient income to support the mortgage and carrying charges of the house. The good news came at the next foreclosure settlement conference: the homeowner’s application to modify his mortgage loan was approved by the lender and the foreclosure proceeding was dismissed. Home! Sweet Home!

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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Legal services marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc. www.TheInnovationWorks.com
Image at top: Flowering Plum Tree, Eragny, 1894, by Camille Pissarro (1830-1903). This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired. This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This image is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.

Force ‘Em to Sell! The Right to Specific Performance

2012-02-07T08:00:00.000-05:00

In the typical real estate transaction, the seller is interested in selling the property, the buyer is interested in buying it, and the Contract of Sale is merely used to memorialize the deal and as the basis for the buyer to obtain a mortgage commitment from a mortgage lender. The closing takes place; everyone leaves happy!

Sometimes, however, the seller fails or refuses to comply with the Contract of Sale and sell the property to the buyer. In that circumstance, the legal ramifications of the Contract of Sale come into play. This was the situation in a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, “Your Court Street Lawyer,” and decided in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Nassau last month.

In Korzeniewski v. Estate of Poswolsky, the plaintiff wanted to buy a house in Long Beach, New York. Through a local real estate broker, he found a nice house owned by an 86-year old man looking to sell his house so he could downsize to an apartment. The Contract of Sale was signed, with a sale price of $465,000, in October 2003. Each side had been represented by counsel.

In November 2003, the owner/seller entered into the Nassau University Medical Center complaining of pains, and a pacemaker was installed. The medical records of the hospital had notations that the seller was sometimes disoriented and suffering from dementia. In December 2003, after voluntarily checking himself out of the hospital three weeks earlier, the owner died.

After the owner’s death, his son was appointed the executor of his estate by the Surrogate’s Court. The son/executor informed the buyer that he believed that the real estate broker took advantage of his father, and that the house was really worth more than $200,000 above the original $465,000 sale price. Accordingly, the son disavowed the Contract of Sale, indicating that he would only sell the property to this buyer if he paid the additional moneys.

Real estate is “unique property”:

One of the tenets of contract law is that real estate is considered a “unique” property – one which cannot be substituted with another. That is, just like a snowflake, one piece of property is not the same as any other. Since the house is unique, and no monetary award for breaching of the contract would satisfy the buyer, the buyer brought an action for specific performance against the son/executor. The substance of the action was the request for the judge to direct the executor to “specifically” perform the contract and transfer the Deed to the property for the original sale price.

Lack of evidentiary proof of dementia:

At the conclusion of discovery in the case, including the taking of depositions of the parties and the attorney for the owner/decedent (who happened to be a distant cousin of the owner), a motion was brought for summary judgment in favor of the buyer, awarding him specific performance of the contract. Attached as part of the proof in support of the motion was the petition filed by the executor with the Surrogate’s Court, in which he indicated that the value of the house was $500,000 at the time of death (less than 10% more than the sale price negotiated four months earlier).

In response, the executor put forth two proofs that his father was suffering from dementia and, therefore, lacked the mental capacity to sign the Contract of Sale, namely: (a) the medical records from Nassau University Medical Center (where the notations of dementia appeared in the records); and (b) the affidavit of a neurologist who neither examined the decedent nor consulted with any of his personal physicians, but relied solely upon the medical records which post-dated the signing of the Contract of Sale.

No need for a trial – just make the seller perform the real estate contract:

In granting summary judgment to buyer (which meant that the judge did not believe that there existed any factual issues to be decided by trial), the judge enforced the terms of the Contract of Sale to make the executor “specifically” perform the contract and sell the property for the original sale price. Relying upon case law, the judge found that the buyer proved that he “substantially performed [his] contractual obligations and was willing and able to perform the remaining obligations, that defendant was able to convey the property, and there was no adequate remedy at law.”

In disregarding the executor’s proofs, the judge found that he did not meet his burden of proving that the decedent was incompetent (in order to refute the presumption that people are considered mental competent and capable of making a contract). According to well settled law from the NYS Court of Appeals (Ortelere v. Teachers’ Retirement Board), the focus of the inquiry is whether the person’s mind was so affected as to render him wholly incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction at issue. In this case, the executor did not offer any proof that his father was so affected by dementia that he was unable to enter into the Contract of Sale. Further, there was no proof that he was forced or coerced into signing the contract.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2007 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Der Steigbügel. Artist: Giovanni Fattori. Marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Court Upholds 25-Year Lease at Fixed $800 Rent

2012-01-07T13:17:00.004-05:00

In Borough Park, there lived an elderly couple in a house (the Kimmels). Their neighbor (Twersky) was interested in renting the first floor apartment for her son and his family. At the time that she rented the apartment, it was in poor shape and in very poor condition; indeed, the entire house needed extensive renovations. In 1995, Twersky and the Kimmels entered into a lease agreement to rent the first floor apartment.The lease agreement provided that the monthly rental amount was to be $800, and the lease term was for 25 years. As indicated in the lease agreement, throughout this time, the rental amount would not increase. Unstated in the lease agreement, however, but alleged by Twersky as a material aspect of the 25-year term at a low fixed rent was the fact that she needed to invest over $100,000 into the extensive renovation of the house, including a complete gut renovation of the first floor apartment. Separate from the lease agreement, Twersky entered into an Option to Purchase Agreement with the Kimmels, which would allow Twersky to purchase the entire house for $325,000 less rent paid until exercise of the option but in no event less than $300,000 (which option agreement was held unenforceable by the court).

Unconscionability Argument Fails:

The matter wound up in litigation after the elderly couple passed away and the executor of the surviving spouse’s estate (Kazaks) brought a “holdover” proceeding in Housing Court to evict Twersky from the apartment. Twersky then filed an action in the Supreme Court seeking an injunction to prevent Kazaks from evicting her family. Twersky relied upon both the option and lease agreements in her Complaint. Kazaks, for her part, claimed that (a) the 25-year lease was unenforceable as a matter of law; and (b) the purchase option agreement was unenforceable because not all of the heirs at law of original owners of the house signed it but just the Kimmels (who owned a portion of the house). She put forth two arguments concerning the lease: that, by law, a lease of 25 years with no rent increases throughout the term was unconscionable; and that the elderly couple suffered from various ailments and diseases during and after the time of lease execution.In making his decision, the trial judge (Justice Knipel) properly found that the lease agreement between Twersky and the Kimmels was valid and enforceable. The arguments by the executor that the lease agreement was unconscionable and should not be enforced pursuant to Real Property Law §235-c was determined to be without merit, and not supported by the evidence presented at trial. As Justice Knipel observed, the executor was “doubtless correct that a residential lease for a 25-year term is unusual, especially where, as here, no increases were provided for the entire term.”Real Property Law §235-c provides as follows:

1. If the court as a matter of law finds a lease or any clause of the lease to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the lease, or it may enforce the remainder of the lease without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.

2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that a lease or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.

In Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 73 NY2d 1, 10 [1988], the NYS Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) held, “An unconscionable contract has been defined as one which ‘is so grossly unreasonable or unconscionable in the light of the mores and business practices of the time and place as to be unenforceable according to its literal terms (See 1 Corbin on Contracts, § 128, p. 400.).’” As further enunciated by the Court, a determination of unconscionability generally requires a showing that the subject contract was both (a) procedurally and (b) substantively unconscionable when made, i.e., “some showing of an ‘absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.’” Gillman, supra at p. 10.At trial, Kazaks had not proven that the lease agreement was either procedurally or substantively unconscionable, by the standards set forth by the NYS Court of Appeals. There was no proof adduced at trial that there was an absence of meaningful choice or that the terms of the agreement were unreasonably unfavorable. On the contrary, all of the witnesses testified that the Kimmels were competent to act in their own affairs, and that the lease agreement was negotiated (including the 25-year term contained therein). Accordingly, Justice Knipel held “the court concludes that the lease is valid on its face and is enforceable.”

Appellate Division Ruling:

Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was retained by Twersky to defend the appeal brought by Kazaks. By the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, Twersky v. Kazaks, 868 NYS2d 912 [12/16/08], the appellate court ruled that the executor could not prove that the estate was an “aggrieved” party because the two causes of action in the original action were dismissed. Accordingly, the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal of Kazaks. Further, the Court affirmed (upheld) the decision after trial by Justice Knipel.By affirming the decision of Justice Knipel, the Appellate Division held that the 25-year lease at a fixed rent of $800 will remain in effect, and that Twersky may enforce the same in any future Housing Court proceedings between the parties.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Seward Park apartment for $33K: "Too Good to be True"

2011-12-27T14:15:00.001-05:00

From The Low Down, news from the Lower East Side:

Grand St. Apartment for $33K: Too Good to be True
"...By contrast, a similar case that Salamon’s attorney, Richard Klass, is handling a few blocks away at the Hillman Housing Corp. has garnered no press attention. In that case, plaintiff Elena Slukina of Manhattan bid $180,000 on apartment #GD at 550H Grand St. in April, after the previous owner defaulted. Hillman is attempting to block that sale based on arguments similar to Seward Park’s, according to court documents filed in Supreme Court Sept. 16...."

Read more here:
http://www.thelodownny.com/leslog/2011/12/a-grand-street-apartment-for-33000-too-good-to-be-true.html/trackback

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

2011-12-12T14:07:00.001-05:00

Seward Park co-op board voids sale of one-bedroom that went at auction for $329G

BY Barbara Ross
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS
Thursday, December 1 2011, 9:13 PM

"Linda Salamon thought she won the real estate lottery last May when she bought a $400,000 one-bedroom co-op apartment on the lower East Side for $329,000 at a public auction...."

"...Salamon declined to discuss her battle, but her lawyer Richard Klass said that under state law, the co-op board cannot exercise its right of first refusal because the sale is not voluntary; it was forced by the lender.

"He also noted that Seward Park's board was notified of the auction and could have bid on the apartment when Salamon won the unit...."

# # #

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Feeling a Million Bucks Better!

2011-11-21T11:45:00.000-05:00

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Bad economic times over the past few years have seen the foreclosure of tens of thousands of properties across New York State (as well as around the country). One corporate landlord had two commercial rental buildings located in Brooklyn. Spread across those two buildings was a ‘blanket’ mortgage of $1.1 million (the term ‘blanket mortgage’ refers to one mortgage recorded against two or more properties). The buildings fell into foreclosure as a result of the landlord’s inability to pay the mortgage loan and the general economic downturn in the area. The corporation that owned the buildings and the individual owner who signed a personal guaranty of the mortgage loan were sued in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding.

On September 30, 2010, the two buildings were sold at the foreclosure auction sale by the court-appointed Referee as one combined lot for $574,000. The mortgage lender’s attorneys prepared the Referee’s Report of Sale and Statement of the balance due to the lender on the mortgage loan after the auction sale (the “deficiency”), which was computed as follows: Total due Plaintiff: $1,408,111.61. Amount of Bid: $574,000. Deficiency: $834,111.61.

After the foreclosure auction sale, the plaintiff-mortgage lender filed a motion with the court, asking the judge to grant a Deficiency Judgment against the corporation and the individual owner based upon his personal guaranty. The defendants did not receive notice of the motion. The motion was granted and the court entered a Deficiency Judgment against them for $902,506.17.

The individual guarantor (and now judgment debtor), came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal advice to challenge the Deficiency Judgment.

Deficiency Judgment:

Mortgage foreclosures in New York are governed by Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL). The normal flow of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding is: (a) filing and serving the Summons and Complaint; (b) having the court appoint a referee to determine how much is due to the lender on the mortgage loan; (c) granting the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, allowing the mortgage lender to “foreclose” the mortgage upon its collateral (security for the loan) – the house; and then (d) conduct an auction sale of the house to satisfy the debt owed.

Many times, the foreclosure auction sale of the property does not sell for enough money to pay off the debt due to the mortgage lender/bank. When a property is worth less than the amount due on the mortgage, the property is considered “underwater.” If, after the sale, the lender is still due money for its debt under the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, the lender may bring a request for the judge to award a judgment for the balance of the money due for its debt – it is asking for a Deficiency Judgment to be entered against the person or people liable under the mortgage note (the term “deficiency” referring to the remaining shortage due to the bank). The procedure for requesting the Deficiency Judgment is laid out in RPAPL Section 1371, and it must be strictly followed.

Attacking the Validity of the Deficiency Judgment:

At the stage that the client retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to help, a game plan to attack the Deficiency Judgment had to be formulated and put into action. The entire file in the mortgage foreclosure proceedings, including all of the pleadings, motions, and court orders had to be obtained from court and reviewed to see whether every step taken by the mortgage lender was proper – in other words, did the mortgage lender cross every “t” and dot every “i”?

1. Motion made after 90-day time limit. The Referee’s Deed from the auction sale was dated October 9, 2010. The date that the motion was served upon the defendants, January 11, 2011, exceeded the 90-day time limit specified in RPAPL 1371(2) by four days. New York case law has held that the 90-day time period in which to request that a deficiency be granted is considered a “statute of limitations” and, if not made within this period, it is time-barred. Thus, it was argued that the plaintiff-mortgage lender made the motion too late.

2. Improper calculation of the deficiency. In RPAPL 1371(2), it states that the deficiency is the amount owing less “the market value determined by the court or the sale price of the property whichever shall be the higher.” The plaintiff calculated the deficiency based upon the lower sale price ($574,000) instead of the higher appraised fair market value ($675,000), which would have resulted in a lower deficiency amount (by over $100,000).

