Wednesday, July 25, 2012

Continuing Wrongs Doctrine and the Statute of Limitations

"This Action Is Not Barred By the Statute of Limitations"
"This action is not barred by the statute of limitations, and should be permitted to proceed. As laid out in the Complaint, there have been a series of wrongs on the part of Defendants, over the course of years, which establish their bad faith and lack of fair dealing with Plaintiff. Based upon the continuing wrongs, the causes of action were properly brought within the statute of limitations period."
Breach of fiduciary duty may constitute a continuing wrong that “is not referable exclusively to the day the original wrong was committed.” Kaymakcian v. Board of Managers of Charles House Condominium, 49 AD3d 407, 854 NYS2d 52 [1 Dept. 2008]  (denying dismissal of the breach of fiduciary duty claim as time-barred where board had a continuing duty to repair leaks in building’s limited common elements); 1050 Tenants Corp. v. Lapidus, 289 AD2d 145, 146, 735 NYS2d 47 [1 Dept. 2001].

The continuing wrong doctrine applied to breach of fiduciary duty limits monetary damages to three years from the commencement of the action. See Kaufman v. Cohen, 307 AD2d 113, 118, 760 NYS2d 157 [1 Dept. 2003]; CPLR 214[4].

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

Ownership of Property among Two Sets of Spouses

"Rodriguez’s Right to 50% of the Property Was Created by Operation of Law"

In this case, the Deed to the subject real property indicated ownership of the property as follows:

“GILBERTO HERNANDEZ and CONSOLACION HERNANDEZ, HIS WIFE … AND ERLINDA QUE and ELPIDIO RODRIGUEZ, HER HUSBAND.”

As to the 50% interest in the property owned by movant  Elpidio Rodriguez and his wife, Erlinda Que, they owned their share as tenants by the entirety. Based upon the substantial case law in New York State, Mr. Rodriguez and Erlinda Que took ownership of their half-share as husband and wife, have continued as such until Erlinda Que’s death.

In Prario v. Novo, 168 Misc.2d 610 (Sup. Ct., Westchester Co. 1996), the court held that a grant of real property to a husband and wife creates a tenancy by the entirety “unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy or tenancy in common.”  Estates, Powers and Trusts Law § 6-2.2(b). A joint tenancy is subject to partition during the lifetimes of the joint tenants (24 N.Y.Jur.2d, Cotenancy and Partition, § 33; 3A Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Partition, § 3.03; id., vol. 2A, Joint Tenants, § 4.01) whereas a tenancy by the entirety cannot be divided absent consent of both spouses or upon a divorce (24 N.Y.Jur.2d, Cotenancy and Partition, §§ 38, 56; 3A Warren's Weed, op. cit., Partition, § 3.12) The tenancy by the entirety can be changed by voluntary act of the couple, divorce or death.

In Goldman v. Goldman, 95 NY2d 120 (2000), the Court of Appeals noted that a tenancy by the entirety is a form of real property ownership available only to parties married at the time of the conveyance (Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d 203, 207, 401 N.Y.S.2d 47, 371 N.E.2d 809). As tenants by the entirety, both spouses enjoy an equal right to possession of and profits yielded by the property (Neilitz v. Neilitz, 307 N.Y. 882, 122 N.E.2d 924). Additionally, “each tenant may sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber his or her rights in the property, subject to the continuing rights of the other” (V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 68 N.Y.2d 560, 565, 510 N.Y.S.2d 848, 503 N.E.2d 496). Only if the legal relationship between the husband and wife is judicially altered through divorce, annulment or legal separation, does the tenancy by the entirety converts to a tenancy in common (Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d, supra, at 207, 401 N.Y.S.2d 47, 371 N.E.2d 809).

Courts have recognized that a tenancy by the entirety cannot be altered without the mutual consent of the spouses or divorce. In Sciacca v. Sciacca, 185 Misc.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co. 2000), the court held that: “As articulated by the Court of Appeals in Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d 203, 401 N.Y.S.2d 47, 371 N.E.2d 809, a court cannot direct the disposition of property held by married couples as tenants by the entirety until the court first alters the marital status, such as by entering a judgment of divorce or separation. Indeed, the law is long-settled that neither entirety tenant may, without the consent of the other, dispose of any part of the property to defeat the right of survivorship.” Citing to Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N.Y. 306, 39 N.E. 337.)

The Court of Appeals held, in Hiles v. Fisher, 144 NY 306 (1895), that the husband had a right to mortgage his interest, which was a right to the use of an undivided half of the estate during the joint lives, and to the fee in case he survived his wife; and by the foreclosure and sale the plaintiff acquired this interest, and became a tenant, in common with the wife, of the premises, subject to her right of survivorship.