3. Both properties were sold together as one combined lot. For some reason, the plaintiff opted to lump together two separate and distinct properties into one foreclosure sale. By conducting the sale of both properties at the same time, it was argued the plaintiff waived the right to claim a deficiency against the defendant. In Sanders v. Palmer, 68 NY2d 180 [1986], the Court of Appeals held that “there shall be separate sales of the security in such order as the court may fix, and an application after each sale and before the next occurs for determination of the deficiency resulting from the sale, for otherwise what remains due and payable from the additional security provided cannot be known.” Here, the plaintiff decided to sell both properties as a “package deal” without selling each property separately; therefore, the proper deficiency could not have been determined.

4. The personal guaranty was “limited” to $55,000. But, perhaps, the most glaring mistake in the foreclosure proceedings was that the personal guaranty of the individual owner (attached to the Complaint) stated on its face that it was limited to only $55,000 of the mortgage debt plus the legal expenses and costs associated with protecting the collateral. This was not brought to the attention of the judge when the plaintiff made the motion for the deficiency.

Based upon the several errors in the motion and procedures taken to obtain the Deficiency Judgment, the plaintiff-mortgage lender agreed to vacate and dismiss the Deficiency Judgment against the individual guarantor. Instead of owing the bank close to $1 million, he wound up owing $0!

— RAK

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Credits:
Photo of Richard Klass by Robert Matson, copyr. Richard A. Klass, 2011.
Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc. www.TheInnovationWorks.com
Image at top: The Merry Fiddler, 1623, by Gerard van Honthorst (1590-1656). This image is in the public domain because its copyright has expired. This applies to Australia, the European Union and those countries with a copyright term of life of the author plus 70 years. This image is in the public domain in the United States. This applies to U.S. works where the copyright has expired, often because its first publication occurred prior to January 1, 1923.

Who Are You and Why Are You Suing Me?! The Debt Buyer Phenomenon.

2011-11-01T13:51:00.003-04:00

He got the Summons and Complaint from a process server in 2007. The name of the plaintiff suing the defendant was “New Century Financial.” He had never heard of the plaintiff and did not know why it was suing him. The Complaint claimed that the defendant had a Providian credit card account and owed money on the account. He remembered having an account with Providian a long time ago and also remembered making his last payment to Providian in the Fall of 2000. Many people still remember the fall-out of the Savings and Loan crisis in the 1980s, and the take-over of bank assets by the FDIC and RTC, including hard assets (such as buildings) and monetary instruments (such as promissory notes); those assets were sold to third party investors and collected upon by them. In the 1990s, an offshoot of that industry began in full force – the purchase of credit card charge-offs, auto loan deficiencies and other debts owed by consumers. Debt brokers began buying nationwide and statewide portfolios of debt, and selling them to debt buyers in every imaginable stratification. When the defendant in this case got sued by New Century Financial, he turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to defend himself against this debt buyer’s claims.

Statute of Limitations:

In almost every type of case that a person may bring against someone, there is a time in which that case may be brought, and once that time has passed, the “statute of limitations” for that type of case prohibits a late case from being brought. There are various reasons for this rule, including failing memories, loss of evidence, and fairness to litigants. According to New York State law, in Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) Section 213(2), the statute of limitations to sue someone for breaching a contract is six years from the date of breach. In this case, one of the defenses put forth by the defendant was that his last payment to Providian was made in the year 2000, and the lawsuit was filed by New Century Financial in the year 2007; seemingly, the six-year statute of limitations period in which to bring the case had already passed. Since the defendant did not have records of all of his payments to Providian, there was an issue as to whether the last payment was, in fact, made in the year 2000.

Who are you and why are you suing me?!

More importantly, a much more compelling defense was asserted by the defendant that New Century Financial lacked “standing” to bring the case. The defendant admitted that he may have previously owed a balance on his credit card bill due to Providian; he even saved some of the old dunning letters that he received from Providian. But why was someone he never heard of before suing him for that balance. In addition to the statute of limitations, there is another fundamental of law, the issue of standing. When someone brings a lawsuit against another, he has to prove that he may legally do so; in other words, that he owns the claim he is bringing. One of the common problems in these so-called “debt buyer” cases is that the plaintiff cannot prove that it is the rightful owner of the debt allegedly owed by the defendant.The defendant took a very simple legal position – if Providian showed up to collect its debt, it may be due; but, the plaintiff cannot show it owns the debt. This called into question an evidentiary issue as to whether New Century Financial could prove the chain of title from Providian to itself. After pressing for disclosure of the purchase agreements and other evidence of the alleged assignment of the credit card account from Providian to New Century Financial, the debt buyer finally capitulated. New Century Financial agreed to discontinue the lawsuit WITH PREJUDICE (meaning that it cannot bring the lawsuit against the defendant again in the future).

Changes developing in the law:

Across the country, various governmental agencies have been busy trying to address the problems encountered between debt buyers and consumers. The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) prohibits many forms of harassment and abuse by debt collectors who collect debts owed by consumers to creditors. In recent years, the FDCPA has redefined the term “debt collector” to include "debt buyers" to curb their abuses. The New York City Administrative Code, which requires the licensing of debt collection agencies with the Department of Consumer Affairs, was amended to include debt buyers.By the directives of the Chief Clerk on May 13, 2009, new requirements came into action in the New York City Civil Court system to directly address two common problems with debt buyer cases. The first one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include an affidavit from the plaintiff or its attorney that it has “reason to believe that the statute of limitations has not expired.” The second one is that, when a plaintiff applies to the clerk for entry of a default judgment against the defendant, the papers must include (a) an affidavit of sale from the original creditor and not an agent; (b) an affidavit from any intermediaries who owned the debt before assignment to the plaintiff; and (c) an affidavit from the plaintiff attesting to the chain of title from the original creditor to it.Without doubt, the changes being put into effect, coupled with the difficulties of debt buyers in obtaining documents and witnesses from the original creditor, will tilt the scales of justice towards consumers for some time.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Seminar Announcement: "Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law"

2011-10-19T14:51:00.000-04:00

In early November, Richard Klass will help present a seminar entitled The Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law. This seminar, presented by the National Business Institute, will take place at the Hyatt Place Garden City, in Garden City, New York. Information follows.

Nuts and Bolts of Collection Law

Date: Wednesday, November 09, 2011

Time: 9:00 am-4:30 pm

Location:

Hyatt Place Garden City
5 North Avenue
Garden City, NY

Facility Phone: 516-222-6277

NBI Product ID#: 57049ER

For more information and to register, click this link:

http://www.nbi-sems.com/SemTeleDetails.aspx/R-57049ER%7C?ctname=SPKEM

Program Description

Ensure Your Clients Get Paid
Winning a judgment against a bad debt doesn't necessarily mean cash in hand. Do you have a firm grasp of the procedures for legally collecting that debt? Are your recovery actions in compliance with the strict guidelines governing collection? Don't rush in unprepared. Maximize your chances for recovery with the practical steps provided in this strategic seminar. Enroll today!

Avoid collection activities that violate the FDCPA and/or state laws.
Learn best practices for discovering debtor assets both pre- and post-judgment.
Recognize what provisional and final remedies are available to creditors to collect what is owed.
Walk through the procedural steps for executing wage garnishments, judgment liens, attachments and other methods of collection.
Know the creditor's rights when collecting debt and when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

Who Should Attend

This basic-to-intermediate level seminar is primarily designed for attorneys and other legal professionals. Those who may also benefit from the collection techniques provided include: collection and loan officers, accounts receivable personnel, credit managers, bankers and controllers.

Course Content

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and State Collection Laws
Ethical Issues in Collection
How to Find Debtors and Their Assets
Obtaining a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
Collecting a Judgment: A Procedural Guide
Creditors' Rights When a Debtor Files Bankruptcy

Continuing Education Credits:

Continuing Legal Education
CLE 7.20 - NJ
CLE 7.00 - NY*

Continuing Professional Education for Accountants

CPE for Accountants: 7.00

Institute of Certified Bankers

ICB: 6.75*

* denotes specialty credits

Agenda

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA) AND STATE COLLECTION LAWS

9:00 - 9:45, Richard A. Klass

Scope of the FDCPA
Understanding the Actions Permitted or Restricted by the Act
Demand Letters: Pitfalls to Avoid
Liability and Defenses
State Collection Laws and Their Application/Preemption

ETHICAL ISSUES IN COLLECTION

9:45 - 10:45, Richard A. Klass
Communication With Clients and Other Parties
Disclosure Issues
Aggressive Collection Practices
Unauthorized Practice of Law
Reporting Professional Misconduct

HOW TO FIND DEBTORS AND THEIR ASSETS

11:00 - 12:00, Michael Cardello III
Prejudgment Discovery Methods
Personal vs. Business Assets
Replevin/Self-Help Repossession Considerations

OBTAINING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE

1:00 - 2:00, Michael Cardello III
Filing the Lawsuit
Service of Process
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims
Judgments (Default, Summary, etc.)

COLLECTING A JUDGMENT: A PROCEDURAL GUIDE

2:15 - 3:15, Kenneth H. Wurman
Post-Judgment Discovery
Judgment Liens
Wage and Bank Account Garnishment
Attachments
Writ of Execution/Seize and Sale by Sheriff
Charging Orders
Debtor Slow-Pay Motions
Turnover/Receivership
Exemptions by Debtors
Dealing With Fraudulent Transfers

CREDITORS' RIGHTS WHEN A DEBTOR FILES BANKRUPTCY

3:15 - 4:30, Michael D. Brofman

Speakers

RICHARD A. KLASS is an attorney in the Brooklyn office of Your Court Street Lawyer. Mr. Klass is an arbitrator for the small claims part of the civil court of the City of New York, County of Kings. He practices in the areas of collections, bankruptcy, debtor and creditor, commercial litigation, legal malpractice, medical malpractice, personal injury, real estate condominium law, family law, divorce, child custody and private placement adoption law, wills, probate, trusts and estates. Mr. Klass has written numerous articles and has lectured frequently for the Brooklyn Bar Association and New York County Lawyers Association, as well as other professional groups and organizations. Mr. Klass is a member of The American Association for Justice, the New York State Bar Association, the New York County Lawyers Association (chair, The Mentoring Program, Group Mentoring Program) and the Brooklyn Volunteer Lawyers Project (Pro Bono Counsel). He earned his B.A. degree from Hofstra University and his J.D. degree from New York Law School.

MICHAEL D. BROFMAN is a member in the New Hyde Park law firm of Weiss & Zarett P.C., where he practices in the areas of bankruptcy law, debtor/creditor rights, non-judicial workouts and commercial litigation. He has lectured for the Nassau County and New York State bar associations on topics relating to his areas of practice, and is a frequent lecturer for National Business Institute on bankruptcy and secured creditor topics. He is a member of the Nassau County (member, Bankruptcy and Bank sections) and the New York State (member, Committee on Bankruptcy Law and General Practice Section) bar associations, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the Volunteer Lawyer's Project Pro Bono Bankruptcy Panel. Mr. Brofman earned his B.A. degree from the State University of New York at Binghamton and his J.D. degree from Fordham University.

MICHAEL CARDELLO III is a partner in the Litigation Department of Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP, concentrating in business and commercial litigation. Mr. Cardello represents large and small businesses, financial institutions and individuals in federal and state courts. He has a wide range of experience that includes trials and appellate work in the areas of corporate disputes, shareholder derivative actions, dissolutions, construction disputes, equipment and vehicle leasing disputes and other complex commercial and business disputes. Mr. Cardello earned his B.A. degree in marketing, his M.B.A. degree in finance and his J.D. degree from Hofstra University. While in law school, he was associate editor of the Hofstra Law Review. Mr. Cardello is the current vice-chairman of the Commercial Litigation Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association and also is a member of the Alternative Dispute Resolution and Securities Committee of the Nassau County Bar Association. He lectures on discovery, trial practice, equipment and vehicle leasing issues and e-discovery.

KENNETH H. WURMAN is a partner in the law firm of Naidich Wurman Birnbaum & Maday, LLP, where his practice areas, for more than 30 years, include collections and real estate. Mr. Wurman is a lecturer for National Business Institute on collection matters. He earned his B.S. degree from the State University of New York at Albany and his J.D. degree from New England School of Law. Mr. Wurman is a member of the Nassau County and New York State bar associations.

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Don’t Give Me a Black Russian!

2011-10-07T13:24:00.000-04:00

IN 2006, the executor of the estate of a woman who owned a cooperative apartment in Brooklyn attempted to sell the apartment. She first made a contract with a black woman who had two children to sell the apartment for $160,000. The contract of sale provided (as almost all do in cooperative apartment sales) that the buyer had to apply to the coop board for approval of the sale. She applied to the coop board for approval; then, dissention came about between the resident board members and the sponsor-management company. Despite supposedly being “approved” by the residents on the board, the management company claimed that the board was not legally constituted; accordingly, no closing of title would be scheduled.

The buyer elected to file a complaint with the New York State Division of Human Rights, charging that the coop engaged in discriminatory housing practices against her based upon her race. The NYS Division of Human Rights made a determination after investigation that there was “probable cause” to believe that the respondents engaged in discriminatory practices.The executor then attempted to sell the apartment to another person, a young Russian woman whom the board declined to even interview. It started to appear to the executor that a cooperative apartment owner’s fear of having every potential buyer denied, like a revolving door, was happening here.Faced with the possibility of the estate being left with a “dead asset”—an apartment that cannot be disposed of by the estate and continues to incur monthly maintenance charges, the estate turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to sue the coop board for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the proprietary lease and housing discrimination.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty:

According to New York State law, the directors of a corporation owe its shareholders a fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty of a director of a corporation consists of the obligation to perform his duties in good faith, without discriminatory practice, and with the degree of care which an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. See, Bernheim v. 136 East 64th Street Corp.,128 AD2d 434 [1 Dept. 1987]. In the Complaint against the coop, it was alleged that the coop board breached its fiduciary duty to the estate as the owner of shares of stock in the corporation and the proprietary lease to the apartment.In a similar case, in which the owner of a cooperative unit sued the board members for rejecting applicants for various reasons, including discriminatory ones, the court noted that the general deference granted to decisions of a cooperative corporation’s board of directors is not unlimited. If those board members act in a manner which is contrary to their duty to act fairly and impartially, courts may review claims of misconduct. Further, upon review, those claims of misconduct may prove actionable against the board members. See, Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp., 189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001].

The Estate was “Personally Affected” by Discrimination:

Both New York Executive Law §296 and New York City Administrative Code §8-107 provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for a cooperative housing corporation to discriminate against an applicant based upon his age, race, familial status or religion. Those statutes also provide that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to aid, abet, incite, or compel the doing of any acts forbidden under those statutes. In Dunn v. Fishbein, 123 AD2d 659 [2 Dept. 1986], the court permitted a Caucasian person to maintain a claim that he was denied an apartment because his roommate was African-American. As was held in Axelrod v. 400 Owners Corp.,189 Misc.2d 461 [Sup.Ct., NY Co. 2001], if the plaintiff can show that she was adversely affected by reason of discrimination perpetrated against the prospective purchasers, she has a cognizable claim for discrimination. The Complaint alleged that the estate was personally affected by the unlawful discriminatory practices of the coop board and coop corporation.

“Reverse Holdover”:

The Complaint suggested the creation of a new cause of action under New York law—the concept of a “reverse holdover.” In this case, the estate claimed that the defendants effectively prevented the estate from exercising its right to sell the apartment to another party. Accordingly, it was urged that the defendants should be deemed to have effectively “purchased” the estate’s shares and leasehold interest in the apartment. By their alleged actions, it was claimed that the defendants had rendered this asset of the estate a “dead” asset—it could not be disposed of or sold!Generally, a tenant may be subject to eviction because of a substantial violation of the terms of the tenancy. In this situation, the reverse had occurred—the Complaint claimed that the defendants have committed a substantial violation of the estate’s tenancy. It is axiomatic that in every cooperative corporation, the right to sell a cooperator’s apartment is a valuable right, which ought not be irrationally or arbitrarily taken away. It is safe to say that the whim and caprice of coop boards is one of the prime reasons that people prefer to buy condominiums.In upholding the estate’s Complaint, the judge held that the estate had stated “cognizable causes of action.”Estate of Cameron v. United Management, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 2671/2008.During the pendency of the litigation, the estate found another buyer for the apartment, albeit at a lower price than originally negotiated with the first buyer. The estate, coop board, and management company settled the litigation—the estate sold the apartment for $139,000 and the defendants paid $35,000 to the estate.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2009 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Man in uniform beside building, yurt in background (1905-1915). Photographer: Prokudin-Gorskii, Sergei Mikhailovich, 1863-1944. Digital color composite made for the Library of Congress by Blaise Agüera y Arcas, 2004. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.www.TheInnovationWorks.com.

-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Making Sure the Guarantor is a “Good Guy.”

2011-09-14T13:56:00.000-04:00

In 1997, a landlord rented a commercial space to a tire company pursuant to a commercial lease agreement. The tenant defaulted in the payment of rent, owing the landlord the claimed arrearage sum of $157,000. To collect the rent arrears, the landlord came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to recover.

When the lease was entered into, the president of the tenant executed the lease agreement both as president of the tenant and as personal guarantor of performance and payment of rent. The initial term of the lease agreement was for two years, and it provided for two-year renewal periods, with all of the terms and conditions of the original lease expressly reserved. The president of the tenant signed letter agreements extending the lease four times, the last time being December 20, 2004.

The landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against the personal guarantor of the lease, seeking payment of all outstanding arrears; the guarantor cross-moved for summary judgment, seeking to dismiss the case. The guarantor contended that he was not a proper party, claiming that he notified the landlord in February 2005 that the tenant was going out of business and all of its assets were being transferred to a different entity, effective March 2005. The landlord refuted receiving this notice from the guarantor.

Motion for Summary Judgment:

The term “summary judgment” means that a litigant is claiming that there is no reason to have a trial (either by judge or jury) because the case can be decided based upon application of the law. A “motion” is basically a request for a judge to take some sort of action.

Summary judgment is a drastic remedy, as it deprives a party of his day in court, and should be granted when it is clear that there are no triable issues of fact. See, Alvarez v. Prospect Hospital, 68 NY2d 320 [1986]. The burden is upon the moving party (the landlord in this case) to make a prima facie (Latin term for “by its first instance”) showing that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law by presenting evidence in admissible form demonstrating the absence of any material facts. See, Giuffrida v. Citibank, 100 NY2d 72 [2003]. The failure to make that showing requires the denial of the motion regardless of the adequacy of the opposing papers. See, Ayotte v. Gervasio, 81 NY2d 1062 [1993]. Once a prima facie showing has been made, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party (the tenant in this case) to produce evidentiary proof sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which necessitate a trial.

In this case, the judge decided that the landlord laid out its case that the tenant owed rent arrears. This was based upon the evidence submitted with the motion, including the written lease agreement, the letters extending the lease for several additional terms, and the rent ledger. The judge dismissed the evidence presented by the guarantor, which amounted to his affidavit and the supposed notice that the tenant was ceasing business and a new company would be the tenant going forward.

Restriction on Assignment of Lease:

The argument that the tenant had given notice of assignment of the lease to a new company was refuted by the specific provisions of the lease. A provision in a lease which restricts assignment or subletting, and requires the consent of the landlord prior to doing so, is enforceable. See, Matter of Clason Management Co. v. Altman, 40 AD2d 635 [1 Dept. 1972]. The lease agreement at issue had such a restriction, which explicitly barred the tenant from assigning or transferring the lease or subletting the premises unless the tenant obtained the prior written consent of the landlord. Thus, even if the landlord did receive the letter from the guarantor in February 2005, there was no showing that the mandated consent was ever procured from the landlord.

Enforceability of Personal Guaranty:

It is no secret to landlords that, unless the incoming tenant is a large corporation, a commercial tenant is essentially a shell entity whose assets can disappear overnight (nowadays, even large corporations could qualify). So, landlords insist upon obtaining signed personal guaranties from the principals of the corporate tenants. Sometimes, the guaranty will be for all lease obligations through the end of the lease term, and sometimes, the guaranty will be effective through the date the tenant physically moves out of the premises – the proverbial “good guy clause.”

In this case, the landlord obtained the guaranty through the end of the lease term, but still expected the guarantor to be a “good guy” and pay the rent. Generally, a guaranty is to be interpreted in the strictest manner. See, White Rose Food v. Saleh, 99 NY2d 589 [2003]. But it is also the case that a personal guaranty which contains language of a continuing obligation is enforceable and survives payment of the original indebtedness. USI Capital and Leasing v. Chertock, 172 AD2d 235 [1 Dept. 1991]. Thus, termination of a continuing personal guaranty requires compliance with the provisions governing termination expressly set forth in the guaranty. In the absence of some writing which addresses termination, a guaranty which is silent on that issue remains in full force and effect. See, Chemical Bank v. Geronimo Auto Parts Corp., 224 AD2d 461 [1 Dept. 1996]. In this case, the personal guaranty could not be canceled merely by the president of the tenant sending a notice, indicating that the old company was going out and a new one was coming in.

In granting the landlord’s motion for summary judgment, the judge held that the personal guarantor is liable to the landlord, based upon his guarantee of the tenant’s lease obligations. Ribellino v. Fleet 2000, Inc. and Rosenfeld, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 7501/2008 [Decision dated October 7, 2009].

— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

$401,452.59 Surplus Moneys: The Extra Bit Left Over!

2011-08-21T17:51:00.004-04:00

In the typical mortgage foreclosure proceeding, the mortgage lender (or “mortgagee”) brings an action against the homeowner to foreclose on its mortgage against the real estate, generally because the homeowner (or “mortgagor”) failed to make payments on the loan. The mortgage is the legal document recorded by the mortgagee against the mortgagor property to provide the collateral for the making of the loan. In case of default in payment, the mortgagee has the right to sell the collateral to satisfy the remaining balance due on the loan (most foreclosure proceedings are judicial sales, where a court has authorized the sale, as opposed to ‘non-judicial’ sales in limited circumstances). Sometimes, in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff is not the holder of a mortgage but rather has another type of lien against the real estate, such as a tax lien for unpaid real estate taxes, mechanic’s lien (for building supplies or labor performed), or judgment lien.

Once the mortgagee or lienor has obtained a Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, it can then sell the real estate. The mortgage foreclosure proceeding culminates with the public auction of the mortgagor’s real estate to the highest bidder. At that point, the property is sold to the bidder, who pays the sale price to a court-appointed referee.

Definition of Surplus Moneys:

If the amount paid by the successful bidder at the auction sale exceeds the amount due to the mortgagee according to the Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale, then there is created a special fund of the left-over purchase price called the “Surplus Moneys.” For example, if the mortgagee is due $200,000 and the property sold for $300,000, the remaining sale price of $100,000 is the surplus. According to Article 13 of New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL), there is a procedure for the former homeowner (and other junior lienors, such as second mortgagees, judgment creditors or other lienholders) to petition the court for the release of the surplus moneys.

Fighting over $401,452.59 Surplus Moneys:

In 2005, the owner of a building in Brooklyn failed to pay his property taxes. A foreclosure proceeding was brought based on the tax lien, and the building was sold at auction. The referee paid off the tax lien and then deposited the remaining surplus moneys of $401,452.59 into court. The building owner died, leaving his second wife and children as his survivors. He had been married previously and, as part of his and his first wife’s divorce case, had agreed to pay her half of the value of the building. The first wife and one of the owner’s children retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, to pursue the payment of their respective shares of the surplus moneys.

The various heirs to the estate of the owner, along with the first wife, filed motions in court to have a “surplus moneys referee” appointed to determine who would be entitled to what portion of the surplus moneys. The second wife alleged that the first wife was not entitled to any portion of the surplus moneys, claiming that she was previously paid by the decedent for her portion – but she could not find proof of the alleged payment. A hearing was held before the surplus moneys referee, who determined that the first wife should receive her half-share of the moneys of over $200,000, along with accrued interest.

The balance of the surplus moneys were to be distributed according to New York’s Estates, Powers and Trusts Law (EPTL) Section 4-1.1, which comes into play when someone dies without a Will. (This is the reason that making a Last Will and Testament is very important!) According to the EPTL, the balance of the surplus moneys were to be distributed as follows: (a) the first $50,000 plus half of the remaining balance paid to the second wife; and (b) the other half of the remaining balance paid to the surviving children, evenly divided among them.

After the completion of the hearing, the referee rendered a report, setting forth the manner of distribution. Then, an Order confirming the report and directing the distribution was signed by the Judge. At the conclusion, each of the clients received her fair share of the surplus moneys in full with interest.

-- Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Announcement: Distinguished Service Award for Richard A. Klass

2011-08-09T17:41:00.000-04:00

Announcement:

On May 11, 2011, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was presented with the prestigious Distinguished Service Award by the Brooklyn Bar Association. This award, presented by Association President Andrea Bonina, recognized the accomplishments of Mr. Klass in founding the BBA's Mentoring Committee. The Mentoring Committee was formed to assist lawyers in obtaining advice on the practice of law, including finding a job, starting a law firm, resumé building, and how-to help. It is with great honor that Mr. Klass serves to help the legal community in enhancing their opportunities and developing professionalism.

Amendment to Bankruptcy Petition Worth Millions!

2011-08-01T08:00:00.004-04:00

A brother tried to help his sister, and it almost cost him millions of dollars. Based upon the brother’s good credit, his sister bought a house in Queens in his name. At some point, she was unable to keep up with the mortgage payments and the house fell into foreclosure.

On the eve of the foreclosure sale, the brother filed bankruptcy to “stay” the sale. In the mad rush to save the family home (which, unfortunately, is common these days!), the brother did not understand something very important: the personal injury lawsuit he filed years earlier, relating to a construction work-site injury in which he was severely injured, was an “asset” of his to be listed in his bankruptcy petition. Unfortunately, the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed because the brother could not make the mortgage or bankruptcy plan payments. The house was later sold at foreclosure sale.

State Court Motion to Dismiss:

Subsequently, the defendants in the state court personal injury case asked the judge to dismiss the case based upon the failure of the plaintiff/injured person to list the pending lawsuit as a “contingent asset” in his bankruptcy petition. Substantial New York case law, going all the way up to the New York State Court of Appeals, has held that the failure to list the asset in the petition is fatal to the continuance of the personal injury case – every case on point says the injured person’s lawsuit gets dismissed without any recovery, no matter how grave the injury.

Uncharted Course to Be Taken:

Faced with this apparently insurmountable challenge, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, was brought in to help save the man’s personal injury case. The strategy developed was to return to the Bankruptcy Court to seek to amend or fix the petition to reflect the existence of the personal injury claim. This was trail-blazing!

In determining that the debtor/personal injury plaintiff should be permitted to amend his bankruptcy petition to list the claim as an asset, Chief Bankruptcy Judge Craig stated: “This Court has not found any statute, rule or precedent that provides that a debtor’s right to amend expires upon dismissal of the case, or that the order dismissing the case must be vacated before schedules, statements or lists may be amended.” In re Severius Raggie, New York Law Journal 7/9/2008.

Interplay between “Closed” and “Closed”:

At first glance, the court noted that the bankruptcy case was marked “closed.” The judge was skeptical that an amendment to the petition could be made because Bankruptcy Rule 1009 provides that “a voluntary petition, list, schedule, or statement may be amended by the debtor as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed.”

However, in relying upon the decision in In re Critical Care Support Services, 236 BR 137, it was pointed out that a case can only be “closed” when the assets of the bankruptcy estate have been fully administered. The term “closed,” as used in Bankruptcy Rule 1009 and Bankruptcy Code §350, does not encompass “dismissed” cases. Thus, an Order dismissing a case accomplishes a completely different result than an Order closing it would; essentially, upon dismissal of a bankruptcy case, all of the debtor’s rights in his property revert back to him.

Separately, the court also held that, as part of accepting the debtor’s amendment, it could reject the amendment when “the facts and circumstances presented indicate that the amendment was filed in bad faith, fraudulent or prejudicial.” Citing to In re Nye, 250 BR 46. In this case, Judge Craig held that there was no evidence of bad faith, fraud or prejudice; the state court defendants’ argument that granting the amendment would “reward” the debtor was not persuasive. In the absence of any evidence that the debtor deliberately omitted the personal injury claim from his schedules to defraud his creditors, permitting the debtor to amend did not reward wrongdoing.

After Judge Craig granted the debtor’s motion to amend his bankruptcy petition, the state court defendants in the personal injury lawsuit withdrew their motion to dismiss the case. The plaintiff’s case is now winding through the New York State Supreme Court towards a trial, in which his serious injuries will be considered by a jury.

— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: Selbstporträt mit fünfzig Jahren, by Giovanni Fattori, 1884; Porträt der dritten Ehefrau, by Giovanni Fattori, 1905. Newsletter marketing by The Innovation Works, Inc.

$73K Buys $200,000 House, Thanks to Debtor’s "Hat Trick" Screw-up.

2011-07-07T14:27:00.001-04:00

The foreclosure auction of the defendant’s Staten Island house came up on a Wednesday at 9:30AM. The courtroom was packed with people ready to bid on the house. The Referee announced the sale of the house, took bids, and struck down the sale at $73,000 to the successful bidder.

Moments later, the Referee informed the successful bidder that one of the two owners of the house had filed bankruptcy at 9:26AM; therefore, the foreclosure sale was invalid and the bidder should take back his bid deposit. At that moment, the successful bidder called Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer about whether the sale was indeed invalid.

Automatic Stay Operates as a “Stop” Sign:

People normally file for bankruptcy protection for one or both of two reasons: (1) to discharge debt; and (2) to “stay” (or stop) proceedings against the debtor, such as foreclosures, lawsuits, repossessions, evictions, etc.

Under Bankruptcy Code §362(a), the filing of a bankruptcy petition with the United States Bankruptcy Court imposes an automatic stay upon creditors from taking certain actions, including specifically auctioning off the debtor’s house (Note: there are exceptions which may apply). Generally, actions taken after the filing of the bankruptcy petition are null and void, as if they never occurred. In this particular situation, the foreclosure auction happened 4 minutes after the bankruptcy filing. Under normal circumstances, the automatic stay would have voided this sale and the successful bidder would have merely gotten back his bid deposit, without getting the house.

Before the drastic changes to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 (under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act [BAPCPA]), debtors would go in and out of bankruptcy to prevent their houses from being sold. Since BAPCPA, it has gotten more difficult for debtors to get the benefit of the “Stop” sign – the first filing will trigger a stay, the second filing a briefer stay, and the third filing no stay unless requested. These “Stop” signs begin to feel like a “Hat Trick,” where one player scores three times.

Searching for Details:

The first step in trying to salvage the foreclosure sale for the successful bidder was reviewing every document filed in the bankruptcy case. This included the “bare bones” petition and the “Credit Counseling Certificate.” This Certificate states that the debtor completed a credit counseling course within six months before the bankruptcy filing, which must be done in order to be eligible to file bankruptcy. Upon very close review, it appeared that the debtor simply took the old, expired Certificate from her prior bankruptcy case the year before (more than 6 months old) and filed the same one again – a big but little-noticed “no-no.”

Upon further digging, it appeared that the co-owner of the house had previously filed bankruptcy and there was an order terminating the stay a year earlier. Also, the debtor had both unsuccessfully filed a bankruptcy before and had filed the current one without complying with the rules, including paying the court’s filing fee.

Validation of Post-Petition Foreclosure Sale:

The Court found that grounds existed to warrant the annulment or termination of the automatic stay and validation of the foreclosure sale. Citing to several cases, the court identified various factors that should be considered in determining whether to validate a post-petition foreclosure sale, including whether:

(1) the creditor had actual or constructive knowledge of the bankruptcy filing and, therefore, of the stay;
(2) the debtor has acted in bad faith;
(3) there is equity in the property of the estate;
(4) the property is necessary for an effective reorganization;
(5) grounds for relief from stay exist and a motion, if filed, would have been granted prior to the violation;
(6) failure to grant retroactive relief would cause unnecessary expense to the creditor;
(7) the creditor has detrimentally changed its position on the basis of the action taken;
(8) the creditor took some affirmative action post-petition to bring about the violation of the stay; and
(9) the creditor promptly seeks a retroactive lifting of the stay and approval of the action taken. In re Campbell, 356 BR 722 (WD Mo.2006); In re Williams, 257 BR 297 (Bankr.WD Mo. 2001).

Reviewing the facts of the particular situation, the Court found “ample support” for annulling the stay retroactively and validating the post-petition foreclosure sale. These facts included the bare bones petition filed by the debtor with the expired Certificate, her case being filed on the same date as the auction sale, her significant prior experience in bankruptcy, and the negative effect to the successful bidder’s (an independent third party) rights.

In granting the successful bidder’s motion, the Bankruptcy Judge determined that the “debtor’s failure to act in good faith in this case warrants the annulment of the automatic stay and the validation of the petition day foreclosure sale.” In re Annie Williams, US Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York, Case No. 1-09-44856-dem [Decision dated January 27, 2010]. Since the Bankruptcy Court validated the foreclosure sale, the successful bidder achieved his desired result – the purchase of the Staten Island house, valued at more than $200,000, for $73,000.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Credits:
Staudacherhaus at the Tegernsee, by artist August Macke (1887-1914).
Photo of Richard Klass by Tom Urgo, 2008.
Law firm business communications services provided by
The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

How the “Continuous Representation” Doctrine Helps Injured Clients

2011-06-14T08:00:00.001-04:00

In legal matters, there is an attorney-client relationship from the moment that the attorney is consulted by the client until the matter concludes. If, during the term of this relationship, the attorney was negligent or commits malpractice in the matter, the client may have a claim against the attorney for legal malpractice. Sometimes, the malpractice is committed at the early stages of litigation and not at the conclusion; for instance, an action may have started in Year 1, malpractice was committed in Year 2, and the action concludes in Year 6. The question then becomes whether or not the client may pursue a claim against the attorney for the malpractice committed in Year 2, when the statute of limitations period may have already passed.

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In order to protect clients The Court of Appeals has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra.

The Continuous Representation Toll

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is tolled during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: [art critic] Diego Martelli in Castiglioncello by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.

-----------
copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

“Busting” the Trust!

2011-05-21T08:00:00.007-04:00

A Trust was created by a woman in her Last Will and Testament (testamentary trust), leaving her children and their issue (children) as the sole beneficiaries of the trust. The Children’s Trust was formed as a “mixed” discretionary trust; meaning that the trustees maintain the discretion to pay moneys to the beneficiaries of the trust but the trust itself is a spendthrift trust, whereby the beneficiaries cannot invade the trust or, in other words, take out money themselves. A “discretionary” trust is typically set up to give the trustees the authority to pay money (either principal or interest) as they see fit, considering the lifestyle and resources of the beneficiary. A “spendthrift” trust prohibits the beneficiary, creditors of the beneficiary, or any other person from taking money out of the trust.

The “deadbeat” parent

A couple was married and had two children. The husband was one of the children of the woman who set up the trust. They got divorced and the two children lived with the wife. As part of the Judgment of Divorce, the husband was ordered to pay child support and yeshiva tuition for the couple’s daughter. The husband failed to pay the court-ordered amounts. The judge granted money judgments against the husband to pay child support arrears, tuition and legal fees. Enforcement of the money judgments proved fruitless. The wife brought proceedings to punish the husband for contempt of court. The judge found that the husband was guilty of contempt of court and even granted an Order of Contempt, allowing for the husband’s arrest for not paying child support. The husband and his assets could not be located – the typical case of a “deadbeat parent.”

Unfortunately, the wife was, perhaps, more down and out than most people. She was ill and unable to work; not eligible for social security disability income; and living off of her adult son’s meager income and public assistance through food stamps. Her daughter was going to be expelled from school for nonpayment of three years’ worth of tuition. That’s when the wife’s divorce lawyer referred her to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for help.

Looking at invading the Children’s Trust

Generally, a trust can be made invincible – no one can gain access to the moneys or property contained in it, not even the beneficiary. The “settlor” (the one who sets up the trust and funds it) appoints a trustee who will carry out her wishes and follows the directions contained in the trust document.

In this particular trust, the beneficiaries were listed as “the Child and the Child’s issue.” Clearly, the Children’s Trust envisioned the trustees giving money not only to the “deadbeat parent” but also to his children, including the daughter who was about to be kicked out of school.

An Order to Show Cause was brought in New York State Supreme Court to (a) have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband; (b) restrain the trustees from paying any money out of the trust to the “deadbeat” parent; and (c) sequester, or set aside, enough money from the trust to pay future child support until the daughter’s age of majority.

The guiding light of Judge Nathan Sobel

The issue of “busting” a trust set up by a grandparent for the benefit of a grandchild was brought up in a case over 40 years ago, in a case of first impression, before the beneficent Surrogate of Kings County, Judge Nathan Sobel. In Matter of Chusid, Judge Sobel first stated the general proposition that a testator may dispose of his own property as he pleases. Among other things, a testator may create a trust for the benefit of an infant or improvident person, so that the beneficiary does not squander the money. However, Surrogate Sobel stated the oft-cited principle which applied to this situation (and, unfortunately, to so many others): “No man should be permitted to live at the same time in luxury and in debt.”

While recognizing that the general purpose of a discretionary trust is to protect the trustee from unreasonable demands of a beneficiary or from creditors’ claims, it does not insulate or protect the trustee from responsibility to and reasonable directions from a court. Further, as stated in the Chusid opinion, this “is particularly true where the income beneficiaries are dependent children who will either starve or become public charges if the trustees refuse to exercise discretion in their favor.” Judge Sobel then held that the trustee’s discretion yields to and is subordinate to the equity powers of the court to direct payment for the support of minor dependent children.

After argument of the Order to Show Cause, with the opposition of the trustees of the Children’s Trust, the judge made the determination that the wife was entitled to “bust” the trust open to have the trustees pay the child support arrears and yeshiva tuition owed by the husband from the principal and interest of the trust. The judge ordered the trustees of the Children’s Trust to pay the following amounts: (a) 82,350 for yeshiva tuition; (b) 43,329 for child support arrears; and (c) $3,960 for school transportation expenses; he also ordered the trustees to sequester $53,891 for future child support payments.

— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Art credits: Leute am blauen See, by August Macke (1887-1914).

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Notice to Admit: The Power of a Piece of Paper

2011-05-01T08:00:00.038-04:00

In the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) – the “Game Book” of civil practice in New York State courts, there is a little-used device called the “Notice to Admit.” While not as often utilized by attorneys as it ought to be, it can pack a powerful punch to the other side in litigation.

As most of us know, the old days of Perry Mason pulling out a trick at trial have greatly diminished due to the introduction into the legal process of a phase in the litigation known as “discovery.” During the discovery phase, each adversary is permitted to inspect and “discover” relevant documents and information pertaining to the lawsuit, through the use of various discovery techniques. Those discovery techniques may include, among other things, inspecting the books and records of a business, asking questions known as “interrogatories,” performing a physical examination, viewing photographs or videos made of the scene of an incident, and inspecting the geographic location of an area which is the subject of the litigation. Among those discovery techniques, there is the Notice to Admit.

CPLR Section 3123 provides that: “a party may serve upon any other party a written request for admission by the latter of the genuineness of any papers or documents, or the correctness or fairness of representation of any photographs, described in and served with the request, or of the truth of any matters of fact set forth in the request, as to which the party requesting the admission reasonably believes there can be no substantial dispute at the trial and which are within the knowledge of such other party or can be ascertained by him upon reasonable inquiry.” It is further provided that, if the latter party fails to respond, the effect is that the matter shall be deemed “admitted.”

In Rodriguez v. Moreno, it was alleged that, in 1994, the owner of a 2-family house in Brooklyn had to leave this country in a hurry and needed cash. He made an agreement with his tenant that, in exchange for $30,000 cash and the continued payment of the mortgage on the house, the tenant could effectively purchase the house from him. To memorialize their understanding, the owner and his tenant went to the owner’s attorney to sign documents.

The owner’s attorney drafted the documents necessary to transfer title to the house, including a Deed. The owner signed the documents, and the attorney held onto the originals. The agreement was, once the tenant paid off the last of the mortgage payments on the house, the Deed would be released to him from the attorney’s escrow. This arrangement continued for 13 years.

In 2007, the tenant discovered that the owner, who still held title to the house, was trying to sell it to someone else. The only proof of the agreement he had was a photocopy of the front side of the Deed that the owner signed 13 years earlier. Unfortunately, the owner’s attorney had been disbarred years earlier and was nowhere to be found; also gone were the original documents.

Quick Action Was Needed

Armed with only a skimpy photocopy of the first page of the Deed, which had the signature of the owner, the tenant hired Richard A. Klass, Esq., to bring an action under New York’s Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL) to enforce his rights to the house. Since the owner was actively trying to sell the house, and had signed a contract to sell the house to someone else, quick action to stop the sale was needed. With the filing of the Summons and Complaint, a Notice of Pendency (also known as a “lis pendens”) was filed against the house, which operates as notice to outsiders that someone is laying claim to ownership of the house.

The owner denied the agreement, since there was no proof of the agreement between himself and the tenant. He also claimed that the mortgage payments made by the tenant were intended as rent.

Proving the Copy To Be a Duplicate of the Original

The next, important step was to nail down through the discovery phase the proof of the agreement. In general, contracts relating to the sale of real estate require written proof under a legal doctrine known as the Statute of Frauds. Since here, there was no writing other than the photocopy of the Deed, the lawsuit appeared to be futile.

The admissions requested were as follows:

That the attached Deed was signed by the defendant on September 1, 1994.
That the attached Deed was prepared by the defendant’s attorney, or on his behalf by a member of his staff or office.
That the defendant’s attorney prepared the attached Deed at the request of, or on behalf of the defendant.
That the original of the attached Deed was taken into escrow by the defendant’s attorney at or about the time of execution thereof.

Despite being served with this Notice to Admit, the defendant failed to respond to it within the 20-day time frame in which to respond. By virtue of his not timely responding, the above allegations were deemed “admitted.”

Since it was now admitted that the owner signed the Deed in favor of the tenant, and the Deed was to be held in escrow by his attorney, the terms of the agreement were arguably established in a manner allowed by the Statute of Frauds. Coupled with the fact that the tenant made all of the mortgage payments for 13 years, the owner elected to settle the case instead of proceeding to trial.

— Richard A. Klass, Esq.

©2008 Richard A. Klass. Art credits: page one, Der Schindanger in Livorno by Giovanni Fattori, 1865-1867.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

A New Way to Award Attorney's Fees

2011-04-07T08:00:00.000-04:00

The “American Rule” governs most cases in United States’ courts, where each party to the litigation bears its own costs and attorney’s fees (as opposed to the “English Rule,” according to which the loser of the litigation is chargeable with the winner’s attorney’s fees). There are three exceptions to the “American Rule,” which are when there is:

(a) an agreement between the parties pertaining to attorney’s fees;
(b) a statute which awards reasonable attorney’s fees to the “prevailing party;” or
(c) a court rule provides for attorney’s fees.

Out With The “Old” Ways

Generally, courts around the country use one of two methods to determine the amount of “reasonable attorney’s fees” to be awarded to a party: (1) the “lodestar” method and (2) the “Johnson” twelve-factor method (these methods were the two existing methods endorsed by the US Supreme Court in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 US 424 (1983)).

The “lodestar” method figures out the reasonable attorney’s fee to be awarded — which is basically the product of the attorney’s usual hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours worked (for example: $3,500 attorney’s fees award based on 10 hours of the attorney’s hourly rate of $350). After figuring out the product, the fee may be adjusted by the court as part of the court’s fee-setting method — a starting point (if you will) for an initial estimate before considering the particulars of the case’s circumstances.

The “Johnson” method came about from a case titled Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), in which the court envisioned a one-step inquiry into attorney’s fees, based upon twelve factors, allowing the court to rely more on its experience and judgment with both the attorney and type of case involved. Market forces, which generally influence the hourly rate charged, are not to be the sole determining factor under this method.

In theory, courts that adopted the “lodestar” method were expected to consider fewer variables than the “Johnson” method; in practice, however, many courts consider the same set of variables under both methods to arrive at a fee amount. Some court decisions held that the “Johnson” factors should be applied after applying the “lodestar” calculation; some held that many of the “Johnson” factors were subsumed into the initial calculation.

The Presumptively Reasonable Fee

In a Decision rendered in April 2007 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the case of Arbor Hill Concerned Citizens Neighborhood Association v. County of Albany, the Second Circuit held that it was abandoning the traditional “lodestar” method in favor of the concept of the “presumptively reasonable fee.” (The Second Circuit Court of Appeals covers cases in the federal courts of New York and Vermont). The Decision actually stated that the term, “lodestar method,” was a metaphor that has “deteriorated to the point of unhelpfulness.”

The Second Circuit decided to switch over to a new method of figuring out the reasonable attorney’s fee to be awarded to a prevailing party termed the “presumptively reasonable fee.” This new way asks the court to bear in mind all of the case-specific variables, including the reasonable hourly rate that a paying client would be willing to pay if he was able to negotiate with his attorney. In determining that, the court should consider, among other things, the “Johnson” factors and the fact that a reasonable, paying client would likely want to spend the minimum amount necessary to effectively litigate the case.

The Forum Rule

The Decision also highlighted a particular issue involved in setting fees — the “forum rule.” To determine the general hourly rate, the court has to consider the “community” in which the court sits; in federal courts, it has generally been the geographic area of the district in which the court is located. The Second Circuit recognized that that area could be skewed, depending on the district. So, the court clarified that a district court may use an out-of-district rate (or a rate in between in-district and out-of-district) if it is clear that a reasonable, paying client would have paid the higher rate; however, the court will presume that a client will either hire counsel located within the district or counsel whose rates are consistent with those of local counsel. The presumption may be rebutted if it can be shown that hiring higher-priced, out-of-district counsel was reasonable under the circumstances.

Like all considerations involved in deciding whether to bring a lawsuit against someone, the issue of attorney’s fees is an important one. Without effective, compensated counsel, a litigant with a true cause may be deprived of “his day in court.” Fee-shifting statutes and agreements for attorney’s fees ensure that each side to a dispute knows the risks of his conduct — whether it be the breach of a contract or commission of an act that a statute or court rule is designed to protect.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Getting it Done: The Importance of Entering Timely Defaults

2011-03-14T08:00:00.000-04:00

In 2004, a guy went out for a night of drinkin’ on the town. On the way home, he stopped in to one last bar to drink. At the bar, in a very drunk condition, he hit on a woman. After leaving the bar to go home, he saw standing by a nearby building a woman who he thought was the same one as the one in the bar. When the guy saw the woman on the street, thinking it was the one he saw in the bar, he grabbed and touched her. Unfortunately, it turned out that she was not the same woman—and she pressed charges of assault.

Naturally, the woman claiming assault not only sought criminal charges but also brought a civil action to recover damages from the guy. She brought the law suit against him through her lawyer in 2004. The defendant failed to answer the complaint after being served; however, her lawyer did not ask the judge to enter a default against the guy until 2006 – two years later. In support of the request for the default judgment, the lawyer stated that the woman had left New York to return to her native country because she was emotionally distraught over the assault and did not return until 2006. The judge granted a default judgment for the woman’s pain and suffering for $1,000,000.

The relevant New York statute governing default judgments, CPLR 3215, provides that, when a defendant has failed to appear in an action, the plaintiff may seek a default judgment against him. However, the plaintiff is required to do so within one year after the default, as required by subsection (c) thereof:

Default not entered within one year: If the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed. A motion by the defendant under this subdivision does not constitute an appearance in the action.

According to the above subsection, the court should have dismissed the complaint as abandoned, based upon the woman’s failure to take proceedings for the entry of default within one year. Numerous cases have held that dismissal of the complaint is required when there has been a failure to take timely proceedings for entry of default. See,Saunders v. Central Brooklyn Coordinating Council, Inc., 273 AD2d 294 (2d Dept. 2000); PM-OK Associates v. Britz, 256 AD2d 151 (1st Dept. 1998).

Plaintiff must show a justifiable excuse

The Second Department held, in Winkelman v. H&S Beer and Soda Discounts Inc., 91 AD2d 660 (1982), that, absent a justifiable excuse and a showing that the action is meritorious, the plaintiff’s failure to enter a default judgment against the defendant within one year of the latter’s default mandates dismissal of the action against defendant as abandoned. In the affirmation of the woman’s attorney, he stated:

“That shortly after the Summons and Complaint was served, the Plaintiff, suffering from emotional stress and trauma based on the underlying assault and battery complained in this action, left the United States for her home country of Spain, as Defendant resided in the same neighborhood as Plaintiff, and Plaintiff, in fear of her safety and mental well-being, withdrew from the country.”

In Herzbrun v. Levine, 23 AD2d 744 (1st Dept. 1965), the Court held that the plaintiff’s excuse that she was forced to move to West Germany shortly after the action was commenced was not sufficient cause to excuse the failure to comply with the provisions of CPLR 3215. In Sortino v. Fisher, 20 AD2d 25, 30 (1st Dept. 1963), the court stated that “[T[he duty of prosecuting …. (an) action rests upon the (person) who brings it, not the (party) who defends it.” In that case, the court stated that “there is an intimate relationship between the merit of an action and the fact that it has been neglected.” This is the reason why an affidavit is needed because it must be “as good as the kind of affidavit which could defeat a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there is no issue of fact.” As Justice Breitel wrote in the decision: “Given the delay, he has a double burden; to justify the delay and to lend credit to the proferred justification by establishing merit.” Further, “Even an action of great merit may be forfeited by prolonged delay. It is the right of a defendant to be free of a case which is not diligently prosecuted. For obvious reasons, it is very rare and quite perverse that an action of merit is not diligently prosecuted.”

Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion, termed an “Order to Show Cause,” to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the action. The motion stated that the excuse of the plaintiff for not entering the default within one year (that the woman suffered from emotional stress) had absolutely nothing to do with the requirement that her attorney should have moved for the default within one year since he proceeded on the Verified (or sworn) Complaint of his client and did not need any further sworn affidavits from her to obtain the default judgment.

In response to the Order to Show Cause, the plaintiff capitulated and agreed to settle the ‘Million Dollar’ case for a mere $7,500 to avoid further litigation!

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
Your Court Street Lawyer

The (Property) Bonds of Matrimony That Can’t Be Broken

2011-02-21T14:33:00.002-05:00

Two sisters and their respective husbands decided to purchase a two-family house in The Bronx in 1995. At the closing, they took title to the property, reflected on the Deed, as follows: “Gilberto Hernandez and Consolacion Hernandez, his wife …. And Erlinda Que and Elpidio Rodriguez, her husband.” Erlinda executed her Last Will and Testament, in which she devised her “half share and interest in the real property” to her sister, Consolacion, and her husband, Elpidio, in equal shares. In December 2000, Erlinda passed away, survived by her husband, Elpidio.

For a long time after Erlinda’s death, Elpidio and his deceased wife’s sister continued to maintain the house. At some point, he remarried and wanted to sell it and move. And, when they all couldn’t agree on how to accomplish this, a lawsuit was initiated called a “Partition and Sale” action. In this type of lawsuit, the parties ask a judge to order the property sold at auction.

The decedent’s sister and her husband, along with the nominated executor under the Will, claimed that ownership of the Bronx property passed under Erlinda’s Last Will and Testament. Therefore, they claimed that half of Erlinda’s quarter-share went to Consolacion (or one-eighth of the total interest in the property), and half of Erlinda’s quarter-share went to Elpidio. By their claim, Elpidio would be entitled to only 37.5% of the house.

Elpidio, the decedent’s surviving spouse, came to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal advice. Elpidio felt that, as Erlinda’s husband, he should get more.

Tenancy by the Entirety:

One of the “perks” of being married is that real property deeded to a husband and wife creates a “tenancy by the entirety,” under New York’s Estates Powers and Trusts Law Section 6-2.2(b). This form of ownership, among other things, prevents creditors of one spouse from forcing the sale of the house and easily transfers title to one spouse upon the death of the other. The exception to this rule about a tenancy by the entirety is if the Deed expressly declares it to be a joint tenancy or tenancy in common (where each spouse owns a divisible share).

Commonly, the Deed to a husband and wife will indicate that they are married, with language such as “A and B, as husband and wife” or “A and B, his wife” or “A and B, her husband.” This form of ownership, by statute, cannot be altered or changed without the mutual consent of the spouses or a divorce. Obviously, the ownership of a house by spouses as a tenancy by the entirety gives comfort that one spouse cannot sell his/her interest in the house without the other spouse’s consent. Only in limited circumstances, such as a divorce proceeding or bankruptcy case, can a court force the disposition of a house owned by the spouses in this form without their consent.

Granting of Summary Judgment:

The term “summary judgment” means that the litigant believes that there are no issues of fact which necessitate a trial before a judge or jury. When one litigant “moves” or asks the judge to grant summary judgment, he must present proof (in admissible form) which supports the request and which demonstrates that the matter may be decided on the law alone. It can then be said that the movant has established his“prima facie” case (meaning “at first sight”). Then, the other side to the litigation must present the judge with proof that there are genuine factual issues, and that the matter cannot be decided without a trial. Many readers will understand that judges deny summary judgment motions in most cases because they want to give litigants their day in court, and the facts are not always the facts.

In the probate proceeding in the Surrogate’s Court for Bronx County, Elpidio asked the Surrogate to grant him “summary judgment” on his claim that he is entitled to Erlinda’s entire interest in the house. The ‘Exhibit A’ proof, offered by Elpidio that he was entitled to Erlinda’s whole share, was the Deed itself. There was no express declaration in the Deed that it had been conveyed or transferred to Elpidio and Erlinda as anything other than husband and wife.

In granting summary judgment to Elpidio, in In the Estate of Erlinda Que, Deceased [Surrogate’s Court, Bronx County, February 25, 2010], Surrogate Holzman determined that, despite the language of Erlinda’s Last Will and Testament granting her sister a half-share of her interest in the house, Elpidio should be declared the full owner of half or 50% of the whole house. Specifically, Surrogate Holzman held that:

“A tenancy by the entirety is different from both a tenancy in common and a joint tenancy in that ‘it remains fixed and cannot be destroyed without the consent of both parties’ for ‘as long as the marriage remains legally intact,’ with both parties continuing ‘to be seized of the whole, and the death of one merely results in the defeasance of the deceased spouse’s coextensive interest in the property.’ (V.R.W. Inc. v. Klein, 68 NY2d 560 [1986].)”

Accordingly, by operation of law, the death of Erlinda, one of the spouses, resulted in that spouse/tenant no longer having an interest in the property, with Elpidio, as the surviving spouse, now owning her share as well as his own. Surrogate Holzman recognized the long-standing rule that “a severance of a tenancy by the entirety cannot be effectuated by the unilateral last will of one of the spouses alone.” (Matter of Strong, 171 Misc. 445 [1939].

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Credits:
Paar im Walde (1912). by artist August Macke (1887-1914).
Photo of Richard Klass by Tom Urgo, 2008.
Law firm business communications services provided by
The Innovation Works, Inc.

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copyr. 2010 and 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The Wrong Side of the Tracks Costs Law Firm $800,000

2011-02-01T15:20:00.001-05:00

The Long Island Railroad (LIRR) leased one of its old rail yards in Queens to a recycling company. One of the recycling company’s employees was working the late shift on a rainy evening in 2003. That rainy night, he was assigned the task of welding on a portion of the metal fence surrounding the yard with an acetylene torch. He got up on a ladder, climbed up several rungs, and started to weld. At that point, the injured worker got a shock from the welding equipment. The ladder then shifted in the mud and he fell to the ground, suffering severe injuries. Since that incident, he was unable to work, having become disabled, and having had several surgeries to his back and knee.

The injured worker hired a law firm to bring a personal injury claim against the owner of the yard under New York’s Labor Law Section 240 known as the “Scaffolding Law.” That law firm brought a petition to file notices of claim against the MTA (Metropolitan Transportation Authority) and the LIRR. The Supreme Court Justice dismissed the petition, indicating in his decision that, as to the MTA, the reason for the late notice of claim was not meritorious and, as to the LIRR, no notice of claim was needed and that the law firm merely needed to timely commence a lawsuit under New York’s Public Authority Law. Needless to say, the time within which the injured worker needed to commence the lawsuit against the LIRR had already passed by the time of that decision. The injured worker retained Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer to sue the personal injury law firm for legal malpractice.

Time-barred by the Statute of Limitations:

The concept of a “Statute of Limitations” is that people are afforded a certain amount of time to take action concerning a legal claim they may have; if that period of time passes without taking action, then the ability to pursue the legal claim has been waived. Most people are familiar, for instance, that in New York State the statute of limitations period within which to file most personal injury cases is three years from the date of accident. In this particular case, though, the Statute of Limitations period within which to sue the potentially liable parties was shorter (to a period of one year and thirty days) because the personal injury claim was against the LIRR, a governmental authority under a special statute.

Once the judge had dismissed the injured worker’s lawsuit, thus leaving him without recourse to recover monetary damages for his injuries, the law firm was exposed to the legal malpractice claim brought against it because it was alleged to have “blown” the statute of limitations by neglecting to timely file the lawsuit against the LIRR.

In legal malpractice cases, the statute of limitations in which to sue an attorney is three years from the date of malpractice under New York’s CPLR Section 214(6). Since many times in litigation, attorneys who have committed malpractice continue representing their clients for months or years afterward, there is also a concept of “continuous representation.” This means that the statute of limitations “clock” does not start to tick until the attorney has stopped representing the client in the matter.

Proving the underlying case under Labor Law Section 240:

A legal malpractice case is a very difficult type of litigation for one particular reason: Assuming that the lawyer ‘screwed up’ as much as possible, doing everything as wrong as could be done or failing to do any of the right things, it still might not matter — the ultimate question for purposes of liability for legal malpractice will be whether there was any merit to the underlying case that the lawyer was hired to handle. Rephrased: Would the client have won “but for” his lawyer?!

New York’s Scaffolding Law provides that owners of real estate, such as the LIRR, are “strictly liable” for injuries suffered by workers who fall from a ladder or scaffold under almost all circumstances, with limited exceptions, such as if there was a lack of adequate safety devices. This basically means that the landowner is responsible to pay for all of the worker’s damages for his injuries, including medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. An exception to holding the landowner strictly liable under the Scaffolding Law is where the injured worker is found to have been the “sole proximate cause” of his injuries. In this case, the law firm being sued for legal malpractice argued that, in the event the LIRR had been sued, the injured worker would not have prevailed anyway because this exception to the Scaffolding Law would have applied because he knew not to weld in the rain. In response, the injured worker claimed that his employer at the yard instructed him to weld in the rain and that he was not going to be insubordinate.

Separate and apart from the Scaffolding Law issue, the law firm argued that there was no proof of exactly where the fall occurred to establish that it happened on the LIRR’s property. In response, a surveyor was retained to survey the area surrounding the old rail (now recycling) yard, and Deeds dating back to the 1800s were obtained. These documents were produced to establish the legal ownership of the location where the fall took place. This was a necessary element of the case in order to prove that the LIRR would have been liable for injuries to workers on its property under the Scaffolding Law.

The legal malpractice case came up for a pre-trial conference. Attorneys Richard A. Klass and Stefano A. Filippazzo appeared at the conference on behalf of the injured worker. The law firm being sued for legal malpractice finally settled with the injured worker for $800,000 to settle the action and pay for his injuries and extensive medical lien.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2011 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Art credits: page one, Hjørring - Hirtshals Line in Northern Denmark. Photograph by Tomasz Sienicki, 2003.

The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Emergency and Expedited Legal Services

2011-01-14T13:24:00.000-05:00

The economic downturn has created situations where many clients may need Emergency and Expedited Legal Services.

If you, a friend or a family member has a legal emergency and time is of the essence, call immediately.

I will answer your questions and provide an initial consultation AT NO CHARGE.If you, or someone you know, is facing any of the following situations, it is imperative to quickly secure competent legal representation.

• Need to save the home.
• Need to avoid "fire-sale low-ball offers" on your real estate.
• Bankruptcy protection that considers your needs (Chapters 7, 11 and 13)
• Taking action when you or another homeowner has been lured into a foreclosure scam.
• Any other situation involving the sudden loss of real estate.

What Is a "Traverse" Hearing and Why Is It Important

2011-01-12T13:58:00.003-05:00

Recently, I had the opportunity to successfully represent a client at a traverse hearing in the Civil Court. This article will illustrate the purpose and effect of such a hearing.

A "traverse" is a hearing conducted by a judge to determine whether the defendant was properly served with the Summons in the action. The ultimate result of such a hearing will be a determination that either the defendant was properly served and, therefore, must answer the Complaint, or that the defendant was not properly served and the action is deemed dismissed. Sometimes, this is the critical part of a case, especially where the time to commence a new action against the defendant has passed by virtue of the applicable statute of limitations.

In PRA III LLC v. Weisel, I represented the defendant, who claimed that the first time he learned of the existence of the case was when he received a copy of the judgment from the plaintiff's counsel. Importantly, he claimed that he was never served with the Summons and Complaint by a "process server," or someone authorized to serve such papers. [A "process server" in particular is someone who serves more than five Summonses within a year].

At the hearing, the process server was called to testify about his prior affidavit where he claimed that he served the Summons upon my client. The process server indicated on the affidavit he posted the Summons on the outer door of the defendant's house, which may be permissible according to the statute. However, the defendant testified that he resided in the second floor apartment of a three-apartment house, and that the bells outside the common door are clearly marked with the occupants' names. Service by posting the Summons on the outside door was deemed insufficient in this situation.

The service was also challenged in two other ways, which proved successful:

Firstly, process servers are required to maintain a "log book," in which they note where and when they served process (or attempted to serve process unsuccessfully). Here, the process server's log book did not contain any entry for the date of the alleged service of process.

Secondly, the defendant resided on a block in Boro Park, Brooklyn, which the process server conceded was a heavily Sabbath-observant Jewish neighborhood. By law, service of process on a Saturday upon someone whom the process server knows or should know to be Sabbath-observant is deemed defective.

The end result of the traverse was that the service of the Summons was not sustained as valid, and the action was dismissed. Now, the plaintiff is required to commence a new action if it wants to attempt collection of the debt (perhaps with a more diligent process server!).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
"Your Court Street Lawyer"
Copyright 2005

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

License Information

What Is a "Traverse" Hearing and Why Is It Important by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words "reprint permission request" in the subject line of the email.

Publishing Guidelines

Permission is granted to publish this article electronically in free-only publications, like a website or ezine (print and non-free publications require permission) as long as the resource box is included without any modifications. All links must be active. A courtesy copy is requested on publication (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com).

Article Title:
What Is a "Traverse" Hearing and Why Is It Important

Article URL:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSWinter2005.html

Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com

Author's Firm's Website:
www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Word Count:
450 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]

* * *

Resource Box

Read the original article in context at:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSWinter2005.html

Additional articles by Mr. Klass may be found at: http://courtstreetlaw.com/articles/index.html.
Back issues from Mr. Klass' quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available at http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/index.html.
Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.

* * *

Obtaining Leave of Court to Submit Evidence in Reply Papers for ‘Good Cause Shown’

2010-12-23T09:00:00.005-05:00

In litigation, parties may bring motions for dismissal of the action or affirmative defenses, or move for ‘summary judgment’ (that there are no genuine issues of fact and the judge can decide the case on the law alone). Generally, the moving party puts forward all of its proof in support of its motion, including any affidavits, documents or photographs. The opposing party then puts forward all of its proof. At that point, it is inappropriate for either party to provide additional facts in reply papers, as courts want to give each party an opportunity to properly respond to the facts alleged in the original papers. It would otherwise be unfair.

Sometimes, however, additional facts or proof become necessary for various reasons. In that situation, the party seeking to provide additional proof must show “good cause” for having to do it.

Pursuant to binding Appellate Division, First and Second Department precedents, supplemental affirmations and/or sur-reply’s are permissible upon leave of the court with good cause shown, particularly where (1) the movant submits evidence for the first time in its reply papers or (2) “where the offering party's adversaries responded to the newly presented claim or evidence [citations omitted].” Kennelly v. Mobius Realty Holdings LLC, 33 A.D.3d 380, 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (1st Dep’t 2006); see Gastaldi v. Chen, 56 A.D.3d 420, 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d 750, 751 (2d Dep’t 2008) (“The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in considering the surreply of the plaintiffs, which was in response to the gap-in-treatment argument raised in the defendants' reply papers for the first time (see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raguzin, 12 A.D.3d 468, 469, 784 N.Y.S.2d 644).”); Hoffman v. Kessler, 28 A.D.3d 718, 719, 816 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (2d Dep’t 2006) (“Further, the court properly considered the affidavit of a medical expert submitted by the plaintiffs in reply papers because the defendants had an opportunity to respond and submit papers in sur-reply (see Guarneri v. St. John, 18 A.D.3d 813, 813-814, 795 N.Y.S.2d 462; Matter of Hayden v. County of Nassau, 16 A.D.3d 415, 416, 790 N.Y.S.2d 404; Basile v. Grand Union Co., 196 A.D.2d 836, 837, 602 N.Y.S.2d 30; Fiore v. Oakwood Plaza Shopping Ctr., 164 A.D.2d 737, 739, 565 N.Y.S.2d 799, affd. 78 N.Y.2d 572, 578 N.Y.S.2d 115, 585 N.E.2d 364, cert. denied 506 U.S. 823, 113 S.Ct. 75, 121 L.Ed.2d 40).”); Anderson v. Beth Israel Medical Center, 31 A.D.3d 284, 288, 819 N.Y.S.2d 241, 244 (1st Dep’t 2006); Traders Co. v. AST Sportswear, Inc., 31 A.D.3d 276, 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240-241 (1st Dep’t 2006) (“Defendants also belatedly submitted papers containing a security deposit argument without demonstrating good cause (CPLR 2214[c] ), which was improperly relied upon by the IAS Court (see Pinkow v. Herfield, 264 A.D.2d 356, 358, 695 N.Y.S.2d 20 [1999]).”).

Further binding Appellate Division, Second Department precedents hold that “[c]ontrary to the [movant’s] contention, the court did not err by considering the evidence in the [cross-movant’s] reply papers because it was submitted in direct response to allegations raised in their opposition papers [citations omitted].” Conte v. Frelen Associates, LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (2d Dep’t 2008); see Jones v. Geoghan, 61 A.D.3d 638, 639, 876 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (2d Dep’t 2009) (“Although the appellants expressly raised a defense based on the emergency doctrine for the first time in their reply papers, we may consider it on appeal. In the first instance, the defense was raised in direct response to the allegation made in the plaintiff's opposition papers that the decedent was struck by a van in motion, rather than thrown into the path of a stopped van (see Conte v. Frelen Assoc., LLC, 51 A.D.3d 620, 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d 258; Ryan Mgt. Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671; see also Kelsol Diamond Co. v. Stuart Lerner, 286 A.D.2d 586, 587, 730 N.Y.S.2d 218).”); Ryan Management Corp. v. Cataffo, 262 A.D.2d 628, 630, 692 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (2d Dep’t 1999) (“The defendant characterized the evidence in the reply papers as new evidence not properly before the court. Accordingly, the defendant argued, the court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendant. ...Because the evidence submitted by the plaintiff in its reply papers was in direct response to allegations raised by the defendant in his opposition papers, it was properly considered by the court.”).

In a recent action litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, the defendant submitted photographs of a sign with defendant’s reply affirmation, after plaintiff’s opposition and cross-motion had been submitted, as evidence that the entrance near a certain street, within 50-60 feet of which plaintiff had repeatedly testified his accident occurred, was located at another street, thousands of feet away. In his reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not in a sur-reply, plaintiff requested leave of this Honorable Court to submit (a) further photographs clearly depicting the entrance gate at the particular street indicated, with an identical sign about which he had been testifying, adjacent to which plaintiff testified his accident occurred in his EBT, as well as (b) a supplemental affidavit from plaintiff, authenticating these photographs as fair and accurate representations of the entrance about which he had testified. Accordingly, as the evidence (a) was submitted with a reply affirmation on his cross-motion, not a sur-reply, (b) plaintiff properly asked leave of the court to submit additional evidence in his reply on his cross-motion, in order to respond to the photograph submitted in defendant’s reply on the underlying motion, and (c) defendant has availed itself of the opportunity to respond thereto, this evidence is properly before this Honorable Court. See Gastaldi, 56 A.D.3d at 420, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 751; Conte, 51 A.D.3d at 621, 858 N.Y.S.2d at 260; Kennelly, 33 A.D.3d at 381-382, 822 N.Y.S.2d at 266; Traders Co., 31 A.D.3d at 277, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 240-241.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

-----------
copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Striking the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations in a Legal Malpractice Action

2010-12-17T09:00:00.003-05:00

When a former client sues his attorney for legal malpractice, the defendant-attorney/law firm will almost invariably put forward, as part of its defense of the law suit, the Affirmative Defense of Statute of Limitations. In New York State, the period in which an attorney may be sued (whether for a tort [civil wrong] or breach of contract) is generally three (3) years from the date of malpractice. If the client does not sue the attorney/law firm within the applicable Statute of Limitations period, then the case is “time barred” and may be dismissed as having been filed too late.

When the defendant attorney alleges in his Answer to the law suit that the action is barred by the Statute of Limitations, it is essential to deal with the issue as soon as practicably possible. One effective way is to make a motion to the trial judge to “strike” (or dismiss) the Affirmative Defense from the Answer. Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3211(b) provides that a party may move to strike an affirmative defense.

Affirmative Defense – Statute of Limitations:

In a recent case, the defendant law firm asserted the Affirmative Defense that the legal malpractice action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss the Affirmative Defense. The motion requested that this affirmative defense be stricken, since it was alleged that the plaintiff-injured person brought the action within the applicable three-year statute of limitations period, as specified in CPLR 214(6).

CPLR 214(6) provides that “an action to recover damages for malpractice, other than medical, dental or podiatric malpractice, regardless of whether the underlying theory is based in contract or tort” must be commenced within 3 years.

The cause of action for malpractice accrues at the time of the act, error or omission. See, Julian v. Carrol, 270 AD2d 457 [2d Dept. 2000]; Goicoechea v. Law Offices of Stephen Kihl, 234 AD2d 507 [2d Dept. 1996]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, 96 NY2d 164 [2001].

In the recent case, the allegation of legal malpractice against the defendant law firm was that there was a ‘blown’ statute of limitations because the law firm did not timely sue the potentially liable party. In that situation, the New York State Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) has held that a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues against the attorney when the statute of limitations expires on the underlying action for which the attorney was retained. See, Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. In Burgess v. Long Island Railroad Authority, 79 NY2d 777 [1991], the Court of Appeals held:

A person has one year from the date a claim accrues to commence an action against a public authority such as LIRR (Public Authorities Law §1276(2). The complaint must contain an allegation that at least 30 days have elapsed since the authority was presented with a demand or claim and that the authority has neglected or refused to adjust or pay the claim. This “stay” of 30 days is not counted as part of the limitations period and the plaintiff therefore may serve a complaint at any time up to one year and 30 days after the claim has accrued.

In the case, the plaintiff’s incident was alleged to have occurred on June 4, 2003. According to Public Authorities Law §1276, an action would have to have been brought against the LIRR within one year and thirty days after the incident. The defendant law firm was alleged to have failed to timely do so and the time in which to do so passed on their ‘watch.’

The Continuous Representation Toll:

The accrual of the three-year statute of limitations is ‘tolled’ during the period of the lawyer’s continuous representation in the same matter out of which the malpractice arose under the theory that the client should not be expected to question the lawyer’s advice while he is still representing the client. See, Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, 166 AD2d 505 [2d Dept. 1990]; Shumsky v. Eisenstein, supra. Under the continuous representation doctrine, there must be clear indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing, and dependent relationship between the client and the lawyer. See, Kanter v. Pieri, 11 AD3d 912 [4 Dept. 2004]; Lamellen v. Kupplungbau GmbH v. Lerner, supra; Clark v. Jacobsen, 202 AD2d 466 [2 Dept. 1994].

In the case, the defendant law firm was alleged to have continuously represented the injured plaintiff up until August 2007, as represented by the proceedings brought on his behalf and the correspondence between the parties. Accordingly, the Statute of Limitations in which to sue the defendant law firm for legal malpractice for having missed the opportunity to have sued the proper party for the incident that resulted in the client’s injury started ticking when the law firm no longer represented him.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Asking the Court to Grant Partition and Sale of Jointly-Owned Property

2010-12-10T09:00:00.005-05:00

In a recent case, in which Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, represented one of three owners of real property asked the trial judge to grant ‘summary judgment’ against the other owners, granting his motion to partition and sell the real property at auction. In support of the motion, it was requested that the court grant partition and sale, in accordance with Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law [RPAPL] Article 9.

It was also requested that the court order the distribution of the net proceeds from the auction sale of the real property to the parties in one-third interests, along with crediting the plaintiff for the moneys paid at closing when the property was first purchased.

RPAPL Section 901 provides that one who holds an interest in real property as a tenant in common may bring an action against the other tenants-in-common for the partition or sale of the property. The action was brought by Plaintiff as a tenant-in-common against the other two owners. The Plaintiff had to prove the following:

A: Plaintiff is ‘seised’ with an interest in the Property:

In the action, there was no issue of fact that Plaintiff had a right to possession of the property as a co-tenant, which is all that is needed to maintain an action for partition and sale. See, Dalmacy v. Joseph, 297 AD2d 329 (2d Dept. 2002). He was one of the three owners of the property, as indicated on the face of the Deed.

Pursuant to RPAPL 915, it was requested that the court issue an Order determining the parties’ rights, shares, and interest in and to the property.

B: Physical partition would be prejudicial:

Then, the plaintiff had to show that the property could not be physically partitioned in order to sell the entire property as one. In that case, a physical partition of the house would not have been practical and without prejudice to the owners, given that it was a three story brownstone. See, e.g. Cheslow v. Huttner, 13 Misc.3d 1224(A) (Sup. Ct., NY Co. 2006) (physical partition of a townhouse would be greatly prejudicial to the owners); Donlon v. Diamico, 33 AD3d 841 (2d Dept. 2006) (plaintiff established her entitlement to summary judgment directing the sale of the property because partition alone could not be made without great prejudice to the owners).

Based upon RPAPL 915, where it would be prejudicial to the owners to physically partition the property, the court should direct the property to be sold.

C: Plaintiff should be credited for the down payment:

Since partition, although statutory, is equitable in its nature, the court may compel the parties to do equity between themselves when adjusting the proceeds of the sale. Oliva v. Oliva, 136 AD2d 611. It has been held that a court may consider, among its factors of considering the equities of the partition and sale action, the down payment made by a co-tenant. Perrin v. Harrington, 146 AD 292.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Plaintiffs Should Be Permitted to Amend the Complaint Pursuant to CPLR 3025

2010-12-03T18:07:00.002-05:00

Civil Practice Law and Rules [CPLR] Section 3025 authorizes the amendment of a pleading in an action, including the Complaint of the plaintiff. According to subsection (b) of CPLR 3025, leave of court is needed to amend a pleading once issue has joined; however, it should be freely given to a party.

New York courts have held that, in the absence of prejudice to the defendant, the amendment of a pleading should be freely granted by a court. See, Kushner v. Queens Transit, 97 AD2d 432 (2d Dept. 1983); Sotomayor v. Princeton Ski Outlet Corp., 199 AD2d 197 (1st Dept. 1993). It is also well established law that a motion to amend a pleading should be freely given absent a showing by an opposing party of surprise or prejudice. Zacher v. Oakdale Islandia Ltd. Partnership, 211 AD2d 712 (2d Dept. 1995); Santori v. Met Life, 11 AD3d 597 (2d Dept. 2004).

In a recent case litigated by Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, it was urged that, since the action had not been pending for a significant period of time, and was not on the eve of trial, no prejudice could be shown by defendants to the amendment of the Complaint. See, e.g., Kopel v. Chiulli, 175 AD2d 102 (2d Dept. 1991). Case law has held that delay in seeking to amend the Complaint does not bar such relief. Haven Associates v. Douro Realty Corp., 96 AD2d 526 (2d Dept. 1983).

Finally, Plaintiff provided the trial court with a copy of the proposed Amended Complaint to be served upon the defendants. See, Anderson Properties Inc. v. Sawhill Tubular Division Cyclops Corp., 149 AD2d 949 (4th Dept. 1989).

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Knocking Out Defenses Means They Don’t Get Up!

2010-11-16T08:00:00.005-05:00

The Executor of the estate of a man who owned a mixed-use building in Brooklyn sold it to someone for $700,000. As part of the sale, the Executor agreed to take back two mortgages on the property from the buyer in favor of the decedent’s wife, the beneficiary of the estate.

The buyer (and now building’s owner) defaulted on the mortgages by failing to make payments on them to the beneficiary/lender. At that point, the mortgagee turned to Richard A. Klass, Your Court Street Lawyer, for legal assistance to commence foreclosure proceedings on the two mortgages against the buyer.

Once the foreclosure proceeding was brought, the buyer served its “Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim.” In general terms, an “affirmative defense” is the legal term for when the defendant in a lawsuit puts forth the reason he is not liable to the plaintiff.

The First Affirmative Defense was that the Summons and Complaint were not properly served upon the defendant according to law, so the court lacked jurisdiction over the person. The Second Affirmative Defense and the Counterclaim alleged that the buyer was coerced into buying the property, having known the decedent and his family for 15 years. The defendant claimed that the conditions of the premises were concealed from it by the plaintiff and it did not have an opportunity to inspect the premises prior to the sale. As a result, the defendant claimed that there exists a defective foundation and water seepage into the basement.

Strike First!

Both federal and state court procedural rules allow for parties to a lawsuit to make requests of the judge to deal swiftly with certain claims or defenses of a litigant. These requests are called “Pre-Answer Motions to Dismiss.” In essence, the party is claiming that the claim or defense has no legal merit whatsoever for a number of reasons and, therefore, that matter should not even proceed forward in the case.

Upon receipt of the Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, Your Court Street Lawyer brought a Pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss the defenses of the defendant (buyer of the building). This Motion challenged the legitimacy of these defenses.

Good service of process:

Attached to the motion papers was a copy of the Affidavit of Service of the Summons and Complaint upon the defendant from a licensed process server. New York law has traditionally held that a process server’s affidavit ordinarily constitutes “prima facie” [at first sight] evidence of proper service. National Heritage Life Insurance Company v. T.J. Properties Co., 286 AD2d 715 [2 Dept. 2001]. A defendant can rebut the process server’s affidavit with a ‘detailed and specific contradiction of the allegations in the process server’s affidavit’ sufficient to create a question of fact warranting a traverse hearing (citing to Bankers Trust Co. of California v. Tsoukas, 303 AD2d 343 [2 Dept. 2003]). However, in this case, the defendant did not deny the process server’s allegations in an affidavit, but only in the attorney’s affirmation (which has no evidentiary value). Also, the defendant failed to timely move to dismiss the case within the 60-day period in which a defendant must move to dismiss on this ground (see, Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 3211(e).

No concealment charges against the Mortgagee:

The mortgagee asked the Judge to dismiss the Second Affirmative Defense and Counterclaim that the buyer was not given the opportunity to inspect the premises before purchase, and thus, should not have to pay the mortgages. The building was sold by the executor of the estate of the deceased person but the mortgages delivered at the closing were in favor of another family member, the beneficiary of the property under the Last Will and Testament.

Using the pre-Answer Motion to Dismiss, the mortgagee pointed out to the judge that the defenses were not permitted because they were directed against the estate, as opposed to the beneficiary of the property. Thus, under Civil Practice Law and Rules Section 3211(a)(6), the claim could not be maintained even though in the form of a counterclaim because it could not properly be asserted against the beneficiary. The Judge noted that the buyer did not join the seller of the property (the estate) as a party and could not bring the claims it was claiming in its defense.

In granting the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss, the Judge held that the defenses and counterclaim of the defendant should be properly dismissed. Kodsi v. 115 Bay Ridge Ave. LLC, Sup. Ct., Kings Co. Index No. 33740/2008, 6/28/2010.

It is very important that, upon receiving an Answer to a lawsuit from a defendant, the plaintiff immediately review the Answer to determine the nature of any defenses and counterclaims, as well as decide whether to ask the judge to “knock ‘em out” right away instead of waiting until trial.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.
"Your Court Street Lawyer"

Honors and Appointments

2010-11-13T19:48:00.001-05:00

We are pleased to announce that Richard A. Klass was recently appointed to Co-Chair of the Publications Committee of the New York State Bar Association's General Practice Section, as well as Co-Editor of One on One, the publication of the General Practice Section.

-----------
copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale

2010-10-05T15:17:00.003-04:00

Typically, the sale of real estate involves the signing of a contract of sale between the owner of the real estate and the prospective buyer for a certain dollar amount. Each side is eager to close the transaction -- the seller wants the money from the closing to purchase another property and the buyer wants to move into the house.

Sometimes, the seller/owner of the real estate attempts to delay or cancel the contract of sale for various reasons, including that another party has come along offering more money to purchase the property than the contract price. The buyer is put into a position of bringing an action to enforce his/her rights under the contract of sale to purchase the property.

The right of the prospective buyer to bring an action for "specific performance" is an important one, which is based upon an old, "common law" theory that real estate is considered a "unique asset," for which a money judgment against the seller for breach of contract cannot recompense. The courts recognize that a certain piece of real estate cannot be replicated or replaced with another or with money.

The action to force the sale of real estate based upon a breach of contract starts with the filing of a Complaint with the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located. At or about the same time, the buyer will file a "Notice of Pendency" with the County Clerk. The "Notice of Pendency" or, as commonly known as the "Lis Pendens," is a document which serves as notice to the entire world that the buyer is laying an equitable claim to the ownership of the property and that an action is pending to determine the buyer's potential ownership rights therein. Any person who later contracts to purchase the property is effectively "on notice" of the buyer's claim and is taking substantial risk in proceeding in any transaction with the seller/owner of the real estate.

After the action is filed, the seller will have an opportunity to answer the Complaint. Then, typically, one of the parties will move for "summary judgment," asking the judge to decide whether there was a breach of the contract of sale and whether the buyer is indeed entitled to the specific performance of the contract of sale. If the judge decides that the buyer is entitled to purchase the property, then the judge will issue an Order directing the seller/owner to proceed to closing and tender a Deed to the buyer.

It is important for the prospective buyer to move quickly to file the Notice of Pendency when it appears that a breach of the contract of sale has or will occur, in order to ensure that there is constructive notice of the action for specific performance; otherwise, the buyer, albeit entitled to money damages, will no longer have the right to the property.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

-----------
copyr. 2004 and 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

License Information

Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words "reprint permission request" in the subject line of the email.

Publishing Guidelines

Permission is granted to publish this article electronically in free-only publications, like a website or ezine (print and non-free publications require permission) as long as the resource box is included without any modifications. All links must be active. A courtesy copy is requested on publication (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com).

Article Title:
Bringing an Action for Specific Performance of a Real Estate Contract of Sale

Article URL:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2004.html

Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com

Author's Firm's Website:
www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Word Count:
481 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]

* * *

Resource Box

About the Author:
Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Read the original article in context at:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2004.html

Additional articles by Mr. Klass may be found at: http://courtstreetlaw.com/articles/index.html.
Back issues from Mr. Klass' quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available at http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/index.html.
Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.

* * *

Announcing a Special Public Seminar on Bankruptcy

2010-09-22T17:20:00.004-04:00

Bankruptcy Basics: a primer for the public
Moderated by Richard A. Klass

October 19, 2010
6 - 8 pm

Brooklyn Bar Association Meeting Hall
123 Remsen Street, Brooklyn Heights, New York

Topics will include:
1. Overview of the Bankruptcy Process
2. Differences between Chapter 7 (Liquidation) and Chapter 13 (Reorganization)
3. What to Expect at the Meeting of Creditors
4. The Automatic Stay: the Bankruptcy Law's "Stop Sign"
5. Discharging Debts (and what is not dischargeable)
6. Questions and Answers

Moderator:
Richard A. Klass

Speakers:
Hon. Elizabeth S. Stong
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York

David J. Doyaga, Sr.
Doyaga & Schaefer

Mary Fox
Pro Se Bankruptcy Law Clerk
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of New York

Light refreshments will be served.

To reserve a seat and for more information,
please contact:
Avery Eli Okin, Esq., CAE
E-mail: aokin@brooklynbar.org
Phone: (718) 624-0675

Directions:
By Subway:
2, 3, 4 or 5 to Borough Hall
A, C or F to Jay Street
M or R to Court Street

This program is a joint presentation of:
The Brooklyn Bar Association, The Brooklyn Bar Association Foundation, Inc., The Brooklyn Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Project, Inc., and the Brooklyn Bar Association Lawyer Referral Service.

This program does not provide CLE credit.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The Significance of "ECF" [Electronic Case Filing] in the Courts

2010-09-01T08:00:00.007-04:00

The above headline seems a strange topic for this blog. It does not address a particular area of law, or seem to relate to most people other than lawyers. However, this is not so, and is an important development of which the general public should be aware.

Only until a couple of years ago, the "modus operandi" of various activities relating to a court case, ranging from filing the initial papers to researching archived files, was to make a trip to the actual courthouse. That traditional courthouse is rapidly being replaced with the "virtual" courthouse.

The general process is that documents are uploaded from an attorney's computer (typically in "Adobe" format) to the court's server for electronic filing. Once uploaded, the file becomes a part of the court's case file. The court also provides a manner in which people who either do not have a computer or do not have internet access can either deliver a diskette to the clerk or scan documents into terminals at the courthouse.

For security purposes, each attorney is given a password to permit access. That access password must be protected, as it is treated the same as an attorney's signature.

In 2003, when I first wrote this article, Electronic Case Filing had begun to be used as the only method filing in several New York area courts, including the Bankruptcy Courts, the federal District Courts, and a pilot project in a couple of New York State Supreme Courts.

ECF has significant benefits for various interested parties:

1. The courthouse eliminates almost all paper storage of files, along with court personnel associated with file handling.

2. Files or papers will not be lost, misplaced, or destroyed; unfortunately, these problems have been routine occurrences.

3. Attorney and non-attorney filers are able to file documents at any time, even when the courthouse is closed.

4. The public is able to view any filed document in an electronic case file at any time and from any place.

5. Judges are able to easily review documents.

The ability to view documents online from anywhere is probably the most important part of the ECF evolution. The instantaneous viewing of documents can be a tremendous advantage in making decisions. For instance, the viewing of a debtor's bankruptcy petition online moments after it is filed can afford a creditor sufficient time to determine whether to discharge or whether its claim has been properly listed. Further, the creditor may obtain information on property co-owned by the debtor with a non-filing party. Another example is that ECF access provides the opportunity to verify information given by a credit applicant.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2003 and 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

New Property Registration System Helps New York City Owners

2010-08-17T10:00:00.006-04:00

Last month, New York City went operational with its new “Notice of Recorded Document” System, as part of ACRIS [Automated City Register Information System]. As many people are already aware, several years ago, New York City started electronic recordation of deeds, mortgages, and other types of instruments pertaining to real estate, including buildings, houses, condominiums and cooperative apartments. ACRIS was designed to make these recorded instruments easily accessible to the public.

Now, the City Register has taken the ACRIS program a significant step forward, by introducing the Notice of Recorded Document System. The system allows users to log in at http://a836-acris.nyc.gov/nrd/ and register with the website. Registrants are limited to those with an interest in the subject property, such as owners, lienors, managing agents and executors/administrators.

The user can register to receive notification by email or text of any instrument recorded against the subject property. This may be very useful in preventing deed theft, mortgage fraud or loss of interests in the property.

Partial screen of the new "Notice of Recorded Document" System,

part of ACRIS, at http://a836-acris.nyc.gov/nrd/ .

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The $1.2 Million Shopping Disaster

2010-08-10T10:31:00.007-04:00

At her local supermarket, a shopper bought her groceries and started to walk out the front door of the market with her cart. As she walked out, the entire door at the exit came unhinged from the frame and slammed down on her. The door managed to slice off the rear portion of her leg, taking out part of her calf. The result was a painful ordeal, requiring extensive medical treatment.

The shopper decided to retain Richard A. Klass, “Your Court Street Lawyer,” to pursue her claim for personal injuries based upon the negligence of the supermarket. An action was brought in the Supreme Court, Kings County against the supermarket, alleging negligence for the fallen door.

Res Ipsa Loquitur:

The Latin term “Res Ipsa Loquitur” means the “thing speaks for itself.” It refers to the legal principle that a court may infer negligence when the nature of the accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen without negligence. In New York, the general rule is that an injured party can establish this claim against the defendant/liable party by proving three elements:

1. The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;

2. It must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and

3. It must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.

Dermatossian v. New York City Transit Authority, 67 NY2d 219 [1986].

The circumstances of this injury fit well within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. It certainly could be said that doors to supermarkets do not completely come unhinged without negligence.

Structured Settlement:

On the eve of trial, the defendant was eager to settle the case, given the likelihood that a charge of res ipsa loquitur would be given. The parties discussed settlement in terms of a “structured settlement,” which would allow the defendant’s insurance carrier to pay less money but would maximize the money for the injured shopper.

Structured settlements are those where the settling party purchases an insurance product, typically an annuity policy, that pay the injured person a certain amount of moneys per year over a certain number of years. The benefit for the settling party is the payment of a reduced present-value amount for the policy instead of a higher lump-sum payment. It can also be attractive to an injured person since it will generally be guaranteed tax-free income payable over a period of years and allow for settlement of the claim instead of the risk of losing at trial.

The injured shopper settled the case with the defendant supermarket for $1.2 million, with a structured settlement, which will provide her with sufficient income for a very long time.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Art credits: Anatomy of the Human Body (Figure 438). 1918, by Henry Gray (1825–1861)

copyr. 2010 Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The Importance of Saving Proof of Payment

2010-07-19T15:41:00.005-04:00

In 1994, tax payments were made to the NYC Department of Finance for several parcels of real property by a client. In 2001, unbeknownst to the client, the Department of Finance unilaterally reversed the payments made, added interest, created tax liens, and bundled up the liens for public auction sale.

My firm commenced an action against the City of New York in 2002, after learning of the tax lien sales, to declare that the payments made in 1994 had truly been made, and that the Department of Finance acted without authority in reversing the credits. Luckily for the client, he saved the receipts issued by the Department of Finance when he made the payments in 1994 (which receipts are stamped onto the tax bills and actually given to the taxpayer).

The case culminated with the City of New York agreeing to reverse all of the unauthorized charges in 2001, reversing the tax lien sales, and clearing the tax delinquencies on the client's account. A Win!What does this teach? The importance of retaining proof of payment in various situations. Here, proof of payment was crucial in winning the case.

Common proofs of payment include a check or credit card statement, showing that the bill was paid. Other forms of proof may be a store receipt, credit card receipt, or paid invoice. If cash is tendered, a signed receipt should be obtained.

The general rule of thumb is that most business records should be maintained for safekeeping for seven years. Many advocate saving records for much longer, if feasible given space considerations.

The ability to prove payment of a debt or bill comes in handy in various situations, including:

1. Many parents pay the custodial parent their child support payments by cash; sometimes, the custodial parent has kept poor records, and will allege non-payment. The burden of proving payment will fall upon the person charged with making the support payments.

2. Distribution companies, such as food wholesalers, will have the drivers pick up payments at the time of making delivery of goods. The driver may not account for the payments, and the store will be forced to show payment of the invoices.

3. Tenants of smaller rental buildings or two-family houses will pay the landlord (who generally lives at the building) by cash and fail to obtain a rent receipt. Afterwards, the landlord may commence an action for non-payment in the Housing Court, and the tenant will be without proof of payment of the rent.

Since the general burden of proof of payment falls upon the person liable for the same, it is critical that proof be obtained at the first instance and maintained. This will ensure that later mistakes or intentional denials of payment are disproved.

— by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction

2010-05-26T10:12:00.010-04:00

Almost every parcel of real property within New York City is assessed taxes on an annual basis. When these real estate taxes are not paid, tax liens are created by law which "attach" to the property. The tax lien, similar to other liens, serves as notice to the public that the City has a claim against the property. Traditionally, New York City was enabled by statute to bring "in rem" proceedings to foreclose on the lien and, thus, become the owner of the property.

In 1996, New York City's Administrative Code was amended to include an article permitting the City to sell at auction these real estate tax liens. This was done partly to shift the administrative burden of collecting the tax liens outside of the City's system; it was also partly done to get the City immediate money from the sale of the liens from third parties.

The change of process from "in rem" proceedings to the sale of tax liens, affects owners of real property against which tax liens exist in important ways:

1. Unlike in the past, where the City may have been perceived as almost lethargic in collecting the tax arrears, this new process motivates the purchaser of the tax lien to immediately take action to collect on the lien, including the bringing of a foreclosure action in the Supreme Court in the county in which the property is located.

2. The statute gives the purchaser of the tax lien a high rate of interest on the tax lien until paid, plus an award of reasonable attorney's fees and expenses for the prosecution of the foreclosure action.

3. Once the tax lien is sold, it is removed from the records of the City. Unless the homeowner inspects the tax lien records in the City Register's office, the tax lien information will not appear on the owner's tax bill. This may cause confusion, with the assumption that no older tax arrears are due.

Prior to the sale of a tax lien, the City is required to provide notice to the owner of the subject property and to the public. The owner will be sent notice by mail at the registered address for such owner (which, in some cases, may be different than the property's address). The public will receive notice by virtue of advertisements of the sale published in newspapers.

Once the tax lien is sold, the purchaser will send notification to the owner of the property. Further, the purchaser will afford the owner the opportunity to satisfy the lien prior to the commencement of a foreclosure action. In the event that payment is not made, a foreclosure action will be commenced for the unpaid tax arrears as indicated in the tax lien, along with a request for interest and attorney's fees. After a Judgment of Foreclosure is entered, the property will be auctioned off to first satisfy the lien and, then, to pay off junior lienors. Any surplus moneys left over will be turned over to the owner of record.

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This article was originally published in the legal newsletter LawCURRENTS.

The firm's website: CourtstreetLaw.com

Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

License Information

The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction by Richard A. Klass, Esq. is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License. For permissions beyond the scope of this license, please contact Mr. Klass (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com). Insert the words "reprint permission request" in the subject line of the email.

Publishing Guidelines
Permission is granted to publish this article electronically in free-only publications, like a website or ezine (print and non-free publications require permission) as long as the resource box is included without any modifications. All links must be active. A courtesy copy is requested on publication (email: RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com).

Article Title:
The Sale of New York City Tax Liens at Auction

Article URL:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2003.html

Author Name:
Richard A. Klass, Esq.

Contact Email Address:
RichKlass@CourtStreetLaw.com

Author's Firm's Website:
www.CourtStreetLaw.com

Word Count:
504 words

[This resource box must be included in any publications.]

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Resource Box

About the Author:
Richard A. Klass, Esq. maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 29th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York. He may be reached by phone at (718) COURT-ST [(718) 268-7878)] or RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Read the original article in context at:
http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/LawCURRENTSSpring2003.html
Additional articles by Mr. Klass may be found at: http://courtstreetlaw.com/articles/index.html.
Back issues from Mr. Klass' quarterly newsletter, Law CURRENTS are available at http://courtstreetlaw.com/newsletters/index.html.

Articles from Law CURRENTS may be available for reprint. Please see individual articles for license information.

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