Revisiting this issue, in V.R.W., Inc. v. Klein, 68 NY2d 560 (1986), the Court of Appeals held:
What makes this right of survivorship unique and differentiates it from the right of survivorship inherent in an ordinary joint tenancy is that it remains fixed and cannot be destroyed without the consent of both spouses (see, Kahn v. Kahn, 43 N.Y.2d 203, 401 N.Y.S.2d 47, 371 N.E.2d 809; compare, Matter of Polizzo, 308 N.Y. 517, 127 N.E.2d 316; Matter of Suter, 258 N.Y. 104, 179 N.E. 310, with Matter of Klatzl, supra, 216 N.Y. at pp. 86-87, 110 N.E. 181; Hiles v. Fisher, supra). As long as the marriage remains legally intact, both parties continue to be seized of the whole, and the death of one merely results in the defeasance of the deceased spouse's coextensive interest in the property (see, Stelz v. Shreck, supra, 128 N.Y. at p. 266, 28 N.E. 510; Bertles v. Nunan, supra, at p. 156). Similarly, involuntary partition is not available to either cotenant as a means of severing the tenancy by the entirety, since a contrary rule would permit a vindictive or irresponsible spouse to deprive the other of the comforts of the marital home (see, Kahn v. Kahn, supra, 43 N.Y.2d at p. 208, 401 N.Y.S.2d 47, 371 N.E.2d 809; Anello v. Anello, 22 A.D.2d 694, 253 N.Y.S.2d 759; Vollaro v. Vollaro, 144 App.Div. 242, 129 N.Y.S. 43).
Accordingly, the ownership interests of Mr. Rodriguez and Erlinda Que as “husband and wife” created a tenancy by the entirety. Upon the death of his wife, Mr. Rodriguez became the owner of her share by operation of law; any Last Will and Testament of Erlinda Que would not alter his rights.

Long-established New York law is that real property held as tenants by entirety does not pass under the Will of a decedent spouse. In re Rothko’s Estate, 77 Misc.2d 168 [Sur. Ct., NY Co. 1974]; In re Strong’s Will, 171 Misc. 445 [Sur. Ct., Monroe Co. 1939] (“A severance of a tenancy by the entirety cannot be effected by the unilateral last will of one of the spouses alone.” Citing to Levenson v. Levenson, 229 AD 402 [2 Dept. 1930]).

On the death of the first tenant by the entirety of real property, his estate ceases to have any interest in such property. Matter of Harris’ Estate, 88 Misc.2d 60 [1976], affirmed 61 AD2d 881.

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

The Defense of Equitable Estoppel

There is a concept in the law that one party should not be allowed to lead another party down a road, knowing full well that it is the wrong road, only later to say “a-ha” and attempt to take advantage of the other party. Where one party claims that the other has breached a contract, there may be the availability of the defense of “equitable estoppel.” The term “estoppel” refers to “stopping” someone from taking a certain position that differs from a prior position--and “equitable” refers to that certain degree of fairness that is expected of people.

In the Matter of N.Y. State Guernsey Br. Co-op v. Noyes, 260 AD 240, modified on other grounds, 284 NY 197, the court laid out the essential elements of an equitable estoppel claim, as follows: (1) As related to the party to be charged: (a) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts; (b) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts; and (2) As related to the party claiming the estoppel: (a) lack of knowledge; (b) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (c) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.

In the broad context of contracts,

In Ferlazzo v. Riley, 278 NY 289 (1938), the Court of Appeals pointed out that the contract rights of a mortgagee will be enforced in the absence of waiver, estoppel, bad faith, fraud, oppressive or other unconscionable conduct on its part.

In Caspert v. Anderson Apartments, 196 Misc. 555 (Sup. N.Y. Co. 1949), the court opined: “It may be unconscionable, however, to insist upon adherence to the letter of an agreement where a mortgagee indicates by his conduct or silence that his inaction may turn to his own advantage.”

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

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copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.

Wednesday, July 4, 2012

Summary Judgment Denied When Discovery Pending

Summary judgment should be denied where it appears that relevant evidence needed to oppose the motion is within the exclusive knowledge of the movant, and the opposing party has not had a reasonable opportunity for disclosure prior to the motion for summary judgment. See CPLR 3212(f) (motion for summary judgment should be denied where it appears that facts essential to the motion exist but cannot then be stated due to the absence of discovery). See also, Logan v. City of New York, 148 AD2d 167 [1 Dept. 1989]; Simpson v. Term Industries, 126 AD2d 484 [1 Dept. 1987].

Finally, the failure of a movant to comply with discovery demands may justify the denial of the summary judgment motion. See Jones v. Town of Delaware, 251 AD2d 876 [3 Dept. 1998]. This is especially so where the information sought in the pending discovery demand is clearly specified and relevant to the issues raised by the motion, the motion should be denied. Campbell v. City of New York, 220 AD2d 476 [2 Dept. 1995]; Elliot v. County of Nassau, 53 AD3d 561 [2 Dept. 2008] (A party should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery prior to the determination of a motion for summary judgment).

by Richard A. Klass, Esq.

-----------
copyr. 2012 Richard A. Klass, Esq.
The firm's website: www.CourtStreetLaw.com
Richard A. Klass, Esq., maintains a law firm engaged in civil litigation at 16 Court Street, 28th Floor, Brooklyn Heights, New York.
He may be reached at (718) COURT-ST or e-ml to RichKlass@courtstreetlaw.com with any questions.
Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome.